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Globally, an increasing number of people are confronting accelerating ecological threats, 
including the unprecedented spectre of climate catastrophe, one of the widely predicted 
manifestations of which is an increasing incidence of viral pandemics.  At the same time, broad 
social movements have recently emerged to combat increasing social inequality, gender-based 
oppression, police violence and systemic racism, and ongoing abrogation of the treaty rights and 
resources of indigenous peoples. 
 
A comprehensive effort to address ecological and social issues such as these—and the 
links between them—is the social ecology of Murray Bookchin. Bookchin formulated the 
philosophical basis of social ecology in the mid- to latter part of the previous century., 
emphasising that efforts fo dominate nature have arisen from a long and tragic history of the 
domination of humans by other humans.  
 
This thesis inquires whether the theoretical formulation of social ecology is adequate to 
current challenges, especially those arising from anti-racist and anti-colonial theory and activism. 
In particular, can a dialectical naturalism that seeks to derive an ethics and a politics of 
confederated directly-democratic municipalities and communities from concepts of nature be 
justified, given the prevailing postmodern scepticism toward naturalising theory and toward the 
dialectic? 
 
My research looks at the theoretical bases of social ecology in non-reductive scientific 
investigation, and in a reading of natural evolution that attempts to ‘ecologise’ the Hegelian 
dialectic.  However, I draw primarily upon theoretical resources from an unexpected source in 
contemporary Continental philosophy rather than in the revolutionary tradition—the ‘new 
materialism’ of Catherine Malabou.  Ultimately, I argue that Malabou’s work—supplemented by 
that of key anti-racist and anti-colonial writers—offers ways to think through lacunae in social 
ecology theory so that Bookchin’s project may be relaunched (to borrow Malabou’s terminology) 
in a form more adequate to the challenges of our historical moment.  
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Introduction and Overview 
 
A primary concern associated with the widely acknowledged ecological crisis is the threat 
of climate catastrophe as a result of human-caused rapid climate change.  Evidence of the crisis 
includes disrupted food and water systems, increased threat of resource wars, rising sea levels 
and increased incidence of violent storm systems as ocean water warms, increased risk of viral 
pandemics, and acute loss of biodiversity and rapidly advancing desertification.1 This study 
emerged from the question of whether a social and economic system based entirely or exclusively 
on growth—a fundament of capitalism—can continue to expand against the limits of a finite 
earth. 
The accelerating ecological and climate crisis has encouraged a re-examination of an 
understanding of the political economy of nature, as well as a re-examination of the 
phenomenological location of nature between a subject that views nature outside of itself, and 
the objective status of a nature that is always the pre-existing groundwork of being and thus 
inseparable from the viewer. In this respect, this thesis has two conjoining aims: to search for an 
objective grounding for political action in a concept of nature; and to analyse historical and 
contemporary ideas of nature in the western philosophical-revolutionary tradition.   
As examined more closely in the next section and in Chapter 2 of this thesis, nature can be 
seen as separate from humanity, an element to be managed by technological means, existing 
within a modification or reform of institutional arrangements.  We may call this an 
“environmentalist” perspective.  Alternatively, we may attempt to view nature from a “biocentric” 
or “deep ecology” perspective, regarding humanity as just one species among many, with no 
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special rights or role other than limiting its encroachment on the rest of nature.  A third option is 
to see nature as constructed by human discourse and social practises, a signifier without definite 
referents other than projections of human desire, prejudice, or relations of power.   
This thesis holds that a fourth model—that of social ecology—offers a more fundamental 
and comprehensive response compared to these other three approaches to the ecological crisis.   
This fourth model addresses what has been called an ecological imperative in terms of 
overcoming the growth dynamic of capitalism in the context of finite resources, as well as an 
ethical imperative in terms of linking the achievement of an ecological society to opposition to 
systems of domination and oppression in society—an opposition to social hierarchies as such. 
Attempts to bring ecology explicitly and systematically into revolutionary thought include 
a variety of efforts, often broadly identified as ecosocialist, drawing on the work of Karl Marx.  
The thesis will focus instead on another voice that I argue needs to be brought prominently into 
the conversation, that of Murray Bookchin, for the development of social ecology.   The 
conversation I examine in this thesis highlights perspectives that Bookchin and many others in 
the revolutionary tradition have tended to disdain, that is, philosophical resources from 
contemporary Continental philosophy—especially the work of Catherine Malabou.   
In this moment of ecological crisis, it is time to examine Bookchin’s legacy.  After the 
publication of Post-Scarcity Anarchism in 1971, Bookchin’s social ecology began to gain 
widespread influence among US activists and commentators shaped by the New Left, anti-war 
movement, and counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s.  That influence began to wane in 
subsequent decades with the changing political climate ushered in by Reaganomics and 
neoliberalism.  During the late 1980s and 1990s, Bookchin became embroiled in heated polemics 
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with his deep ecology critics and later with academic critics such as John Clark,2 as well as with 
certain elements of anarchism in the US that Bookchin referred to as “lifestyle anarchists”.3 More 
recently, Bookchin’s social ecology has garnered renewed attention through a new angle: his role 
as a major inspiration for Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK).  Öcalan’s 
adoption of “confederal democracy” led to efforts to realise a social and political project that has 
become known as the Rojava movement, or simply, Rojava, thus demonstrating the far-reaching 
and enduring relevance of Bookchin’s political theory.4 
One way of framing this inquiry, then, would be to ask if social ecology as developed by 
Bookchin is adequate to the challenges of the current historical moment.  This thesis argues that 
social ecology’s philosophical basis in the writings of Bookchin, while enduringly important as a 
framework, requires critique and transformation in order to respond more fully to current 
demands of climate justice and anti-colonial activism.  The thesis thus addresses both theory and 
practise, emphasising the relevance of Bookchin’s argument for political praxis by drawing out 
and assessing some of the implications of my argument for activists, particularly in the final two 
chapters. 
Methodologically, I pursue a broad critical inquiry into social ecology. The inquiry involves 
several elements, including its ontological basis in a philosophy of nature; scientific support for 
its characterisation of nature and natural evolution; its epistemological arguments, or lack 
thereof; the adequacy of its dialectical approaches; its relation both theoretically and practically 
to issues of alterity and contingency; and the status and prospects for its political project.  I 
examine these in the context of current philosophical and theoretical discourse, the writings of 
Malabou in particular.  My three guiding questions are the following:  does the social ecology of 
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Murray Bookchin present a well-argued alternative to various forms of environmentalism, deep 
ecology, and social constructionism? How might certain aspects of his theory and approach be 
transformed by encounters with other schools of thought and thinkers, in the historical context of 
the early decades of the twenty-first century?  How does an analysis of the complex issues raised 
by such an inquiry contribute to a sufficient response to the threat of ecological devastation and 
to the ongoing deleterious effects of various intertwined systems of social domination and 
oppression? 
My aim is not towards a deconstruction of social ecology, but rather towards what 
Malabou refers to as a plastic reading.  As we shall see, Malabou’s strategic philosophical concept 
of plasticity derives initially from the way in which the subject in Hegel’s system can be said to 
anticipate and even create its “accidents”.  Plasticity thus refers to a capacity to receive, create, 
and annihilate form.  A plastic reading would be the form of a philosophical structure left after its 
deconstruction, one that would discover how the project of that philosophy might be relaunched. 
Ultimately, I argue that the new materialism associated with the work of Malabou offers 
philosophical resources that successfully address epistemological and ontological limitations in 
the understanding of nature in critical theory and social ecology, while preserving a 
deconstructive awareness as a counterforce to the potentially dogmatic and even authoritarian 
implications of theoretical closure.  Further, however, I argue that social ecology, with its 
“ecologised” Hegelian dialectical approach, offers a more adequately differentiated political 
theory of a radical democracy than do political approaches inspired by a social constructionist 
perspective, or by contemporary Continental philosophers to date.   
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In addition, I argue that creolization theory as advanced by Jane Anna Gordon and Lewis R. 
Gordon5 suggests a way to understand how a complex interplay of subject positions within the 
Global South and Global North might develop creative transformations of perspectives and 
identities in the process of moving towards what Bookchin, (drawing partly on Rousseau’s idea of 
the general will), terms a general interest.   I argue further that Linda Martín Alcoff’s The Future of 
Whiteness6 shows how the social identity of whiteness, currently mired in a toxic period of white 
nationalism in the US, a “nationalism” ironically with international sources of support, can be 
transformed towards a positive contribution to the radical democratic project envisioned by both 
social ecology and creolization theorists. 
Responding to the holism of Murray Bookchin’s social ecology, this study is broad-ranging, 
critically but sympathetically following the contours of Bookchin’s readings of natural and social 
history, ethical formulations, and political project.  I explore a number of lacunae and critical 
challenges to this project within the current intellectual and political climate, as these are 
increasingly shadowed by the larger threats evoked by the term “climate”.   My primary focus on 
addressing what I see as theoretical lacunae in social ecology, and on suggesting rather than 
spelling out a new form for social ecology, results in a project that may seem composed of 
disparate elements at times.  To counter this tendency, which results from the way I have 
structured the text, I have attempted to provide introductions, conclusions, and transitional 
comments that I hope provide a guiding thread to the overall argument. 
I have responded at various points to some of the major critiques of Murray Bookchin’s 
social ecology from John Clark.  As Sandra Harding has maintained, any viable notion of the 
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objective status of an argument means demonstrating the ability to respond fairly and adequately 
to one’s strongest critics.7 
This introduction provides an overview of my argument.  In the first chapter I briefly 
introduce a key aspect of Murray Bookchin’s social ecology—its thesis that the basis for an ethical 
approach to society and a new politics of confederated direct democracy can be drawn from a 
study of nature.  I then survey some general philosophical approaches to nature as presented by 
Kate Soper.8 I focus on what she defines as “nature-sceptical” approaches, that is, social 
constructivist views, primarily because these have not been as sufficiently addressed by social 
ecology theory as have views emerging from reformist environmentalism and deep ecology.   
I divide social constructionist views into two broad camps: those emerging from Marxism, 
and those emerging from deconstruction, and analyse instances of both.  Stephen Vogel’s Against 
Nature explores the “problem of nature” within Marxist theory, and offers an “ethics of the built 
world”.9 A struggle against a lumber company in British Columbia provides a case study of an 
approach informed by Derridean deconstruction.10 
The second chapter introduces the life and work of Murray Bookchin, followed by a 
presentation of Bookchin’s reading of nature and natural evolution in more detail, as well as his 
dialectical naturalism.  Subsequent chapters provide additional scientific support for some but 
not all of Bookchin’s assertions about nature, while arguing that his views require additional 
epistemological justification as well.  In addition, I assess the adequacy of Bookchin’s ecologised 
dialectic, and argue for the need to articulate more explicitly issues of gender, racism, and 
colonialism in relation to the ethics and politics of social ecology. 
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In the third chapter I examine the treatment of nature in Derrida’s study of Rousseau, 
partly in preparation for introducing Malabou’s New Materialism, which argues against the 
immateriality of the trace in Derrida, and attempts to reconnect Continental philosophy to life, 
conceived in biological and evolutionary terms. I then return to Murray Bookchin’s philosophy of 
social ecology, prefaced by a brief summary of the philosophical biology of Hans Jonas, an 
important influence on Bookchin’s thought.  I argue that Malabou’s work provides philosophical 
resources for social ecologists in thinking through some of the lacunae in social ecology with 
regard to a naturalist ontology, examined in Chapters 4 and 5.  In Chapter 6,  I argue that 
Malabou’s work can aid in opening social ecology to contingency and alterity in the dialectic, as 
well as in theory and practice in general.  In Chapter 7, I argue that the deconstructive efforts of 
Malabou can open social ecology ethics to transformation in the encounter with other thought, 
resulting in the possibility of a creolized social ecology that may expand its global impact.   
Social ecology offers coherent bases for an ethics-based political thought, a thought that 
can revive a revolutionary tradition mired in the limitations of Marxist categories, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, a Continental philosophy in reaction to Marxist dogmatism that remains 
insufficiently self-critical of its own limitations in attempting to find inspiration in sources such 
as Nietzsche and Heidegger.  The political and activist implications of social ecology are examined 
in Chapter 8.  Throughout all these conversations in this study continues the very material and 
“grounded” focus on ecological threats and responses, especially in the concluding chapter the 
potential role of the “soil carbon sponge”—highlighted by social ecologists—on reducing the 
threat of ecological and more specifically, rapid androgenic climate change-related catastrophe. 
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Notes to Introduction 
 
1. For scientific information and assessment of androgenic climate change there are, of course 
many sources.  Two recent assessments can be found at Michael E. Mann, Sonya K. Miller, 
Stefan Rahmstorf, Byron A. Steinman, and Martin Tingley, “Record Temperature Streak Bears 
Anthropogenic Fingerprint,” www.news.agu.org, American Geophysical Union, 10 August, 2017.  
Accessed 20 October, 2018; and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 91 
authors, “IPCC Press Release,” IPCC Press Office, 8 October, 2018.  Accessed 22 October, 2018.  
www.ipcc.ch. 
 
2. John P. Clark is Gregory F. Curtin Distinguished Professor in Humane Letters and the 
Professions as well as Professor of Philosophy and a member of the Environmental Studies 
faculty at Loyola University New Orleans, USA. He is the author of several books, including 
Anarchy, Geography, Modernity: The Radical Social Thought of Elisee Reclus (2004), and most 
recently, The Impossible Community: Realizing Communitarian Anarchism, 2013.  Clark, once a 
student and admirer of Murray Bookchin, has since become one of his staunchest critics. 
 
3. See Murray Bookchin, Social Anarchism vs. Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm (Chico, 
CA: AK Press, 1995). 
 
4. There are now many sources on Rojava.  The story of the connection between Rojava and 
Murray Bookchin is briefly told in the following chapter.  For a pessimistic assessment of the 
fate of the Rojava revolution in light of the US green-lighting of the Turkish see Kenan Malik. 
“Syria’s Kurds dreamt of a ‘Rojava revolution.  Assad will snuff this out.” 27 October, 2019 Oct. 
27, 2019.  Accessed 3 November, 2019. www.theguardian.com. 
 
5. See Lewis R. Gordon, What Fanon Said: A Philosophical Introduction to his Life and Thought (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2015; and Jane Anna Gordon, “Creolizing as the Transdisciplinary 
Alternative to Intellectual Legitimacy on the Model of the ‘“Normal Scientific” Community’ ‘, 
Quaderna, 3/(2015): 3. 
6. Linda Martín Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015). 
7. See Sandra Harding, Objectivity and Diversity: Another Logic of Scientific Research (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015). 
8. Kate Soper, What is Nature: Culture, Politics, and the Non-Human (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1995). 
 
9. Steven Vogel, Against Nature: The Concept of Nature in Critical Theory (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2006). 
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10. Noel Castree and Bruce Braun, eds., Social Nature: Theory, Practice and Politics (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 2001). 
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Chapter 1:  Capitalism and the Climate Crisis 
The claim that capitalism is fundamentally incompatible with an adequate response to the 
threat of climate catastrophe has gained increasing attention in recent years.  A recent report from 
Bios, an independent research institute based in Finland, concludes that we are entering a new era of 
profound challenge, as access to cheap, plentiful energy dries up and the effects of climate 
change take hold—and free market capitalism cannot dig us out. The report’s authors seek to move 
beyond the “either/or” question of capitalism or some other system; instead, they focus on the 
economic aspect rather than the cultural and political dimensions of capitalism.1 
One of the more prominent voices highlighting the need to confront unregulated 
capitalism radically is that of Naomi Klein.  In This Changes Everything,2 Klein critiques the model 
of “extractivism” which treats the environment as a waste dump, and debunks the “magical 
thinking” that underlies various geoengineering schemes, such as dimming the rays of the sun 
using sulphate-spraying helium balloons.  The risks of such mega techno-fixes, she argues, should 
be obvious.  Klein critiques various forms of climate denial, including corporate-promoted efforts, 
and the belief among political centrists that change can be gradual and painless; she insists the 
scope and depth of change requires confronting the growth imperative of capitalism.  She fails, 
however, to sketch an outline of an alternative economic, cultural, and political system, preferring 
to focus instead on local struggles against environmental devastation and exploitation.    
Another prominent voice is that of Jason Moore, whose writings move further towards the 
question of a viable alternative to capitalism, in some form of what may broadly be termed 
ecosocialism.  Moore critiques the notion of the Anthropocene, which suggests that the threat to 
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the natural world comes from an undifferentiated humanity, and suggests the term “capitalocene” 
as a critical provocation to this sensibility.  Even though some one hundred corporations are 
responsible for seventy percent of carbon dioxide emissions, corporate leaders emphasise what 
workers can do to reduce their carbon footprint through individual acts of consumerism.  This 
approach shifts attention from production, the source of most of the problem, to consumption.  
Though modernised societies have the technological means to decarbonise very quickly, finance 
capital seeks only short-term applications that maximise profit, not those that require longer 
term and more extensive transformation, such as rebuilding electrical grids to serve solar and 
other forms of clean energy.  Moore identifies capitalism as not simply an economic but also as a 
political and cultural system, one that continues to lose legitimacy because it no longer can 
promise the kind of development that leads to social well-being without increasing the 
devastation of the environment.  He calls for such changes as the integration of town and country, 
carbon-free transportation systems, and the transformation of banking and finance systems 
towards democratically-controlled accumulation funds.  Further, he notes the threat that ruling 
class forces will seek to impose authoritarian and military “solutions” to the climate crisis.3 
Indeed, a recent resurgence of right-wing responses to climate threats has emerged, 
including what may best be termed ecofascism.4 A recent article by Sam Adler-Bell in The New 
Republic highlights how ecofascism has become fashionable again on the far right.5 Adler-Bell 
briefly recounts the way in which German romantic writers such as Ernst Moritz Arndt and 
Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl synthesised nationalism and naturalism in the mid-nineteenth century.  
Their philosophy later inspired the Völkisch movement, a movement of German youth in the 
1920s and 1930s that celebrated the wholeness, purity, and plenitude of peasant life against its 
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opposite—the rootless urban Jew—and notably comprised a significant cultural milieu for the 
thought of Heidegger.  These movements continue to have impact today in examples of far-right 
racist acts of terrorism.  As Adler-Bell notes, the Christchurch shooter echoed Riehl, linking the 
“preservation of land” to the “preservation of cultural ideals and beliefs”.   His writings in turn 
inspired the El Paso shooter, who wrote, “If we can get rid of enough people, then our way of life 
can become more sustainable.”6 
In addition, Adler-Bell cites the Finnish deep ecologist Pentti Linkola, whose theories are 
increasingly popular with contemporary ecofascists, and who advocates for what has been 
termed “the politics of the armed life-boat”.  Linkola warns, “When the lifeboat is full, those who 
hate life will try to load it with more people and sink the lot.  Those who love and respect life will 
take the ship’s axe and sever the extra hands that cling to the sides”. 7  
Against these survivalist ideologies, Adler-Bell echoes Moore in his criticism not only of 
the far right but also of liberal environmentalists who blame “humankind” for the impending 
climate disaster, rather than ‘the multi-billion extractive industries and the carbon-spewing 
corporations of the Global North’. The only realistic and moral answer, he argues, is a global green 
new deal, brought about by an uprising of the “global working class”.8 
 
The resurgence of ecofascism underscores the importance of Murray Bookchin’s critique 
of the dangerous political implications of certain strands of deep ecology, as I recount in Chapter 
2 and in Chapter 4.  Moreover, the emerging awareness of the incompatibility of capitalism and 
the health of natural systems in the context of climate chaos—including human social, economic, 
cultural, and political systems—decisively underscores the contemporary relevance and 
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importance of his efforts to articulate a viable alternative to these systems that have led humanity 
to the brink of catastrophe. 
 
Shifting The Spectrum 
At a time when the political spectrum of mainstream discourse in the US and in many 
parts of the world seems to have both narrowed and shifted severely to the right, it may seem 
utopian—in the negative sense of an excessively idealistic and unattainable fantasy—to give a 
sympathetic portrayal of a fierce revolutionary anti-capitalist activist and thinker such as Murray 
Bookchin.  I assert, however, that fundamental social and political changes often begin as 
seemingly small movements on the margins, as with the movement for a confederal democracy in 
Kurdistan, and the municipalist initiatives occurring in various cities throughout the world 
discussed later in this chapter and in the concluding chapter.  These nascent social and political 
formations have the potential over time to challenge the hegemony of capitalism in new ways. 
 
Bookchin’s Philosophical Linkage of Nature, Ethics and Politics. 
Murray Bookchin’s work provides a legacy of powerful and soundly reasoned arguments 
concerning the intertwined ecological and ethical imperatives that demand rational alternatives 
to capitalism, especially as societies face the choice of democratic or authoritarian responses to 
increasing climate-related threats.  He argues that the grow-or-die dynamic of capitalism, 
supported by an ethos of competitive individualism, threatens not only the resources of a finite 
earth, but draws from and perpetuates age-old systems of domination, exploitation, and 
expropriation.  Though it may be possible to engineer a “steady-state” or “degrowth” society that 
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addresses the issues of economic growth but avoids naming capitalism as a social as well as an 
economic system, Bookchin strongly rejects such an instrumental “solution”. He demands that we 
envision, think through, and—as best we can—work toward a society free of all systems of 
domination and oppression.  Bookchin argues that a study of natural evolution reveals a nisus or 
tendency towards the increasing diversity and complexity of ecosystems—which he prefers to 
term ecocommunities—that encourages an increasing complexity of lifeforms, and thus an 
increasing complexity of nervous systems, which in turn, leads to nascent capacities for 
subjectivity and choice, and ultimately, of forms of freedom.  He bases an “objective” ecological 
ethics on this notion of progressive evolution, one that informs a politics of confederated directly 
democratic local municipal and community assemblies. 
In his historical and anthropological studies, Bookchin gathers a history of systems of 
domination and oppression along with efforts to contest these, as well as a history of the 
development of capitalism.  My principle critique of his work is a call for the integration within 
social ecology of a theoretical structure that aligns more with anti-racist and decolonising efforts, 
as well as a call for increased attention to recent research that provides a wider global account of 
the emergence of capitalism.9  In the following chapter, I present the life and thought of Murray 
Bookchin in more detail. 
 
Discourses of Nature 
In order to frame the discussion of nature as a possible ground for an ecological ethics and 
radical democratic politics, I turn to an overview of contemporary discourses of nature provided 
by philosopher Kate Soper.  In What is Nature?: Culture,  Politics, and the non-Human, Soper 
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explores the contested status of understandings of what we mean by nature.10 She quotes 
Raymond Williams: ‘Nature is one of the most complex words in the language’.11 The complexity 
of nature is obscured by the ease with which we deploy the word in a variety of contexts.  These 
usages range from the “essential nature” of rocks to the totality of the non-human world; from a 
romantic or poetic evocation of natural beauty to what we eat for breakfast; from supposedly 
pristine “wilderness” to the cultivated garden; from the unimaginable cosmos to what may be 
considered the animal nature of the human body. 
What is Nature? gives a summary overview of various discourses of nature in the Western 
tradition.  Soper notes that the most common and fundamental sense of the term nature refers to 
everything that is not human.  She writes, ‘Whether it is claimed that “‘nature’” and “‘culture’”are 
clearly differentiated realms or that no hard and fast delineation can be made between them, all 
such thinking is tacitly reliant on the humanity-nature antithesis itself and would have no 
purchase on our understanding without it’.12  
The discourse of nature may thus be seen as the paradigmatic discourse of the Other in 
Western thought.  At various points the construction of the Other in Western culture has led to a 
“history of exclusions” from what is considered properly human, including the ‘primitive’, the 
‘animal’, the ‘corporeal’, and the ‘feminine’—all those elements considered ‘nearer to nature and 
lacking in reason; or bestial in their behavior; or immersed in the body and reproductive 
activity’.13 Historically these attitudes have perpetuated colonialism, slavery, forced removal, 
patriarchy, and the oppression of many groups. 
Soper engages with the current politics of the idea of nature, and how these are contested 
in contemporary social movements.  She distinguishes between “nature-endorsing” and “nature-
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   24 
 
 
sceptical” perspectives.  Nature-endorsing perspectives are associated with certain forms of 
ecological advocacy—especially conservation efforts, and the urging of a heightened respect for 
and “sensibility” toward the natural world.  Prominent among these perspectives is “deep 
ecology”, a theoretical and ecological movement that argues for a “biocentric” or “ecocentric” 
view that all living things have intrinsic worth regardless of their utility for humans, and calls for 
a radical restructuring of human societies in accord with these views.  As we will see in Chapter 4, 
Andy Price’s book Recovering Bookchin focuses primarily on recovering the robust quality and 
coherence of Bookchin’s views from the caricature created by Bookchin’s deep ecology 
opponents.14 As noted in my introduction, refuting deep ecology views has become even more 
important today, as neo-reactionary and alt-right elements push anti-modern and “biocentric” 
thought and ethics in an increasingly ecofascist direction. 
Returning to Soper’s distinction previously mentioned, and following Bookchin’s (and 
others’) critiques of deep ecology, this study focuses rather on the “nature-sceptical” perspectives 
that fall under the category of the social construction of nature.  These include efforts to 
denaturalise notions of race in critical race theory, as well as to interrogate the nature-culture 
divide itself and the way in which it has been used to define and exclude what has been 
considered ‘properly human’ in the West.  Judith Butler and a number of other writers have 
developed powerful critiques of the coding of the feminine and hetero-normativity with 
naturality, used to justify the oppressive treatment of women and gender non-conforming 
people.15 Social constructionist views have become increasingly pervasive as well in the social 
sciences.   
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The Social Construction of Nature 
Social Nature: Theory, Practice, and Politics, edited by Noel Castree and Bruce Braun, 
presents a collection of essays that demonstrate a range of ways in which various formulations of 
social constructionism in relation to nature have influenced the work of contemporary 
geographers.16 Castree and Braun argue from various perspectives, most prominently Marxist 
and poststructuralist, that knowledge of nature is invariably inflected with the biases of the 
knower.  Marxists like David Harvey and Neil Smith have analysed the way in which geographical 
knowledges of nature explicitly and implicitly reflect the class interests of the most powerful 
social groups.17 While Marxists speak of ideologies of nature serving specific social interests, 
other theorists influenced by French poststructuralism, such as Kay Anderson and Bruce Braun, 
aim to show that knowledges of nature are more complex, and draw upon a wide repertoire of 
other social images and norms.18 All claims about nature, they argue, are discursively mediated, 
and these discourses create their own “truths” about nature.  In addition, the social construction 
of nature, whether considered from a Marxist or poststructuralist perspective, includes the ways 
in which societies past and present interact practically with nature, and the ways in which they 
physically reconstitute nature, both intentionally and non-intentionally. 
 
One of the principle theorists of a social nature is David Demeritt.  In ‘Being Constructive 
about Nature’,19 he cites Donna Haraway’s claim, ‘Nature cannot precede its construction’.20 
Demeritt does not assume a hyperconstructionist view that would attempt to deny the myriad 
realities that societies define as “natural”.  The point is rather that there is never any way to 
access, evaluate, and affect nature that does not involve socially specific knowledges and practises.  
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Social construction theory can be generally divided into social construction as refutation of the 
naturalising tendencies used to justify systems of domination and oppression as noted previously; 
and social construction as philosophical critique.  Many social construction theorists critique 
Enlightenment presumptions about universal knowledge and experience, and attempt to situate 
knowledge socially and historically.  Haraway, for example, has proposed the idea of “situated 
knowledge” as ‘simultaneously an account of the radical historical contingency for all knowledge 
claims and knowing subjects  . . . and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of the real 
world’. Such situated knowledge is reflexive about its own location and construction, and thus 
politically accountable.21 
However, Demeritt acknowledges a need for more explicit philosophical engagement with 
the epistemological and ontological issues of the social construction of nature.   
 
Debates over the social construction of nature have created more heat than light.  Instead 
of illuminating the political and philosophical stakes at issue, constructionism has become 
largely a symbolic term.  For its proponents it is a sign of modish radicalism, while others 
advertise their commitment to rationality and reasonableness by trashing it.  This  
situation has tended to encourage careless and unreflexive usage of the term.22 
 
In questioning what we mean by phrases such as “nature cannot precede its construction” 
I explore the questions and implications of a philosophy of nature.  It is not often clear what is 
meant by the social construction of nature other than the recognition that humanity has 
materially intervened in almost every aspect of the natural world, together with the insight that 
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all our experience is discursively mediated.  I argue that social construction theories, whether in 
their Marxist, critical theory, or in their poststructuralist-oriented variants, are inadequate to the 
critical challenges of the ecological crises we face.  Instead, I call for a politically radical form of 
“non-reductive naturalism”, a term introduced by Soper, as a philosophical direction between 
deep ecology on the one hand, and a strict social constructionist approach to nature on the 
other.23 I believe only such a non-reductive naturalism offers the epistemological, ontological, and 
ethical resources needed to inform a comprehensive response to these challenges.   
Social ecology certainly presents a well-articulated form of non-reductive naturalism, but 
can be critiqued as a form in which Enlightenment premises of the unitary subject obscure 
potentially valuable insights into the contested way in which agencies and subjectivities are 
formed.  Paradoxically, however, if informed by these insights, a social ecology framework may 
provide the potential for a recovery of a new, community-centred revolutionary subject, with an 
educated sense of agency capable of the dedicated and persevering work required to reconstruct 
society towards a liveable future. 
In the next section, I examine two sustained attempts to articulate a theory of the social 
construction of nature, one based on Marxist and post-Marxist thought, more specifically from a 
Habermasian critical theory perspective; and the other reflecting a poststructuralist approach 
inspired by the writings of Jacques Derrida.   I do not pretend to present a broad assessment of 
social constructionism, especially given Derrida’s critique of the logic of the example, that is, of 
iterating instances of a supposedly unified essence.  However, these examples raise issues 
important for my argument as a whole. 
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The Problem of Nature in the Marxist Tradition 
The critique of a naïve element within the Marxist tradition, a scientism attributed 
especially to Engels, can be seen in the emergence of the tradition of Critical Theory, also known 
as German Western Marxism.  Steven Vogel offers an analysis of the difficulties and ambiguities 
that emerged within this tradition in relation to the treatment of nature generally, and to the 
possibilities for a coherent environmental ethics in particular.24 He focuses ultimately on the work 
of Jurgen Habermas as a context for articulating his own contribution to a “communicative theory 
of nature”.  The Critical Theory tradition and especially the work of Habermas reveal a continuing 
appropriation and adaptation of Kantian and Hegelian epistemologies, situated within a 
problematic defined by Marxism and modern social science. 
Critical Theory defined itself from the beginning in opposition to the attempt of Engels to 
understand Marxism as a “science,” with methodologies similar to natural science.  For Georg 
Lukács, guided by a subtle understanding of Hegel, the epistemological foundation of Marxism 
was considerably more complex than could be provided by a positivistic understanding of science.  
Critical theorists sought to bring science itself into a critique of ideology.  Lukács and others 
rejected the idea that a critical social theory should take the methods of natural science as a 
model.  Yet the validity of that method for the examination of nature remained ambiguous and 
complex.  Lukács used a version of a Neo-Kantian methodological distinction between 
philosophical investigation and natural science to argue that Marxist philosophy deals entirely 
with the social and has nothing to offer to the results of natural science.  By the time of 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, the appropriation of the methods of natural 
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science even within the sphere of social theory had become problematic: natural science itself 
had to be criticised, not only the scientistic effort to construct social theory in its image.   
Given the technologically mediated horrors of World War II and the Holocaust, Frankfurt 
School theorists began to argue that the “domination of nature” associated with science and 
technology could not be separated from the social domination that had been the focus of critical 
theory.  Vogel comments that the critical theory tradition vacillates between these two poles, 
sometimes sanctioning or employing natural science when applied to nature, and sometimes 
endeavouring to go further and criticise natural science itself.  The dualistic assertion of Lukács 
that critical theory must restrict itself to the social is undercut when he expands the category of 
the social so broadly as to include nature as a category.  On the other hand, Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s critique of “enlightened reason” as domination tends to undermine itself, insofar as 
their own normative claims in opposition to domination are grounded on the very Enlightenment 
values they are questioning.  They attempt to avoid circularity by appealing to the “nature” that 
enlightened natural science and technology are supposed to be harming; however, they are 
unable to provide an epistemological justification for a knowledge of nature that would provide 
an alternative to the knowledge provided by natural science.   
Vogel asserts that two primary kinds of argument can be discerned within the tradition of 
critical theory.   The first is a Hegelian argument, associated with Lukács and others, insisting on 
the active role of a socially situated subject that emphasises the dynamic, social, and historically 
changing account of what the world is like, and sees the static and supposedly “natural” as 
representing those aspects of the world whose social character has been congealed, hidden and 
thus reified.  The model for critical theory here is the dissolving of false immediacies to reveal 
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that what may be thought of as “natural” is actually the result of socially organised activity.  This 
model is similar to Marx’s account of the exchange value of commodities as consisting in the truth 
of “congealed” labour.   
The second kind of argument has its roots in more romantic traditions of nature; in such 
traditions, nature appears as the Other to the human and takes on a positive sign in this argument, 
in which science and technology are critiqued because they violate that world’s otherness as a 
distinct ontological realm that humans cannot fully grasp.  The latter argument is defended not 
only by Horkheimer and Adorno, but by Marcuse as well, and it is similar to themes that appear in 
the late writings of Heidegger. 
Vogel’s attempt to articulate a “communicative theory of nature” to resolve some of the key 
dilemmas of the theory of nature in critical theory is informed both with and against Habermas.  
Vogel cites Habermas’s ‘key methodological insight’ introduced in his Theory of Communicative 
Action that philosophy should concentrate on linguistically mediated relations among subjects as 
originary, rather than taking the model of an individual subject confronting an object in the world, 
attributed to Hegel’s alleged “philosophy of consciousness”. Horkheimer and Adorno had 
presented an unrelenting critique of the instrumentalism of a reason derived from a subject-
object encounter, but could not justify their own critique, and could only appeal to a “reason 
before reason” in nature.  Habermas suggests they could have established their normative 
foundation based on concepts of freedom, domination, and reconciliation derived not from the 
instrumental relations of a subject to the world of objects, but rather from the communicative 
relations among subjects interacting through language.   
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Building on Austinian and Searlian speech-act theories Habermas develops a system that 
incorporates neo-Kantian distinctions between validity claims, regulative speech acts, and 
expressive speech acts, leading to the idea of  discourse ethics.  Though Habermas was discomfited 
by challenges concerning how discourse ethics might apply to questions of environmental ethics, 
Vogel remarks that Habermas may have been right to assert that this difficulty in extending the 
theory to nature ‘may not be a defect’.  After critiquing anti-anthropomorphic challenges from 
“deep ecology” and other sources, and exploring the various tensions and problematics of the 
grounding of an environmental ethics, Vogel argues that in fact discourse ethics offers the most 
consistent grounding of a theory of nature in an ‘ethics of the built world’. 
 
We are responsible for what we build precisely because we build it, and because in 
building it we build the world and build ourselves as well; but too often nowadays we do 
not acknowledge that responsibility.  To acknowledge it would be to see the question 
“what ought we to build?” as indeed a normative one, bearing some relation doubtless to 
what Habermas calls “ethics” or “aesthetics” but in less of an existentialist or narcissistic 
sense.  Discourse about such a question would be discourse about what it would be good 
to build, what would make the world a better place, more beautiful and more livable for its 
inhabitants (human and nonhuman both), and what would make us—the language users 
whose first sentence lights the world up and releases value in it—better people.25 
 
Vogel’s communicative theory of nature provides structures and concepts for an effective 
rebuttal of the supposed “biocentric” claims from deep ecology proponents and others.  Deep 
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ecology, drawing from the work of philosopher Arne Naess and popularised within academia by 
Bill Duvall and George Sessions as well as within an earlier phase of activism by the Earth First! 
organisation, has sought to articulate an ethics wherein every organism in nature is seen to have 
absolute—and equal—value, and an intrinsic worth apart from human utilitarian concerns.  
Certain interpretations of such a “biocentric” ethics lie behind the notorious call by Earth First! 
activist David Foreman to abandon efforts to eradicate AIDS in Africa and elsewhere and let 
‘nature finds its course’ in relation to population balance between humanity and non-human 
nature because these non-human forms—including the HIV virus—have their own intrinsic 
worth.26 
Beyond this rebuttal of biocentrism, Vogel reveals the dilemmas of an environmental 
ethics that seeks to honour the value of a nature “in-itself” without falling into a romantic 
naturalism on the one hand, and an ethics that acknowledges all our concepts of nature as 
mediated through discourse, on the other.  As the only animal that exhibits both a sustained 
discourse and thorough transformation of the environment, we humans must, it is argued, take 
responsibility for that environment in human terms as socially constructed both conceptually and 
materially, by using the only truly meaningful terms, those of our reflexive and inter-subjective 
human discourse. 
However, a communicative theory of nature remains limited as a guide for both action and 
interaction that may avoid the problems of relativism, nor is it sufficiently robust to defend 
against the power of a hegemonic instrumental reason within communicative or other interaction, 
as identified by Frankfurt School thinkers.  Vogel bases his theory partly on a long history of non-
empiricist science. Bookchin also developed an important critique of empiricism, but from the 
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point of view of a naturalistic dialectic.27 He notes Hegel’s distinction between an immediately 
present empirical “reality” or Realitåt, and Wirtlichkeit—the dialectical “actuality” that is the 
fulfilment of a rational process.  The potentiality that Wirtlichkeit  actualises is as existentially 
real as the world we sense.  An egg patently exists, even though the bird whose potential it 
contains has yet to develop and mature.  In a radical empiricism, the real is a “frozen now” to 
which we merely add an adventitious past and presume a future.  In contrast, within a naturalistic 
dialectic both past and future are part of a cumulative, logical and objective continuum that 
includes the present.   
Bookchin argues that one of the failings of dialectical materialism is that it premised 
dialectic on the nineteenth century’s physics of matter and motion.  However, it would be just as 
limited to base a dialectic merely on a notion of ‘interconnectedness’.  Mere ‘interconnection’ is 
not sufficient to account for graded entelechial development—that is, to self-formation through 
the self-realisation of potentiality.  The interconnectedness of certain predator and prey species 
in nature gives us only a limited understanding, but the way in which they may have 
differentiated from a common ancestor in the course of evolution can tell us how development 
occurs, and what direction these developments take.  Further, social processes embody a graded 
development of a potential from a given “what is” to a “what should be.” 
A broader evolutionary perspective of the development of complex nervous systems and 
the potential for increasing subjectivity and choice, culminating in the graded development of 
humanity and human society and culture as a ‘second nature’, can provide the basis for a more 
robust, radical, and objective ethics than that proposed by Stephen Vogel.  The validity of 
actualities that derive from a dialectical exploration of potentialities and their internal logic is 
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tested by a logic of processes, not by conventional reason alone, whether that of conventional or 
“non-empirical” science.  This dialectical exploration can guide ways in which the processes of 
natural evolution might be concretely illuminated and consciously fostered, evident in social 
ecology’s role in pioneering of permaculture and other principles of ecological land use and eco-
technology, situated within eco-communities whose social and ecological diversity offer 
increased evolutionary pathways.   
Moreover, an ecologised social ecology dialectic may overcome some of the limitations of 
dialectical materialism and help to ground renewed revolutionary movements, recovering a 
socially radical thrust lost within Habermasian-oriented communicative theory.  After all, 
Habermas and Vogel’s dialogic agreements, reached in an inter-subjectively shared life world, and 
depending on the historical social context, may still be coercive in substance if not form.  
Ultimately, Vogel’s thesis remains ensnared (as well) within an ambiguous materialist 
ontology, despite the attempt of critical theorists to move beyond a naïve scientism and a Kantian 
epistemological dualism.  As we shall see when we return to Bookchin’s work, social ecologists, as 
well as the philosophical movement known as the New Materialism, propose new and expanded 
concepts of matter and form, grounded within a Hegelian movement beyond the Kantian paradox 
of the “thing in itself”—of presuming to know what we cannot know. 
 
Poststructuralist Constructions of Nature 
To some extent, the premises of a neo-Marxist or critical theory approach to the social 
construction of nature may be said to be at least partially “sublated” within social ecology, 
emerging as it did, partly out of the Marxist tradition, though including as well influences from 
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classical anarchism, radical feminism, and radical Green thought.  Bookchin argues with Marxist 
categories and logic implicitly and explicitly throughout much of his work.  However, he disdains 
a sustained reply to postmodern or post-structuralist critics out of an ethical stance against what 
he sometimes dismisses as “yuppie nihilism”.  Staging a confrontation between social ecology and 
theories of the social construction of nature inspired by post-structural writing requires a 
somewhat lengthier and more complex journey.  We begin by looking at an instance engendered 
by the dissemination of poststructuralist influences within social science, specifically within the 
field of geography. 
In ‘Nature, Poststructuralism, and Politics’, Bruce Braun and Joel Wainwright present an 
instance of the possible consequences to environmental politics and ethics of a set of arguments 
often referred to as ‘poststructuralist.’28 The instance they present concerns the effect of the 
breakdown of a system of sustained yield forestry on communities linked to forests in British 
Columbia.  In Braun and Wainwright’s account, sustained yield forestry was organised in the 
1940s according to a system of bounded forest spaces where “harvesting” was permitted by the 
provincial government of British Columbia at a rate equal to the annual increase in tree fibre in 
the region as a whole.  The metaphor of a “working circle” was used to image the rationality of 
this system, whereby, in theory, areas initially harvested would be ready to cut again when one 
cycle of the circle was completed. 
However, by the 1980s and 1990s, for reasons ranging from inaccurate inventories to 
falling rates of profit, areas of second-growth forest designated to be recut were not yet ready for 
harvesting.  In addition, the increasing mechanisation of forestry in the area, led to 
unemployment in the industry, with significant effects on some local communities.  These factors 
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pressured the logging companies to log areas of the forest that were more remote.  All these 
factors created a crisis in the British Columbian forest communities, leading to escalating 
conflicts among loggers, corporate interests, and environmentalists, and an array of other actors, 
such as state forest managers, community businesses, local First Nation peoples. 
In their analysis of the British Columbia logging crisis, Braun and Wainwright critique 
“conventional” interpretations of forest struggles, which place actors in pre-given categories as 
consciously representing particular objective interests.  Above all, they challenge the ways in 
which the ‘rainforest’ itself is constructed and stabilised as a prior object of economic and 
political calculation. 
In pointing to the ways in which the rainforest has been constructed, the authors discuss a 
1945 report by Justice Gordon Sloan, entitled The Royal Commission Report on the Forest 
Resources of British Columbia, which provided the blueprint for sustained yield forestry.  In 
accordance with the discursive practises of most white settlers in British Columbia (and by 
extension, with many of the discursive practises that characterise Western colonial expansion), 
this report presents the forest as a natural rather than a social entity, consisting entirely of a mix 
of different species of trees. This discursive presentation of the forest as “nature” had become 
common sense through processes of iteration, where it became sedimented as ‘reality’, or as a 
master concept of the forest, in ways that facilitated technocratic management and control.   
Braun and Wainwright draw on poststructuralist insights in calling attention to the ways 
in which this master concept of the forest was constituted, as well as to the ways in which the 
ordinary play of its concepts may be put under suspension.  They note how Jacques Derrida read 
Ferdinand de Saussure’s insight into the “arbitrariness of the sign” to demonstrate the mutability, 
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and often un-decidability of meaning.  They adopt Judith Butler’s notion of the “constitutive 
outside”, or that which must be excluded in order for any entity or identity—such as nature, sex, 
or the body—to appear coherent.   They also reference her idea of an “affirmative 
deconstruction . . . [wherein] a concept can be put under erasure and played at the same time”.29  
British Columbian forest disputes came to a crucial point in 1984, when the multinational 
company MacMillan Bloedel announced plans to log portions of Meares Island, located in 
Clayoquot Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island.  One of the most effective protests was 
made by a Tla-o-qui-aht band, which produced and delivered to court proceedings a map 
produced for them by archeologists, which claimed the entire island as their ‘traditional 
territories’.  Braun and Wainwright write: 
 
The significance of this map was that it challenged the erasures, or “cognitive failures,” 
that had underwritten forestry since the 1940s.  Where forestry officials had always seen a 
“natural” landscape without political-cultural claims, the Tla-o-qui-aht interjected a 
landscape worked-over by many centuries of Tla-o-qui-aht land use.  With this map the 
exclusions that were constitutive of colonial forestry on the coast returned to disrupt the 
smooth workings of colonial power.30 
 
The authors do not claim that the Tla-o-qui-aht map, or the other maps subsequently 
produced for First Nation peoples of their native territories, represent the final “truth” of nature.  
The maps are intelligible because of a complex inter-textuality with cartographic conventions of 
‘objectivity’, Lockean discourses of ‘property’, archaeological norms of research and notions of 
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indigeneity, and so on.  They endorse a version of what Gayatri Spivak terms “a politics of the 
open end”—an ongoing process in which struggles over identities and rights make and remake 
identities and relations, within a “thickets of discourse and practises of signification”(quoting 
Bruno Latour).31 
Braun and Wainwright impressively show the productivity of poststructuralist insights for 
interrogating and subverting sedimented discourses of power.  Such insights into the role of 
discourse and signifying practice can be an important liberating influence, especially with regard 
to overcoming the legacies of ethnocentrism, colonialism and racism within movement-building 
efforts.  However, as even Nietzsche acknowledges and Derrida reaffirms, all thought and 
discourse must privilege some elements over others, unless we completely embrace a nihilism or 
stoicism without reprieve.  I would therefore ask if there is a way in which the deconstructed text 
or argument may yet relaunch itself to inspire the emergence of a shared narrative of liberation, a 
narrative that fully takes into account materiality and formation at multiple levels—for example, 
‘nature’, discourse, and social institutions—beyond discourse analysis alone.  
Seyla Benhabib, in ‘A Reply to Lyotard’, presents a ‘stylised’ history of philosophical 
thought, as it has moved away from a model of mirroring nature involving the attempt to match 
concepts naively to external reality.32 This movement began in the nineteenth century with the 
critique of the traditional subject.  The Hegelian and Marxist traditions show that knowledge is a 
result of an active subject reworking and revealing the unfolding reality of itself and the world, 
rather than a passive subject transparent to itself.  Nietzsche and Heidegger are associated with 
the critique of an object readily given to consciousness, in the will to power as knowledge of 
presence. A third and ultimately triumphant movement has focused on the complexities of 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   39 
 
 
meaning introduced by the hidden structures of language, beginning with Charles Sanders Pierce 
and Ferdinand de Saussure, and developing prominently with the work of Derrida.   
Similarly, Benhabib quotes Frederick Jameson’s claim that postmodern philosophy turns 
ultimately on the question of political perspective, and she recounts Lyotard’s earlier history as a 
member of the socialism or barbarism group, who became a disillusioned theorist of the relativity 
of ‘language games’.  However, as we have seen, the Habermasian critical theory perspective 
providing the basis for Benhabib’s reply to Lyotard, has also come under the sway of the 
privileging of language, and has lost the revolutionary thrust of previous Marxist-oriented 
movements. 
Here, it is tempting to stage another act of a certain polemic between radical and 
revolutionary thought and deconstruction.  Judging from works such as The Other Heading and 
Rogues, a politics of the open end is not able to imagine social and political forms beyond 
capitalism and the state.33 The only opening offered is that of a “messianism without messianicity” 
seen in Derrida’s later writing on the themes of the gift, cosmopolitanism, and hospitality.34  
Deconstruction may open up creative and affirmative possibilities for the strategic contest 
of hegemonic economic and political forces; but, however, in turning away from the spectres of 
Marx, of the Terror, of the failures of the New Left and of 1968 Paris, deconstruction has remained 
within the texts of capitalism and the state.35 Developing political movements and counter-
institutions that redefine democratic decision-making authority in a way that might confront the 
ongoing power dynamic of a MacMillan-Bloedel or Weyerhauser, does not appear on the horizon 
of the poststructuralist political imaginary, even though the challenges presented by climate 
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chaos to the fundamental tenets of capitalism have been increasingly recognised by writers 
outside of the orbit of deconstruction and Continental philosophy. 
Perhaps Kant is right that polemic does not convince.36 Instead, in the interests of 
exploring the possibilities for a more thorough philosophy of nature, as called for by Demeritt, 
one that may move beyond the limitations of environmentalism, deep ecology, and social 
constructionism, in the following chapters I examine concepts of nature as they emerge, 
especially within the writings of Bookchin, Derrida, and Malabou, beginning in the next chapter 
with an introduction to the life and work of Murray Bookchin. 
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This chapter presents a portrait of Bookchin’s life and an in-depth presentation of his reading of 
natural history.  I begin with an account of his life and his more recent connection with Abdullah 
Öcalan and the Kurdish freedom movement, a connection that has resulted in a popular re-emergence 
of his work to a certain degree, and a renewed appreciation of his legacy.  I then investigate more 
closely his development of a “dialectical naturalism”.  The aim is to bring Bookchin’s prescient insights 
on ecological threats and his comprehensive reconstructive social and political vision more fully into 
the conversations across the borders of contemporary philosophy, science, and revolutionary thought. 
 
Biographical sources for Bookchin’s life are relatively few.  In the following account I draw 
minimally from the recent biography Ecology or Catastrophe by Janet Biehl, noting the considerable 
reservations towards this biography—especially the latter part—held by Bookchin’s family, and other 
members of the social ecology community.1 In addition, I draw from accounts by Bookchin’s daughter 
Debbie Bookchin2 and his wife Bea Bookchin, as well as from an article by the Dutch labour historian 
Marcel van der Linden3, and from an outstanding master’s thesis by Aaron Hyams that focuses on the 
early life and work of Bookchin up to the publication of his Post-Scarcity Anarchism in 1971.4 
Murray Bookchin was born in the Bronx in 1921 to pre-Bolshevik Russian revolutionaries.  His 
mother was abandoned by her husband when Murray was a young boy; after his grandmother’s death, 
when he was nine, they were often impoverished. Around the same time, in 1930, he became a member 
of the Communist youth organisation, Young Pioneers of America.  At thirteen, he joined the Young 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   45 
 
 
Communist League.  The youth members were expected to have read The Communist Manifesto and 
many other texts, and they were sent into the streets to sell the party paper.  In addition, the group 
supported labour union efforts.  As a young radical, Bookchin spoke and debated in such venues as 
Crotona Park.  He recalls that in the 1930s: 
 
I began to actually speak from what you’d call soap boxes today. In the meantime I tried to earn 
my livelihood selling newspapers and carrying ice cream on my back in Crotona Park in a huge 
kind of insulated box—being chased by the police, incidentally, because it was illegal in those 
days to sell ice cream—that was the privilege mainly of little stands and concessions that the 
park department gave to people. So even from the age of thirteen and fourteen, as a worker, I 
began to earn my own bread and cheese.6 
Bookchin graduated from high school, and worked for four years as a foundryman in northern 
New Jersey, becoming active as a labour organiser for the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO).  
Bookchin served in the US Army during the mid-1940s, later recalling opposing anti-Semitism in the 
military, even at times through violent confrontations with Army personnel who made anti-Semitic 
remarks.7  He then returned home to work as an autoworker, becoming highly active in the United Auto 
Workers (UAW), one of the more libertarian unions of the time. 
He left the communist party following the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939.  Though initially aligning 
himself with the American Trotskyists, he became alienated by the Bolshevist authoritarianism that 
characterised even these dissident communist groups.  After participating in the General Motors strike 
of 1945–48, he became further disillusioned with traditional Marxist notions of the “vanguard” role of 
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the working class.  Bookchin identified himself as a libertarian socialist and began an association with 
a group of dissident German Marxists in New York City, the International Kommunisten Deutschlands, 
or IKD, whose members were developing a critique of orthodox models of the working class as the 
revolutionary subject.  This association with the IKD was to have a pivotal influence on the 
development of Bookchin’s thought. 
Bookchin published many of his earliest articles in the publications associated with the IKD, the 
German-language Dinge der Zeit, and the English-language Contemporary Issues, using the pen names 
M. S. Shiloh, Lewis Herber, Robert Keller, and Harry Ludd.  In 1952 he wrote an article for 
Contemporary Issues entitled “The Problem of Chemicals in Food.”8 In this article, Bookchin opposes 
the move to large-scale industrial agriculture, where the land was now “to be exploited like any other 
resource”. He voices one of the first warnings of the dangers of the mounting accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 
In an influential 1964 essay, “Ecology and Revolutionary Thought”, Bookchin seeks to wed 
ecology and “classical” or “social” anarchism.  In “Toward a Liberatory Technology” he advocates a 
new ecotechnics using alternative and renewable energy sources and microtechnologies as part of a 
decentralised and locally controlled infrastructure of a liberatory and ecological society.  In “A Note on 
Affinity Groups” he highlights the anti-hierarchical unit of political organization employed by the 
Spanish anarchists, a model that was to have significant influence on subsequent organising movements 
through not only the theoretical exploration but also through the active participation of Bookchin and 
other social ecologists in the anti-nuclear Clamshell Alliance.  In “Listen Marxist!”, he mounts a sharp 
attack on Marxism-Leninism, and attempted to warn members of the Students for a Democratic Society 
(SDS) of an imminent takeover by the Progressive Labor Party, a Maoist group.  These and other 
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essays were collected into the anthology Post-Scarcity Anarchism, first published in 1971.10  
Working with the IKD exposed Bookchin to Josef Weber, someone whose ideas became very 
important in the development of Bookchin’s thought.  Indeed, Bookchin dedicates his best-known early 
work, Post-Scarcity Anarchism, published in 1971, partially to Weber, who, according to Bookchin 
“formulated more than twenty years ago the outlines of the Utopian project developed in this book”.11  
Weber had fled Germany for Paris in 1933 and later New York, where he was the central figure 
in the IKD.  By 1945-46 Weber and his supporters had abandoned the principles of Trotskyism for what 
became known as the “retrogressive movement theory”.  Weber argues that capitalism had passed its 
peak, and because of the labour movement’s failure to subvert the system, had entered a period of 
retrogressive change.  Weber’s theory has been presented by means of eight key points: First, the 
labour movement has failed to achieve the downfall of capitalism, and has become thoroughly 
corrupted.  Second, the fact that capitalism has passed its peak and entered a phase of decline means 
that timely action is required to halt the trend towards barbarism in the form of political, economic, and 
cultural disintegration.  Third, this decline is marked by the remobilisation of earlier pre-modern and 
early modern forms of capitalism, such as semi-feudal forms of organisation.  Fourth, the declining 
capitalist society is increasingly developing forms of ecological self-destruction.  Fifth, the cultural 
trends are leading to low levels of philosophical-moral content in literary, musical, and artistic 
production, and a decline in the intellectual force and critical function of science and current 
philosophy.  Sixth, the solution is to mobilise the majority of the world’s population, which does not 
benefit from these trends.  Because of the potential for surpluses, protest is no longer organised around 
problems of scarcity, but around interests shared by an overwhelming majority against a tiny minority.  
Seventh, the mobilisation must emerge as a worldwide movement for a “democracy of content” that 
goes beyond traditional bureaucratic political organisation around parties.  Eighth, the movement for a 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   48 
 
 
democracy of content must develop a concrete democratic alternative to capitalist society.   
Van der Linden claims that Bookchin’s Post-Scarcity Anarchism embodies seven of the eight 
elements from Weber’s analysis.  Bookchin departs from Weber only in stating that the science of 
ecology can come to express a critical function, thus constituting an exception to Weber’s pessimistic 
view of the “dwindling force of cognition in bourgeois society.”  This exception for ecology allows 
Bookchin to evolve from a “half-Trotskyist” to a social anarchist and a social ecologist, according to 
Van der Linden. 
In later years a debate ensues between Marcel van der Linden and Bookchin’s partner and close 
colleague, Janet Biehl, as well as among other social ecologists, on the importance of Josef Weber’s 
thought to the development of Murray Bookchin’s social ecology.  Van der Linden argues that 
Bookchin was greatly indebted to Weber, and deviates only in one seemingly small respect from 
Weber’s eight theses in arguing that the science of ecology alone escaped capitalism’s cooptation of the 
revolutionary potential of sciences and philosophies (Weber’s fifth thesis).  Biehl responds that 
Bookchin and Weber mutually influenced each other and that Bookchin was drawn to Weber partly as a 
father figure rather than as a philosophical mentor.  Aaron Hyams argues that the truth lies somewhere 
between these two positions; however, his elucidation of the significance of Bookchin’s critique of 
Weber’s fourth thesis as it developed in the late 1970s into the former’s embrace of anarchism shows 
clearly the limitations of Van der Linden’s argument in particular.12 
Hyams traces Bookchin’s evolution from a “libertarian socialism”, the term adopted by 
Bookchin during his alliance with Weber, to anarchism and social ecology.  In important respects, 
Weber’s post-Trotskyist views seem similar to core tenets of classical anarchism, in terms of their 
revolutionary critique of centralised power structures and the call for decentralised, democratic, and 
communal forms of social and political organisation.  Bookchin, like other post-Stalinist Marxists of 
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the time, looks to Marx’s theory of alienation in Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Marx had 
identified not only the alienation of the worker and capitalist boss, but also the alienation of the worker 
from the commodity in the process of production.  In supporting Weber’s fourth thesis that capitalism 
increasingly developed ecologically destructive tendencies, he emphasises the alienation from nature 
resulting from such a reified process of production.  
However, Marx envisions the revolutionary overcoming of the centralised bourgeois state with 
the proletarian state, with urban industrial workers awakened by class consciousness to this destiny, 
and disciplined by industrial work to the demands of this task.  Bookchin does not believe that any 
segment of society could be entrusted with such centralised power, and that such delegation would 
result in the replacement of one set of elites by another, as had occurred in the case of the brutal and 
authoritarian communism of the Soviet state.   
Further, both Weber and Bookchin at the time accepted a kind of neo-Malthusian view of 
scarcity.  The British scholar Thomas Malthus had based his analysis of the problem of scarcity on the 
premise that food supplies increased arithmetically, while populations increased geometrically.  Marx, 
however, could not have foreseen the way in which the problem of scarcity could be overcome by the 
development of the productive resources of modern society.   
Both Weber and Bookchin bring a post-scarcity orientation to political theory, but the solution 
for Bookchin enables him to overcome Weber’s pessimism that no social forces had the revolutionary 
potential to overcome the way in which capitalism had deeply instilled competitive “instincts”.  
Weber’s pessimism was sustained partly by the recognition of the success of capitalism in absorbing 
and co-opting challenges.  The capitalist system absorbed the effect of Darwin’s evolutionary theory in 
undermining the authority of the church, which had served as the principle means of bourgeois cultural 
control, by adapting to atheism (or, we might add, by resorting to various forms of creationism).  
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Further, the system had absorbed the challenge of Marxism by granting a degree of worker’s rights and 
“domesticating” proletarian movements toward goals of self-advancement.  Science, according to 
Weber, had increasingly become another instrument of social control. 
Bookchin argues that the science of ecology must escape this trend, insofar as it is not based on 
abstract arguments in theoretical space, but presents undeniable evidence that accumulating ecological 
destruction threatens the very existence of all elements of society.  He bases the decentralized program 
of social ecology partly by drawing from the British ecologist Charles Elton.  Elton, drawing in turn 
from Ernst Mayr, had shown how evolutionary forces led to increasing diversity within ecosystems, a 
diversity that enabled greater resilience to climate and other ecological threats, than did the 
monocultures of industrial agribusiness.  
In addressing the issue of what sectors might come to take the place of the co-opted industrial 
proletariat as revolutionary agents, Bookchin’s study of Proudhon, Bakunin and other anarchists 
enables him to overcome the class-based analysis that still obscured Weber’s views.  In his historical 
studies Bookchin notes that revolutionaries in the case of the French and Russian revolutions did not 
emerge from the working classes but rather from peasants and artisans fighting to preserve their way of 
life.  This insight allows Bookchin to move beyond Weber’s pessimistic meditation on the implications 
of his second and third theses.  Revolutionary impulses could be drawn from cross-class sources.  They 
did not require being drilled and disciplined by a revolutionary vanguard, but could arise in a relatively 
spontaneous fashion, as claimed by Bakunin. Cross-class revolutionary impulses would increase as 
capitalism threatened not only environmental degradation, but the very existence of human society and 
more complex life-forms, something even Weber did not envision. 
It can be argued that Hyams overemphasises Bookchin’s study of Mikhail Bakunin and 
underemphasises the role of Peter Kropotkin in the evolution of his movement toward anarchism in the 
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1970’s.  Kropotkin’s views on mutualism and decentralisation, and his opposition to social hierarchy 
profoundly influenced Bookchin, who then proceeds to think through and propound a concrete political 
project based on this social orientation.  In later years, however, Bookchin becomes concerned about 
the neglect of the importance of a law-governed society in Kropotkin’s The Conquest of Bread.  This 
neglect in Kropotkin’s writings, together with the failure of the Spanish anarchists to meet the 
challenges of governance as they were essentially outmanoeuvred by Franco’s forces toward the end of 
the period of the Spanish Revolution, and the individualistic character of “lifestyle anarchism” in the 
US at the time, contributed to his abandonment of anarchism and adoption of “communalism” by the 
mid to late 1990s.  As examined more closely in my final chapter, Bookchin sees communalism as the 
“democratic dimension of anarchism”, more explicitly directed to social and not merely individual 
liberation. 
At the time of Post-Scarcity Anarchism, Bookchin also looks to the revolutionary potential of 
the New Left, the Anti-War movement, and the counterculture of the late 1960s and the 1970s in the 
US.  Those who populated these developments had not been born into the scarcity that had shaped the 
outlook of previous generations; they were indeed, contrary to Weber’s views, capable of overcoming 
the competitive instincts that capitalism bred.13 
In 1974 Bookchin co-founded the Institute for Social Ecology (ISE) in Plainfield, Vermont, 
along with his friend and colleague Dan Chodorkoff.  The ISE attracted students internationally, with 
its advanced courses on ecophilosophy, social theory, ecofeminism, ecotechnologies, bio-regional 
agriculture, community based health, and activist art in community.  Bookchin, along with colleagues 
and students from the ISE, was active in the antinuclear movement during the 1970s (and beyond), 
participating in the Clamshell Alliance that opposed the Seabrook nuclear reactor in New Hampshire.  
Social ecologists active in the Clamshell Alliance in Vermont influenced later activism through their 
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emphasis on non-hierarchical forms of organising.   
 
Major Publications 
Bookchin continues his study of urban social and ecological issues from a radical political lens 
with his 1974 book, The Limits of the City.14  In 1977 he publishes The Spanish Anarchists, a history of 
the Spanish anarcho-syndicalist movement from its origins to the mid-1930s.15 In essays written in the 
1970s he critiques the limitations of the ecology movement of that time, distinguishing the radical and 
creative potential of ecology from the shallow, instrumentalist perspective of reformist 
environmentalism on the one hand, and mystical and misanthropic elements of “deep ecology” on the 
other.  These essays were collected into the 1981 publication Toward an Ecological Society.16  
In 1982 Bookchin publishes The Ecology of Freedom,17 which argues on the basis of historical 
and anthropological research that the project of dominating nature arose from the domination of human 
by human, as systems of domination such as gerontocracies, patriarchies, and warrior societies emerged 
and became institutionalised.  The ‘epistemology of rule’ established by these systems of domination 
existed in a historical dialectic with the ‘legacies of freedom’ represented by movements of resistance 
and revolution, as well as by alternative, more democratic forms of social organisation, such as the 
confederated municipalities of the Hanseatic League and the Italian city-states.  The Ecology of 
Freedom widened the scope of the revolutionary project well beyond that of the Marxist goal of 
abolishing class exploitation to that of overcoming social hierarchy as such. 
The Rise of Urbanisation and the Decline of Citizenship, originally published in 1986,18 further 
explores the history of civic self-management, direct or face-face democracy, and confederalism.  This 
work traces a history of radical democracy in the Western tradition from ancient Greece, through 
medieval and later confederated city-states, to popular institutions in the American and French 
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revolutions.  The concluding chapter presents an exposition of the political project of social ecology, 
which Bookchin terms libertarian municipalism, as well as a sketch of how such a politics might take 
shape in a city Bookchin knew well, Burlington, Vermont.  This project envisioned the development of 
municipal assemblies that would enact direct democracy within a revitalised public sphere as the 
fundamental basis of decision-making authority, while other democratic bodies would carry out 
administrative functions in accordance with the decisions of the local assembly.  Gradually, the 
economy would become municipalised rather than nationalised. As these assemblies became 
established over wider regions, they would confederate, until they gained sufficient strength to 
constitute a dual power that could challenge the nation state. 
In addition, in 1996 Bookchin publishes a book he considered one of his most important works, 
The Philosophy of Social Ecology.19 The essays in this work comprise an important statement of the 
philosophical basis for social ecology, and are discussed extensively next.  In the latter years of his life 
Bookchin devotes most of his time to his four-volume history of revolutionary movements, The Third 
Revolution.  Volume I is devoted to a history of the American and French revolutions, volume II to the 
French revolutions of the nineteenth century, volume III to the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, 
and the final volume to the central European and Spanish revolutions.20 
In the mid-1990s Bookchin begins to question his earlier identification with anarchism as a 
framework for his political approach, believing it too entrenched in individualism.  In 1995, he writes 
Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable Chasm, a challenge to what he regarded as 
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Bookchin’s Ongoing Influence 
Though in later years Bookchin embraces the term communalism for his project, he never 
renounces the core principles of a social anarchism that had consolidated in his work by the late 1970s.  
Nor, for that matter, does he ever fully renounce elements of Marxism, particularly its dialectical 
outlook.  He had long seen his project in historical terms, as one of making Marx’s brilliant 19th 
Century revolutionary critique of capitalism relevant for our time. 
Perpetually engaged in rethinking his own politics and avoiding stagnation or dogmatism, 
Bookchin breaks off former relationships and forges new connections. Bookchin’s distance from many 
of his contemporaries came from his “take no prisoners” argumentative stance bred by formative 
experiences with the intense debates in NYC revolutionary circles in his younger days, as well as from 
his personal ambition to be and to remain unique.  He tended to be most critical of the “near enemy”—
those whose views might seem to approximate his own, but for crucial differences he discerned.  
Bookchin’s daughter Debbie summarised Bookchin’s life and influence in an article for the 
New York Review of Books: 
 
Over the years, some of Bookchin’s theories about affinity groups, popular assemblies, eco-
feminism, grassroots democracy, and the need to eliminate hierarchy were taken up by the 
antinuclear campaign, antiglobalization activists, and eventually the Occupy movement. 
These groups incorporated Bookchin’s ideas—often unaware of their origin, perhaps—
because they offered ways of acting and organizing that prefigured the social change they 
sought.22 
 
In April of 2004, when he was eighty-three years old, Bookchin unexpectedly receives a letter 
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from an intermediary writing on behalf of the jailed Kurdish activist Abdullah Öcalan, head of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As its co-founder, principle theoretician, and leader, Öcalan had 
acquired a significant reputation—but nothing about his (earlier) Marxist-Leninist ideology seemed in 
any way to resemble that of Murray Bookchin. 
Founded in 1978 as a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist organisation, the PKK had for thirty years 
been waging an insurgent war on behalf of the almost fifteen million Kurds living in Turkey who have 
suffered a long history of violence. For decades, Turkey has prohibited Kurds from speaking their own 
language, wearing customary dress, using Kurdish names, teaching the Kurdish language in schools, or 
even playing Kurdish music. Kurds have routinely been arrested and tortured for any expression of 
their cultural identity or for opposition to Turkey’s one-flag, one-people, one-nation ideology, which 
originated in the early twentieth century and has endured under the authoritarian rule of President 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Islamist party. 
Like other national liberation movements of the 1970s, the PKK was originally founded to win 
an independent Kurdish state. It sought to unite the Kurds, whose homeland for some five thousand 
years, a swath of land known as Kurdistan, had been arbitrarily divided between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria in the aftermath of World War I.  Since its founding, Öcalan has been the PKK’s ideological and 
organisational leader. 
Öcalan read The Ecology of Freedom while in prison, and agreed with its analysis. In his own 
book In Defense of the People, published in German in 2010 (forthcoming in English), Öcalan writes, 
 
The development of authority and hierarchy even before the class society emerged is a 
significant turning point in history. No law of nature requires natural societies to develop into 
hierarchical state-based societies. At most we might say there might be a tendency. The Marxist 
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belief that class society is an inevitability is a big mistake.23 
 
Bookchin’s emphasis on hierarchy becomes a crucial aspect of Öcalan’s efforts to redefine the 
Kurdish problem. In The Roots of Civilization, Öcalan’s first published volume of prison writings, he, 
too, traces the history of early communitarian societies and the transition to capitalism. Like Bookchin, 
he focuses renewed attention on the formation of early societies in greater Mesopotamia, the cradle of 
civilisation and birthplace of art, written language, and agriculture. Öcalan argues that the powerful 
kinship ties that remain a fixture of Kurdish family life—the traditional relationships of extended 
families, and folk culture—could provide a foundation for a new ethical society that melds the best 
aspects of Enlightenment values of individual rights and responsibilities with a communal and 
ecological sensibility.  
Öcalan goes further than does Bookchin in the trans-historical significance he places on 
patriarchy.  Bookchin had examined how hierarchies originated from the need of the elders in society to 
preserve their power as they aged by institutionalising their status in the form of shamans, and later 
priests—a process that incorporated the domination of women by men.  Öcalan, though, sees patriarchy 
as a defining characteristic of human civilisation, one whose entrenched nature requires a thorough 
transformation at multiple levels, on the part of individual men as well as in institutionalised power 
relationships. 
Murray Bookchin died on 30 July, 2006, at the age of eighty-five, about two years after 
Öcalan’s intermediaries had contacted him. Arthritis had made it impossible for him to sit before a 
computer and type, so his correspondence with Öcalan ended after the exchange of two letters from 
each side. In his last letter, Bookchin sent his best wishes to Öcalan and wrote: 
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My hope is that the Kurdish people will one day be able to establish a free, rational society that 
will allow their brilliance once again to flourish. They are fortunate indeed to have a leader of 
Mr. Öcalan’s talents to guide them.24 
 
Upon Murray Bookchin’s death, the PKK issued a two-page statement hailing him as  
one of the greatest social scientists of the twentieth century. He introduced us to the thought of social 
ecology, and for that he will be remembered with gratitude by humanity,” the statement’s authors wrote. 
“We undertake to make Bookchin live in our struggle. We will put this promise into practice as the first 
society which establishes a tangible democratic confederalism.”25 
 
A Reading of Natural history 
After reviewing Murray Bookchin’s life and influence, I now examine Bookchin’s thesis that an 
understanding of nature can provide an objective ground for an ecological ethics, by exploring his 
philosophy of nature from which this claim emerges.   
Murray Bookchin began writing about pressing aspects of the ecological crisis as early as 1952, 
in an article on “The Problem of Chemicals in Food.” In this lengthy article, Bookchin opposes large-
scale agriculture (as noted previously), arguing that only the small-scale farmer, with “personal 
familiarity, with fairly extensive experience and understanding” of the specific local ecological 
situation, could intervene responsibly without causing irreparable damage.   
A decade later, in Our Synthetic Environment, Bookchin begins to outline the dangers of an 
inadequately thought-out nature philosophy:   
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Understandably, a large number of people have reacted to the nonhuman character of our 
synthetic environment by venerating nature as the only source of health and wellbeing.  . . . The 
more man’s [sic] situation approximates that of his primitive forebears, it is thought, the more 
he will be nourished by certain quasi-mystical wellsprings of health and virtue.  In view of the 
mounting problems created by our synthetic environment, this renunciation of science and 
technology—indeed of civilization—would be almost tempting if it were not manifestly 
impractical.24 
 
In 1964, in Ecology and Revolutionary Thought, Bookchin articulates a vision of the 
revolutionary potential of ecology, ‘an integrative and reconstructive science’ which sought ‘the 
harmonisation of nature and man’.  This harmonisation demanded an understanding of the lessons of a 
study of the natural world, especially ‘organic differentiation’.  He observed that the ‘mechanical 
standardization’ of modern society was reducing this differentiation, simplifying nature as well as 
society as an ecosystem.  Rather than calling for the pretensions of mastery over nature, Bookchin calls 
for the conscious fostering of diversity in the natural world, through the concurrent social development 
of diverse, decentralised, spontaneous and variegated human communities.25 
Through the 1970s, Bookchin continues to develop his radical ecological vision, distinguishing 
it sharply from an environmentalist approach. Environmentalism in his view seeks to diminish the 
hazards caused by the project of dominating nature, while avoiding and obscuring the question of the 
very notion of dominating nature itself.  Ecology, in contrast 
is an artful science, or scientific art, and at its best, a form of poetry that combines science and 
art in a unique synthesis.  Above all, it is an outlook that interprets all interdependencies (social 
and psychological as well as natural) non-hierarchically.26 




With regard to the ecosystem, Bookchin notes that ecologists have observed that the more 
simplified an ecosystem—as in arctic and desert biomes or in monocultural forms of food cultivation—
the more fragile the ecosystem and more prone it is to instability, pest infestations, and other potential 
catastrophes.  As he later came to emphasise, these simplified ecocommunities also offer fewer 
evolutionary pathways.    
Bookchin calls for the application to ecological thinking of the Hegelian notion of unity in 
diversity, which begin to appear frequently in more reflective ecologically oriented writing.  He 
highlighted the need for a conscious appreciation of the spontaneity of the natural world, a world he 
considered much too complex and to be reduced to simple mechanical properties.  
Bookchin refers to non-hierarchical social communities as ‘organic communities’.  He quotes 
the anthropologist Dorothy Lee from her study of the Wintu peoples of California, the Hopi of the 
Southwest, and the Algonkians of the North American forests: 
 
[E]quality exists in the very nature of things, as a byproduct of the democratic structure of the 
culture itself, not as a principle to be applied.  In such societies, there is no attempt to achieve 
the goal of equality, and in fact there is no concept of equality.  Often, there is no linguistic 
mechanism whatever for comparison.  What we find is an absolute respect for . . . all 
individuals irrespective of age and sex.27 
 
In “What is Social Ecology” Bookchin stresses that social ecology challenges the way in which 
a necessitarian view of nature is used to justify social hierarchy and domination: 
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More than any single notion in the history of religion and philosophy, the image of a blind, 
mute, cruel, competitive, and stingy nature has opened a wide, often unbridgeable chasm 
between the social world and the natural world and, in its more exotic ramifications, between 
mind and body, subject and object, reason and physicality, technology, and “raw materials”, 
indeed the whole gamut of dualisms that have fragmented not only the world of nature and 
society but the human psyche and its biological matrix.28 
 
Social ecology, according to Bookchin, negates this harsh image of the natural world without 
dissolving the social into the natural, as in sociobiology, or by imparting mystical properties to nature 
that place it beyond the realm of rational insight.  Social ecology seeks to radicalise the understanding 
of nature by questioning the marketplace images of nature as a set of natural resources created by 
competitive forces of natural selection, and offering instead an understanding of nature as a 
participatory realm of interacting life-forms. The most outstanding attributes of such lifeforms are 
fecundity, creativity and directiveness, marked by a complementarity that renders the natural world the 
grounding for an ethics of freedom rather than domination.  Rather than simply a form of metabolic 
matter passively awaiting external forces and mechanically shaped by them, according to social 
ecology life is active, interactive, procreative, relational, and contextual.  The logic of differentiation 
makes it possible to relate the mediations of nature and society into a continuum.  The “underlying fact” 
of wholeness makes unity and diversity in nature more than a suggestive metaphor—not a wholeness 
signifying a finality or totality, a “reconciliation” of all Being in a complete identity of subject and 
object—but one reflecting varying degrees of the organic unfolding of the wealth of particularities 
latent in the as-yet-undeveloped potentiality. 
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In “Freedom and Necessity in Nature”29 Bookchin elaborates on the notion of a participatory 
evolution.  He claims that Darwin never fully organicised evolutionary theory.  Informed by the 
Lockean atomism that nourished nineteenth century British science, Darwin and his acolytes treated 
species as phenomena somewhere between inorganic machines and mechanically functioning 
organisms.  Darwin portrayed the development of individual species such as Eohippus in “lofty 
isolation” from the life-forms other than prey and predators that normally interact with it and with 
which it is interdependent.  Participatory evolution in contrast, emphasises the contextual reality of the 
ecology of species development.  The horse lived among not only its predators and food but also in 
creatively interactive relationships with a great variety of plants and animals; it evolved not alone but 
in ever-changing ecocommunities.  The rise of Equus caballus occurred conjointly with that of other 
herbivores that shared and maintained their grasslands, and even played a major role in creating the 
grassland environment.  Participatory evolution enriches evolutionary theory by placing the evolution 
of ecocommunities at the forefront, while not denying the unique lines of development of species.   
Participatory evolution thus highlights the way in which the growing choices conferred by 
complexity and the alternative pathways opened up by the growth of complex ecocommunities led to 
the development of increasingly complex neurological systems.  The human brain has its evolutionary 
history in the natural world, and as the neurological capability of lifeforms to function more actively 
and flexibly increases, so too does life help create new evolutionary directions that lead to enhanced 
self-awareness and self-activity, as life-forms increasingly become active agents in their own evolution. 
Spontaneous development in nature must be allowed to unfold its wealth of potentialities, 
though guided by human consciousness (as nature rendered self-conscious and self-active), in a manner 
akin to ‘steering a boat’. Bookchin modifies Johan Fichte’s remark that humanity is nature rendered 
self-conscious to emphasise that humanity has this status and stewardship role only potentially—
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because humanity and society remain quite irrational and even are ‘cunningly dangerous to ourselves 
and all that lives around us’.30 All that lives in an ecocommunity contributes its coequal and non-
hierarchical role in maintaining the balance and integrity of the whole, manifesting the principles of 
unity in diversity, spontaneity, and complementarity.  The principles inform not only ecology as an 
‘artful science’, but a sensibility recovered from non-hierarchical communities and placed in a new 
social context.   
 
From First to Second Nature to a ‘Free Nature’ 
Though Bookchin thus challenges the notion of human mastery over the rest of the natural 
world, he strongly opposes the “deep ecology” abstraction of humanity from nature as a purely 
destructive element.  Deep ecology proponents have called for a movement toward self-realisation of 
the larger Self as the whole of both humanity and nature and a commitment to non-interference in 
nature by humanity.  In ‘Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology’ Bookchin argues that if a biospheric 
egalitarianism is broadly defined as a universal whole, then ‘a unique function that natural evolution 
has conferred on human society dissolves into a cosmic night that lacks differentiation, variety, and a 
wide array of functions’.31 If humanity is abstracted into a humanity that ‘accurses the natural world’, 
the natural world itself becomes separate and abstracted, rather than an ‘evolutionary development that 
is cumulative and includes the human species’.32 Humanity has evolved the capacity to form conscious 
communities that are not genetically programmed, but can be radically changed—including in ways 
that can benefit the natural world.  Humanity’s social evolution is distinct as a ‘second nature’, a new 
evolutionary pathway in natural evolution, though it is prefigured within a graded continuum of 
increasingly active responses of organisms in shaping their environments.   
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Traditionally in social thought according to Bookchin, the relationship between nature and 
humanity has been seen as antagonistic.   As we have noted, the domination of nature by humanity in 
the Marxist and liberal tradition is seen as necessary to overcome the domination of humanity by nature.  
The “taming” of a wild and indifferent nature—the realm of necessity—by human skills and 
technology is seen as essential for the progress of civilization.  Bookchin seeks to overcome this a 
priori antagonistic framework by showing that it is natural for humanity to create a second nature out 
of first nature, as part of a creative evolutionary continuum.  Both biocentrism and anthropocentrism 
can be overcome, if it can be seen that second nature and first nature need not be antagonistically 
opposed in thought or in practice.  It becomes possible to conceive of a “third nature” or “free nature”, 
wherein humanity lives in creative harmony with other humans and with the non-human natural world, 
fostering its processes of differentiation and its diverse evolutionary pathways toward increasingly 
more complex nervous systems, the biological basis for increasing consciousness, choice, and potential 
freedom. 
 
A Dialectical Naturalism 
The pathway towards a free nature as the purposeful goal of a continuity of process from the 
simplest evolutionary form to the most complex is illuminated by a dialectical conception of ecology, 
and an ecological conception of dialectic.  Just as the child lingers on in the adult, the evolution of 
nature is a cumulative process.  The dialectical tradition allows a ‘building up the differentia of natural 
and social phenomena from what is implicit in their abstract level’.34 The dialectical interpretation of 
the science of ecology, as Andy Price observes, opens up the possibility of ‘a concept of evolution as 
the dialectical development of ever-variegated, complex, and increasingly fecund contexts of plant-
animal communities’ as opposed to ‘the traditional notion of biological evolution based on the 
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atomistic development of single life forms’.35 Through the opening of a greater variety of evolutionary 
pathways within ecosystems or ecocommunities that are able to maintain their diversity, individual 
organisms are presented with ‘a dim element of choice’, and from this, they began to play an 
increasingly active role in their own evolution.  Rather than competition for the survival of the fittest, 
the key concepts of natural evolution for Bookchin are ‘participation and differentiation’.  Bookchin’s 
dialectical interpretation of ecology calls attention to “the compensatory manner by which animals and 
plants foster each other’s survival, fecundity, and well-being’.  Once natural evolution is seen as united 
by this logic of differentiation, 
 
[t]he possibility of freedom and individuation is opened up by the rudimentary forms of self-
selection, perhaps even choice, if you will, of the most nascent and barely formed kind that 
emerges from the increasing complexity of species and their alternate pathways of evolution.  
Here, without doing violence to the facts, we can begin to point to a thrust in evolution that 
contains the potentialities of freedom and individuation.36 
 
We can thus begin to see the emergence of a ‘sense of self-identity, however germinal, from 
which nature begins to acquire its rudimentary subjectivity’, a subjectivity that extends itself beyond 
self-maintenance ‘to become a striving activity, not unlike the development from the vegetative to the 
animative, that ultimately yields mind, will, and the potentiality for freedom’.37 Dialectic ‘explains, 
with a power beyond that of any conventional wisdom’38 how the organic flow of first into second 
nature is a re-working of biological reality into social reality. 
According to Bookchin, the counterpart to a dialectical understanding of ecology is the 
understanding of how evolution, dialectically understood, provides a new ground on which to base an 
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ethics for society and nature.  Dialectic thus becomes far more than a method of thought.  Nature’s 
striving towards increasingly complex and self-conscious life forms provides a potentiality on which 
norms can be built.  These norms can then be formulated as the actualisation of the potential “is” of 
natural evolution ‘into an ethical “ought” [. . .] anchored in the objective reality of potentiality itself’.39 
Nature’s thrust towards self-reflexivity may then provide a radical and far-reaching contrast and basis 
for critique of the current ‘is’ of the irrational anti-ecological society.  For Bookchin, growth, change, 
and diversification in nature never reach an end point but are ever present.  Investing dialectic with an 
ecological understanding divests dialectic of its earlier teleological interpretations as a movement 
towards Absolute Knowledge, as with Hegel, or towards a communist society as with Marx and Engels.  
Therefore, bringing nature into the foreground of dialectical thought ‘can ventilate the dialectic as an 
orientation toward the objective world by rendering it coexistent with natural evolution.’40 An 
ecologised dialectic thus overcomes the limitations of previous idealistic or materialistic approaches to 
dialectic. 
For Bookchin, the process of natural evolution as a whole ultimately provides ‘certain premises’ 
for the emergence of social life, ‘the institutionalisation of the animal community into a potentially 
rational, self-governing form of association’.41 In addition, the thrust of natural evolution in terms of 
the ever-greater complexity of the nervous system and brain also provides the necessary processes for 
the emergence of reason itself.  This ensemble of ideas reflects the emergence of selfhood, reason, and 
freedom from nature, rather than in sharp opposition to nature.  Natural evolution, fully aware of itself 
in the form of a humanity that has fulfilled its potentiality, could create a fully ecological society, 
wherein humanity and nature retain their specificity yet mutually reinforce each other: nature would re-
enter humanity in the lessons of a full understanding of natural evolution, and humanity would re-enter 
nature as the most conscious guide of its immanent striving.  Humanity could lead in creating an 
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ecological society, one that would transcend first and second nature into the new domain of a free 
nature.42 
 
The Philosophy of Nature in the Intellectual Context of Modern Scepticism 
The suspicion and scepticism surrounding a philosophy of nature in the social constructionist 
context is not a new development.  Murray Bookchin in his essay ‘Toward a Philosophy of Nature’43 
referred to the ‘prejudices’ against such a project; the essay provides another examination and closer 
look at Bookchin’s thinking: 
 
Today, virtually all nature philosophy is burdened by a massive number of stultifying prejudices, 
but the worst of these prejudices fester precisely in the academy.  There, any conjunction of the 
words nature and philosophy automatically evokes fears of antiscientific archaisms and 
premodernist regressions to a static cosmological metaphysics.44 
 
In the essay, Bookchin calls for a renewed appreciation of the Pre-Socratic ‘archaic’ background 
of the Western philosophical tradition.  He comments on the way in which the positing of Cartesian 
mechanism as the original sin that distorted the modern image has been overstated for programmatic 
reasons, to avoid singling out the “dubious subjectivism” of Kant, evident in the “quasi-religious 
transcendentalism now burgeoning in so much ‘anti-mechanistic’ thinking”.  Bookchin acknowledges 
Heidegger’s exploration of the founding thinkers of Western philosophy, but dismisses Heidegger 
sternly: 
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Ontology understandably bears a fearsome visage when it lacks a social and moral context, and 
the concept of Being loses contact with reality when it is subtly assimilated to subjective 
approaches to reality like Heidegger’s.45 
 
Bookchin values Ionian, Eleatic, Heraclitean, and Pythagorean thinkers not so much for their 
specific speculations as for their intentions and the kind of unities they attempt to foster.  The themes of 
Being, Form, Motion, and Causality are infused with moral meaning.   Crucially, Pre-Socratic 
philosophers assume the ability to know the world because it is orderly and intelligible, and lends itself 
to rational interpretation because it is rational.  As noted previously, Bookchin criticises contemporary 
ecological philosophy, including Batesonian systems theory, as captive within the “Kantian trench” that 
excludes the onta constituting the substantial underpinnings of nature philosophy and turns philosophy 
instead towards the question of the nature of knowing.  Bookchin also criticises the limitations of 
Bertalanffy’s ‘general systems theory’, which attempts to replace a closed cybernetic systems theory 
with a more open one, as ultimately mechanistic.  In particular, he claims that general systems theory is 
unable to account adequately for evolutionary change and development, relying on a passive 
interpretation of natural selection and an emphasis on interaction rather than development.  
Bookchin argues that a “presuppositionless” philosophy is a myth. Overcoming “subjectivistic” 
approaches to nature and approaches based on an ultimately mechanistic systems theory requires us to 
formulate new premises that provide coherence and meaning to natural evolution.  The truth of a nature 
philosophy will lie in the faithfulness and adequacy of its account of the evolutionary unfolding of 
nature as it grades into social evolution and ethics.  The first presupposition is that we have the right to 
attribute properties to nature based on the best of our knowledge—that certain attributes and contexts 
are self-evident in nature.  Bookchin comments, ‘This assumption is immediately problematic for a vast 
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number of academic philosophers—although, ironically, it is no problem for most scientists’.46 
Although ‘the great Renaissance notion’ that matter and motion are the most underlying properties of 
nature has changed as our understanding of the meaning of these terms has changed, it remains a 
prevalent scientific assumption. 
Bookchin cites a non-scientific source—Denis Diderot in D’Alembert’s Dream—for the 
articulation of one crucial transformation of the meaning of matter and motion.  Diderot proposes the 
notion of sensibilité, an internal nisus commonly translated as “sensitivity.”  Bookchin sees this notion 
as identifying an immanent fecundity of matter, as distinguished from motion as mere change of place, 
and as a marked advance over the prevalent mechanism of La Mettrie, anticipating not only nineteenth-
century theories of evolution but recent developments in biology.  Diderot’s sensibilité offers an active 
concept of matter, though the title D’Alembert’s dream forewarns readers of his doubt of his story, 
given the limited scientific knowledge of the time. 
Bookchin offers more recent scientific research that may be seen to support the notion of 
matter’s ‘sensitivity’, as it develops in terms of increasing complexity from the atomic level to the 
brain. 
 
[T]here is a nisus for complexity, an entelechia that emerges from the very nature, structure, and 
form of potentiality itself, given varying degrees of the organization of “matter”.  From this 
potentiality and the actualization of the potentialities of various organisms, sensibilité initiates 
its journey of self-actualization and emergent form.  Diderot’s holism, in turn, is one of the most 
conspicuous features of D’Alembert’s Dream.  An organism achieves its unity and sense of 
direction from the contextual wholeness of which it is part, a wholeness that imparts 
directiveness to the organism and reciprocally receives directiveness from it.47 




A second presupposition is the alternative pathway to the epistemological focus of Kantianism 
opened up by Hegel, within the phenomenological and dialectical approach of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit.  In Hegel’s words, the Phenomenology “has only phenomenal knowledge for its object, free and 
self-moving in its own peculiar shape; . . . it can be regarded as the path of the natural consciousness 
which presses forward to true knowledge’.48 Bookchin quotes Engels’s view that the Phenomenology 
may be seen as ‘a parallel of the embryology and the paleontology of the mind, a development of 
individual consciousness through its different stages, set in the form of an abbreviated reproduction of 
the stages through which the consciousness of man has passed in the course of history’.4 
 
Scientific Support 
The concept of sensibilité in matter and Hegel’s phenomenological strategy suggest the 
metaphor that nature itself “writes” natural philosophy and ethics—rather than ‘logicians, positivists, 
neo-Kantians, and heirs of Galilean scientism’.50 Bookchin cites support for this speculative proposition 
developments in a number of scientific fields current in the latter part of the twentieth Century when he 
was writing.  These include revolutionary advances in astrophysics that enable us to envision the entire 
universe as the cradle of life. The presence of complex organic molecules in the vast reaches of space is 
replacing the image of space as a void with the understanding of space as a restlessly active 
chemogenic ground.  All elements form from hydrogen and helium, combine into small molecules and 
then self-form into macromolecules; the organisation of these macromolecules into the constituents of 
life and mind challenges Bertrand Russell’s image of humanity as an accidental spark in a meaningless 
void.  Recent theories about the formation of DNA modelled on the activity of crystalline replication 
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suggest how genetic guidance and evolution itself might have emerged to form an interface between 
the inorganic and the organic. 
These developments suggest strongly that we can no longer accept the characterisation of nature 
as “inert” matter that fortuitously aggregates into life.  The universe bears witness to a developing—not 
merely moving—substance with an unceasing capacity for self-organising into increasingly complex 
forms.  Form plays a central role in this development, with function as an indispensable correlate. The 
orderly universe scientists assume makes the logic of mathematics meaningful and presupposes the 
correlation of form and function.   
Additionally, Bookchin cites theoretical advances in biology, wherein the metabolism of life 
establishes another elaboration of sensibilité—symbiosis beyond the chemogenic crucible we call the 
universe.  He claims that ‘recent data’ support the applicability of Peter Kropotkin’s mutualistic 
naturalism not only to relationships among species but among complex cellular forms.  Bookchin 
quotes biologist William Trager’s remark about the ‘survival of the fittest’: ‘few people realise that 
mutual cooperation between different kinds of organisms—symbiosis—is just as important, and that 
the “fittest” may be the one that most helps another to survive’.51 
The work of Lynn Margulis further suggests that the cellular structure of all multicellular 
organisms is testimony to a symbiotic arrangement that renders complex life-forms possible.  Her study 
of the eukaryotic cell making up organisms highlights the functional symbiotic arrangement of the less 
complex and more primal prokaryotes, or anaerobic single-celled organisms, thereby suggesting three 
ideas: eukaryotic flagella derived from anaerobic spirochetes; mitochondria derived from prokaryotic 
bacteria that were capable of respiration as well as fermentation; and plant chloroplasts derived from 
blue-green algae (cyanobacteria).52 Bookchin quotes Manfred Eigen, who postulated that evolution 
‘appears to be an inevitable event, given the presence of certain matter with specified autocatalytic 
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properties and under the maintenance of the finite (free) energy flow [solar energy] necessary to 
compensate for the steady production of energy’.53 This observation adds to the argument that matter is 
active substance, that life and all its attributes are latent in matter, and that biological evolution is 
deeply rooted in symbiosis or mutualism.  This active substance, evolved into life, appears to create 
much of its own environment actively, rather than passively adapting to it, as evidenced by the role of 
life-forms in maintaining the concentration of oxygen in the Earth’s atmosphere and the salinity of the 
oceans.   
Bookchin cites the “Effect Hypothesis” of evolution as advanced by Elizabeth Vrba, which 
looks to internal parameters that affect rates of speciation and extinction, and challenges the Modern 
Synthesis neo-Darwinian model of evolution.54 The Effect Hypothesis suggests that evolution features 
an immanent striving, not merely random mutational changes filtered by external selective factors.  
These and other revisions to understandings of evolution raise the possibility of a directiveness to 
genetic change itself, not merely a fortuitous randomness, and an environment largely created by life 
itself, not by forces exclusively external to it. 
These developments across the disciplinary boundaries of various sciences suggest an 
ecological view that ontologically grades natural history into social history without sacrificing the unity 
of either.  Bookchin identifies the fallacy of classical Greek cosmology not in its ethical orientation but 
in its dualism:   
 
[A]ncient cosmology erred most when it tried to join the self-organizing fecund nature it had 
inherited from the Ionians with a vitalizing force alien to the natural world itself.  The self-
organizing properties of nature were replaced with Parmenides’ Dike—like Bergson’s elan 
vital, a latently dualistic cosmology that could not trust nature to develop on its own 
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spontaneous grounds, any more than ruling social and political strata trust the body politic to 
manage its own affairs.”55  
 
Classical nature philosophy thus erred not in the project of eliciting an ethics from nature, but in the 
‘spirit of domination that poisoned it’.56 
In modern times, bolstered by developments in the contemporary science of his day, Bookchin 
argues that we may be able to permit nature, rather than Dike, God, or Spirit to reveal itself as the 
ground for an ethics on its own terms.  Mutualism can be seen to affirm community as a “desideratum” 
in both nature and society.  The claims of freedom can be validated by what Hans Jonas called the 
“inwardness” of lifeforms:  Bookchin writes: ‘The effort, venture, indeed self-recognition that every 
living being exercises in the course of “its precarious metabolic continuity” to preserve itself reveals—
even in the most rudimentary of organisms—a sense of identity and selective activity that Jonas 
appropriately called evidence of a “germinal freedom’“.57 Bookchin admits that some forms of systems 
theory may explain the disequilibria that change systems, but we need to look to inherent attributes of 
substance such as the sensibilité of matter to account for the development of nature towards complexity, 
specialization, and consciousness.   He comments on the way in which this view of nature runs counter 
the contemporary philosophical biases, which tend to either ignore the fact of directiveness or endow it 
with human traits such as purposiveness, rather than seeing it as simply a tendency that inheres in the 
organisation of substance as potentiality. 
Bookchin’s approach to nature philosophy asserts that the validity of the presuppositions 
advanced must be tested against the real dialectic of natural development, rather than against data and 
statistical probabilities adduced by empirical observation.  Here, Bookchin acknowledges agreement 
with “contextualists” like Whitehead who claim that facts do not exist on their own but are always 
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relational or interactive, using Diderot’s germinal word.58 In addition, he acknowledges that his 
approach may be as self-enclosed as the Kantian approach; however, he affirms that he has not faulted 
neo-Kantian or even positivistic theories for their internal unity or impregnability to immanent 
criticism.  Rather, he faulted them for their claim to universality, because their presuppositions lack an 
adequate framework for understanding natural history and its ethical implications.  For Bookchin, the 
study of nature exhibits a self-evolving nisus that is implicitly ethical.  Mutualism, self-organisation, 
freedom, and subjectivity are not solely human concerns.  They require no God or Hegelian spirit to 
vitalise them.  They can be seen to cohere according to social ecology’s principles of unity-in diversity, 
spontaneity, and nonhierarchical relationships, which are constitutive of evolution’s potentialities.  
Bookchin concludes, “if social ecology can provide a coherent focus on the unity of mutualism, 
freedom and subjectivity as aspects of a cooperative society that is free of domination and guided by 
reflection and reason, it will have removed the difficulties that have plagued naturalistic ethics for so 
long.”59 
 
Assessing Bookchin’s social ecology 
In the following chapters, I critique the philosophy of social ecology, offering recent scientific 
support for some of Bookchin’s characterisations of the natural world, though I question his 
‘directionality thesis’—the notion of an overarching telos or tendency toward increasing biological 
complexity, consciousness, subjectivity, choice, and freedom.  Further, I argue that in the context of 
philosophy and critical thought today, social ecology needs an epistemology, a well-argued basis to 
trust its assertions about nature as something real and not simply something we wish to believe because 
it supports our political goals.  Finally, I examine the ways in which the revolutionary project of social 
ecology might respond theoretically and practically to a lacuna in terms of the issues of racism and 
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colonialism.60 First, however, I look at the potential contributions that a so-called “New 
Materialism”—and especially the work of Catherine Malabou—offers to Bookchin’s social ecology.  
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Chapter 3: Social Ecology and Deconstruction 
As I observed in my introduction, radical and revolutionary political thought has existed in 
tension at best and often in opposition to two elements: Continental philosophy in general, identified 
as it has been with the work of Heidegger; and deconstruction as put forward by Derrida and more 
recently reworked by Malabou.   The purpose of this seeming digression is to encourage a greater 
openness to deconstructive approaches among those who may be more at home in other forms of 
social inquiry, based on what may be considered more straightforward political concepts. I now 
recount the infamous Sokal hoax and the polemic associated with it. 
In pivoting to deconstruction at this juncture, I imagine a dismissive groan from those who 
remain on one side of a polemic that came to a head with the Sokal hoax.  To revisit this oft-cited 
incident briefly, The New York Times reported on the front page of its 18 May, 1996 edition the story 
of a hoax played on the peer-reviewed academic journal Social Text, the chief outlet of the “cultural 
studies” movement greatly influenced by poststructuralist discourse.  The physicist Alan Sokal had just 
revealed in Lingua Franca that he had submitted a satire entitled ‘Transgressing the Boundaries: 
Toward a Transformative Hermeneutic of Quantum Gravity’, aimed at making what postmodern 
sociologists for science say about gravity look ridiculous, and challenging what Sokal took to be the 
relativism of cultural studies regarding the ‘hard science’ of physics.1 
The Sokal hoax prompted an article entitled “Postmodernism and the Left” by Barbara 
Epstein,2 whom Sokal had contacted to help prepare a piece that disclosed his hoax, which was 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   80 
 
 
subsequently overtaken by events that led to the discovery of the hoax by free-lance journalist David 
Glenn, and the statement by Sokal published by Lingua Franca. 
In her article, Epstein provides a useful overview of some of the controversies surrounding the 
rise of cultural studies in the late twentieth-century academy.  She presents an abbreviated historical 
and sociological overview of issues related to postmodernism, critiquing the “subculture of 
postmodernism” within the university, and its claim to be the intellectual voice of the left.  She traces 
postmodernist intellectual movements to the debates within intellectual circles in the aftermath of 
the betrayal of the student movement by the French Communist Party in May of 1968.  Epstein notes 
that postmodernism rejected not only the humanism of Sartre but also the structuralism dominant at 
the time, though retaining its focus on language.  This led to the view that all reality is shaped by 
language, which then becomes primary, and everything else, including overt structures of political 
power, are derived or constructed from it.  Combined with the work of Foucault on how power is 
dispersed through society, this view about language led to a focus on cultural critique and the 
micropolitics of daily life, away from the macrostructures of the economy and the state.  Epstein 
asserts that the demands of the academy took precedence over the relation with (the attenuated) 
social movements by the 1990s, with claims to radicalism serving primarily the purpose of career 
advancement. 
Epstein rejects the “strong” version of postmodernism, which she states as the view that 
because all reality is mediated by language, there is no truth, only truth claims, and no privileged or 
unassailable position from which to measure these claims.  She accepts the obvious premise that our 
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perception of reality is mediated and argues against the claim that all truth claims have equal status.  
Epstein acknowledges that we will never possess ultimate truth, but asserts that it is possible to 
expand our understanding, and that it is worth the effort to gain more knowledge. 
Epstein’s comments would seem non-controversial, even from a constructionist position: as we 
have seen, the “hyper-constructionist” questioning of any objective reality outside of that constructed 
by discourse is a decidedly minority view.  However, Epstein’s comments have been part of a 
polemic—one I argue has resulted from a process of mutual caricaturisation similar to that between 
Bookchin and certain of his deep ecology critics, as well as to a tendency still prevalent to subsume a 
disparate and often contentious discourse within the general label of postmodernism, with a 
presumed set of common denominators among quite divergent thinkers.  It is important to emphasise 
that Derrida never argues for the relativity of truth claims.  John D. Caputo has responded to the 
caricature of Derrida and deconstruction in particular. He writes,  
The last thing Derrida is interested in doing is undermining the natural sciences or scientific 
knowledge generally.  A “deconstruction” of natural science, were it undertaken seriously and 
with a sufficient sense of gravity, [pun definitely intended] would be good news. Its effect 
would be to keep the laws of science in a self-revising, self-questioning mode of openness to 
the “other”, which here would mean the scientific “anomaly”, the thing that defies or 
transgresses the law (nomos). A deconstructive approach to science would keep the scientific 
community open to the upstarts, the new ideas, the audacious young graduate students who 
come up with unexpected hypotheses that at first look a little funny and then a little brilliant.3 
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Nurtured within the diverse, surprisingly efficacious, and greatly underappreciated activist 
community inspired by social ecology, it might seem ‘natural’ for me to take the anti-postmodernist 
side of the polemic, a polemic that has resurfaced and even intensified with deconstruction and 
‘French theory’ now being blamed for a Trumpian era of ‘alternative facts’. Indeed something like this 
antipathy to “postmodernism” was the case for me for a number of years.  However, as I have read 
more Derrida for this project, I have come to appreciate the ethical thrust of his work.  The general 
itinerary of his approach proceeds from a scholarly, intellectually rigorous ‘first reading’; his intent in 
the subsequent ‘productive’ or deconstructive reading is not to destroy theoretical structures, nor to 
presume to ‘correct’ them in the manner of critique, but to show the complicity of certain structures 
of argument with the forces they oppose and, indirectly perhaps, to provide the conditions of 
possibility for others to make those theoretical structures more sound and resilient. The first response 
for Derrida was not to the theoretical question, but (influenced by Levinas) to the ethical call of the 
other, to the person, thing, or idea that might all too easily seem already objectified and known, such 
as the established categories of gender.  I would agree with Clayton Crockett when he writes, ‘[D]uring 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, this cultural-intellectual-technological scheme of writing evolves into a 
motor scheme that Malabou describes as one of plasticity. . . . In effect, concerns of ethics, politics, 
and religion emerge into the foreground as writing becomes more and more backgrounded’.4 
Social ecology of course is aimed at a concrete project for revolutionary social and political 
transformation.  Social ecology theory is meant to provide a sound basis for coherent thinking, which 
enables activists to pursue this primary goal and the many related goals entailed along the way.  The 
present study is primarily an inquiry into the philosophy of social ecology, though I briefly address 
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some of what may be termed movement-related issues in the present chapter, and in the final two 
chapters.    
Bookchin objects to what he saw as the relativist and even nihilistic implications of 
“postmodernism”, which he strenuously rejects along with “mystical ecologies” as being terribly 
inadequate to meeting the challenges of thinking through and incrementally achieving a revolutionary 
project for our time.  If we apply the political test that this rejection implies to the deconstruction of 
Derrida and Malabou, we must ask how deconstruction contributed or how might it contribute to 
activism towards concrete social and political reconstruction?  I have previously discussed one 
instance of the way Derridean deconstruction may be seen to have indirectly informed the approach 
of activists confronting timber companies in their plans to clearcut portions of the ancient forests of 
British Colombia.    
A further investigation of this topic is provided by Jessica Simpson and James K. Rowe in their 
article ‘Why Poststructuralism is a Live Wire for the Left’, which presents what might be considered an 
update on the ‘theory wars’ discussed by Epstein.5 Similar to what I have been maintaining, Simpson 
and Rowe argue that left movements, including those directed at gender inequities and male violence 
against women, could benefit from more contact with poststructuralist insights.  They cite the 
“growing irrelevance” of theory for emerging anti-globalist movements of the new millennium.  
Although they acknowledge that anti-globalisation activists have probably been exposed to 
poststructuralist writing, they list more probable influences within a broad non-academic anarchist 
orientation as ‘Hakim Bey, Bob Black, Noam Chomsky, Naomi Klein, Subcomandante Marcos, 
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Arundhati Roy, Vandana Shiva, Starhawk, and John Zerzan’. The authors focus on areas in which 
poststructuralist insights can be helpful for left activists—for example, being careful not to 
replicate exclusions in activist organising through tactics such as learning how to avoid this 
exclusion by means of teach-ins and workshops; going beyond moralism and self-righteousness 
in strategic organising, while holding to ethical principles that go beyond the merely strategic or 
cynical and self-serving; and avoiding the tendency to essentialise the “enemy” as having more 
structural coherence than actually possessed, thereby ignoring the cracks and contradictions that 
activists can turn to their advantage.  I agree with these sound insights, but point out the need for 
utilising these within an engagement toward a macropolitics of change, something which social 
ecology can uniquely provide.   In addition, I challenge the notion of the irrelevance of theory: 
theory creates a milieu, I argue, in which ideas actualise in unforeseen and creative ways, as we 
have seen with the example of the struggle against clear-cutting in British Colombia.  Later in this 
study, I suggest the process of creolization as a way to understand this interactive space of 
creative potential among various actors engaged in a shared project towards a more inclusive and 
radical democracy. 
I now turn to a short explication of deconstruction as developed by Derrida and reworked by 
Malabou.   I then suggest how these insights might enter into conversation with Bookchin’s social 
ecology, noting as part of the analysis the way in which Bookchin’s philosophy of nature builds on the 
work of a somewhat overlooked thinker, Hans Jonas.  Finally, I consider how the insights offered by 
deconstruction might serve social ecology and other movement activists working for an anti- or post-
capitalist future. 
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Jacques Derrida and the Erasure of a Natural Origin 
Linking the critique of presence and the philosophical focus on language, and most pointedly 
encompassing a subversion of the notion of an efficacious subject, is the work of Jacques Derrida.  
Derrida’s thinking regarding that which deconstructs the closure of philosophical systems from within, 
variously termed différance, the trace, or the supplement, continues to influence strongly the idea of a 
social nature, as we have seen.   
Derrida’s philosophy deconstructs the assumption of a self-identical presence at the ‘root’ of 
things, and also the assumption of a simple origin.  Derrida claims that whatever origin we find or 
whatever sequential ordering we posit is effectively undone by the very means by which it is articulated.  
A past origin cannot be thought without its derivation, and further, it cannot appear without being 
occulted or eclipsed by the means by which it signifies.  The double movement of occultation or 
erasure and retroactive constitution is known as the ‘trace’.  The trace through which we refer to the 
past is not continuous with that past, nor is it a kind of being.  It is understood through a related key 
concept, that of ‘différance’, spelled with an ‘a’, which introduces a gap irreducible to any prior 
synthesis, unity, or continuity. 
Derrida developed his deconstruction of self-identical presence through and against Hegel, 
Husserl, and Heidegger.  In some ways, Derrida follows a path similar to Hegel’s critique of 
external reflection, the critique of the subject as merely reading the truth of an object as reflected 
back to itself, rather than as the awareness that such determinations occur in a context always 
already given to the subject through the synthetic activity of consciousness.  The veiled essence of 
experience as the way in which subject and object are defined in relation to each other is the 
expression of a determining power that Hegel calls ‘determining reflection’.  Ultimately, according 
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to Hegel, we must move beyond the stance of detached, disinterested observation to the concrete 
project of recognising that (and in what way) our apparent other is a reflection of our true 
determining identity.  Absolute knowing realises that it is only by grasping the determinate form of 
its relation to objects that it will know itself.  For Heidegger, this self-already-in situation, which 
does not recognise that it is standing outside of itself, is dasein, characterised by a ‘throwness’ into 
‘everydayness’, an everydayness that conceals the gift of being.  Derrida critiques the ‘master 
signifier of being’ in Heidegger, and identifies multiple gaps rather than the one gap that can be 
bridged in the Hegelian aufehebung.  
An early deconstructive effort was Derrida’s 1967 Voice and Phenomenon, a study of 
Husserl’s phenomenological investigation into the nature of scientific objects.6 Here, Derrida 
argues that, when Husserl describes lived-experience (Erlebnis), even absolute subjectivity, he is 
speaking of an interior monologue, auto-affection as hearing-oneself-speak. In the very moment 
when silently I speak to myself, it must be the case that there is a miniscule hiatus differentiating 
me into the speaker and into the hearer. That is, a hiatus exists that differentiates me from myself, a 
hiatus or gap without which I would not be a hearer as well as a speaker. This hiatus also defines 
the trace, a minimal repeatability. Thus, this hiatus, this fold of repetition, is found in the very 
moment of hearing-myself-speak. 
In his seminal text Of Grammatology, Derrida presents the notion of ‘general’ or arche-writing 
that attempts to express the essential nature of language, and indeed of all signification or inscription, 
as that which exceeds and in some sense antedates speech and the narrow history of writing.7 This 
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notion emerges through a careful study of Saussure, Lévi-Strauss, and Rousseau, building upon 
Derrida’s ‘acknowledged precursors’: Nietzsche, Freud, and Heidegger. 
Saussure and Rousseau in varying ways exemplify the nostalgia for lost presence, for unity and 
mastery, identified in the valorisation of the parousia of the voice, the self-presence of the solitary and 
silent thought of the self—the unique type of auto-affection examined by Husserl—in contrast to the 
artifice and ‘unnaturalness’ of writing.  However, Saussure was obliged to acknowledge that there is no 
necessity in the connection of a particular thought or thing and a particular sound—the phonic signifier 
is as arbitrary and conventional as the graphic.  This insight enabled Derrida to suggest that what opens 
the possibility of thought is not merely the thought of being (the ‘transcendental signified’ interrogated 
by Heidegger) but the structure of a never-annulled difference from a completely other.   
Derrida’s strategy is that of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the necessary resources 
for the de-construction of that heritage.  This strategy has some similarity to that of bricolage, which 
Lévi-Strauss alludes to in The Savage Mind, whereby anthropologists must repurpose concepts possibly 
meant for other ends, as tools possessing relative efficacy in the project of empirical work, because it is 
impossible for them to master the whole field.  Derrida, however, argues that it is theoretically—not 
only empirically—impossible to make the end of knowledge coincide with its means: the sign and 
meaning can never become self-identical. 
Derrida shares Nietzsche’s suspicion of the values of Truth, Meaning and Being to a point, 
though he does not summarily dismiss questions of truth.  Moreover, Derrida shares Nietzsche’s 
commitment to the understanding of philosophical discourse as formal, rhetorical, figurative discourse 
to be deciphered, especially metaphor as the originary process of what the intellect presents as truth. 
For Nietzsche, the will to power energises the drive for knowledge as a process of appropriating new 
material into old schemas, the making equal of what is new. The only origin, being a direct sign of 
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nothing, leads to no primary signified.  Instead, there is a thematic of active interpretation.  Acutely 
aware of the way in which philosophers are bound by their perspectives, Nietzsche can at least attempt 
to reverse perspectives often, suggesting the Derridean practise of deconstructing—and reversing the 
hierarchies of—supposed unitary opposites. 
Similarly, Nietzsche analyses the ‘subject’ as a unified concept that results from interpretation, 
and that occurs as a linguistic figurative habit: the thought that when there is thought, there must be 
something that thinks.  Nietzsche sometimes puts the will to power not under the control of a knowing 
subject, but underground, in the unconscious.  For Derrida, then, both Nietzsche and Freud ‘sometimes 
in very similar fashion put consciousness into question in its assured certainty of itself’.8 Nietzsche 
acknowledges that there is no escape from thinking within a determined position or perspective, and 
proposes an ‘active forgetting’ of the relativity of all perspectives.  This forgetting is distinct from the 
‘forgetting of the question of being’ that forms the problematic for Heidegger; Derrida believes 
Nietzsche’s Overman ‘will not be a guard of the house and the truth of Being’.9 Ultimately, Derrida 
reads Nietzsche not only through but against Heidegger, notably against Heidegger’s reliance on the 
‘transcendental signified’ of Being.  This putting the knowing subject into question in Derrida’s 
invocation of Nietzsche and Freud is evident, of course, in Hegel, but the effect is to challenge the 
belief in an efficacious subject significantly more than in Hegel’s philosophy. 
Derrida in Of Grammatology engages in an extended close reading of Rousseau’s Essay on the 
Origin of Languages.  The thought of such an origin places us in that liminal space between the ‘state 
of nature’ and human society and culture.  The first words of the Essay are: ‘Speech distinguishes man 
from the animals.’ Speech is therefore not natural.  However, Rousseau distinguishes between language 
and speech: speech is universally human, but languages are diverse.  Speech owes its form to natural 
causes alone, but to understand what makes one people speak a particular language and not another, 
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one must go back to the local and that which precedes even customs.  Derrida thus writes, ‘the natural 
causality of language splits itself in two.’10  
Imagination and pity, key terms for Rousseau, are natural yet need awakening.  Humans 
encounter others, recognise them, and wish to communicate.  Rousseau envisioned the first language as 
gestural.  Writing then emerges as ‘the dangerous supplement, which on the one hand may add to and 
improve and, on the other hand, may come to replace, resulting in a loss of energy, a loss of the sense 
of immediacy and presence and vital connection between word and thought or thing.  Yet the concept 
of nature within this account, as Derrida writes, becomes enigmatic; there can be no simple origin: 
 
The natural is first valorized and then disqualified: the original is also the inferior retained 
within the superior.  The language of gesture and the language of voice, sight, and hearing, are 
“equally natural”.  Nevertheless, one is more natural than the other, and because of this it is first 
and better. Natural immediacy is at once origin and end, but in the double sense of each of these 
words; birth and death, unfinished sketch and finished perfection.  From then on, all value is 
determined according to its proximity to an absolute nature.  But as this concept is that of a 
polarized structure, proximity is a distancing.  All the contradictions of the discourse are 
regulated, rendered necessary yet resolved, by this structure of the concept of nature.11 
Derrida deconstructed traditional metaphysics by means of the supplement and the trace.  Trace 
for Derrida has no relation to form—form names only that which is captive to the categories of being.  
In Margins of Philosophy he writes, 
As soon as we utilise the concept of form—even if to criticise an other concept of form—we 
inevitably have recourse to the self-evidence of a kernel of meaning.  And the medium of this 
self-evidence can be nothing other than the language of metaphysics.12 
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As we continue our philosophical journey, the question of how we may know nature evolves, 
under the pressure of the prospect of climate and related forms of ecological catastrophe, into 
questioning the forms grounded (perhaps) in nature that may help us think the future, in a way beyond 
“futurism” or dystopic despair, that gives a credible future for us and our descendants.  The critical and 
sceptical approach of deconstruction offers few resources in this regard.  Nature remains an intertextual 
phenomenon, all too easily assimilated to a “nature-sceptical” social constructionist that ironically 
limits the mobility and transformability of concepts of nature. 
Though it emphasises the contingent and the event and seeks to avoid architectonic structure, 
Derridean deconstruction does imply a structure of sorts, the ‘endless play of signifiers’ and the 
aporietic structure of substitutions and supplements.  However, the Derridean and Levinasean ethical 
move towards an atemporal and transcendent ‘messianism without messianicity’ ultimately limits the 
mobility and transformability of such an approach to deconstruction, both in temporal and 
morphological terms.  Even Derrida’s suggestion that DNA constitutes an instance of writing awaits the 
move from the genetic to the epigenetic that we discover in Malabou’s productive and plastic reading 
of Kant, a reading that returns embodiment to the trace and life to deconstruction, in multiple senses of 
the phrase. 
 
Catherine Malabou and the Critique of the Erasure of Form 
For Derrida, trace ‘exceeds the truth of Being’, and it thus exceeds the register of formation, or 
trans-formation, of change and metamorphosis.  Catherine Malabou, at one time a student but 
ultimately not a follower of Derrida, takes issue with these assertions in her Plasticity at the Dusk of 
Writing.13 She asks, “isn’t a certain play in form always the resource lying behind “supplementarity”?’ 
Malabou develops a philosophical concept of plasticity, first encountered in her reading of Hegel’s 
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Phenomenology of Spirit, in which Hegel describes the subject’s relation to its ‘accidents’ as plastic.  
Malabou argues that writing would have to be plastic to open onto its wider meaning in Derrida, 
masked by its derived or common meaning. 
Plasticity as a philosophical concept asks us to understand form in a more subtle, supple, and 
expanded manner, beyond its traditional ‘sculptural’ connotations as the convening of presence, as 
“presenting” in a given form.  Plasticity refers not only to the capacity to give, receive, and “explode” 
form (as in plastic explosives), but also to regulate the transformation of traditional historical concepts 
such as the Hegelian dialectic in its relation to, and ultimately exchange with, the “ultrahistorical” 
destruction in Heidegger, and deconstruction in Derrida.  
Rather than thematically exploring a confrontation of forms of negativity, as between Hegelian 
dialectic and Heideggerian destruction, with endless mutual accusations and denegrations, Malabou 
instead looks for that which authorises the shift from metaphysics to its other in Heidegger.  Change, 
economy, and metabolism in Heidegger occur along both migratory and transformational axes.  
Confrontations with alterity within the folds of being can lead to conceptual transformations, as well as 
new trajectories or pathways of thought.   
However, for there to be authentic transformation, altered thought must show itself in a new 
scheme—it must have visibility (Verwandling).  Malabou thus explores the image, scheme, and 
mobility appearing as the philosophical ‘fantastic’.  In Heidegger’s thought, this corresponds to the 
activated schema of the ‘end of the metaphysics of being’. For Hegel, it may be seen as the reflexive 
relation of history to itself.  Heidegger accuses Hegelian dialectics of constituting an implacable motor 
of change that ultimately does not change anything, because it consists of a ‘farewell to time on the 
road to spirit, which is eternal’. The most serious objection to the Hegelian dialectic for Heidegger is its 
apparent metaphysical understanding of being as immutability. According to Heidegger’s reading of 
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Hegel, the change of the other into the other of the other remains the work of relating the self to the 
undetermined immediacy of the self-same; thus being in Hegel is not originally metabolic.  Though 
Malabou contests Heidegger’s reading of temporality in Hegel’s philosophy in her The Future of Hegel, 
she does not sustain a direct confrontation between the two thinkers.14  
Instead, through her examination of the economy of change in Heidegger’s thought, Malabou 
recognises and demonstrates two essential points: first, the possibility of conferring an ontological 
meaning on plasticity permits its exportation outside of the dialectical framework.  Thus plasticity may 
be seen as the non-dialectical and ontological origin of the dialectic, which Heidegger claims Hegel 
fails to make explicit.  Second, this displacement of plasticity, essential in the genesis of its constitution 
as a ‘hermeneutic motor-scheme’ of thought, allows Malabou to develop Hegel’s implicit response, that 
there exists a ‘schizology’ in Heidegger, in the sense that he fails to recognise the ontological split 
representation as such, even though he is the one to bring it to light.  This schizological tendency can 
be seen in his worship of the ‘simple’.  In ‘Hebel—Friend of the House’, Heidegger writes that 
authentic metamorphosis ‘is an intensification which goes toward simplicity’.15 Malabou writes, ‘Yet 
what can the simple mean in a thought of difference if not something like a return, a regression toward 
the plenitude of presence.  Hegel’s answer . . . could therefore be the following: the recognition of the 
schizological tendency of ontology enables the dialectizing of the simple, breaking its sculptural 
effect’.16 The philosophical concept of plasticity as a hermeneutic motor-scheme allows deconstructed 
systems within the ‘metaphysical tradition’, such as that of Hegel, to ‘negotiate’ with their 
deconstruction—what is plastic has the ability to dissolve as well as assume form, to relaunch itself 
beyond destruction and deconstruction.  
In contesting the transcendence of the trace in Derrida (and in Emmanuel Levinas), Malabou 
challenges the dematerialisation of contemporary philosophy, its fascination with the opening to the 
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formless Other in Messianic thinking, and its mourning of an endless end.  She names not only the 
ontological exchangeability of plasticity but also the material dimension as well, including monetary 
exchange, and the exchange of values.  The image of the path in Heidegger and the other as a line that 
scratches, tears, slices, and striates in Derrida risks “the reduction of the metabolic to the phoronomic 
[echoing Kant], a reduction that Heidegger ultimately confuses with metaphysics’.17 
Malabou refuses to accept a possible beyond of form, any more than a transcendence or absence 
of negativity.  A philosophical impoverishment of movement to only the rectilinear trajectory cuts 
philosophy off from an understanding of alteration, formation or deformation, genesis, and decline—
from a relation to life.  Instead, she proposes a ‘plastic’ reading of a text that ‘seeks to reveal the form 
left in the text through the withdrawing of presence, that is, through its own deconstruction’.  She 
quotes Derrida’s announcement of writing and the “program” in Of Grammatology: 
 
 [W]e say “writing’” for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not 
and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, 
choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural “writing”. One might also speak 
of athletic writing, and even with greater certainty of military or political writing in view of the 
techniques that govern those domains today.  . . . It is also in this sense that the contemporary 
biologist speaks of writing and pro-gram in relation to the most elementary processes of 
information within the living cell.18 
A hermeneutic motor-scheme (the term is drawn partially from Bergson) must not only 
effectively order the understanding and exegesis of the prevailing thought of an era, but must be solidly 
constituted in its philosophical conceptuality.  Malabou writes that the linguistic-graphic scheme 
entered a twilight some time ago, and plasticity is establishing itself in its place, as the paradigmatic 
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figure of organisation in general, not only in research into the ‘plasticity’ of the brain, but in new forms 
of social and economic organization, including gender and sexual identities.  The political implications 
of nonhierarchical assemblies of neuronal networks in the brain and the self-organization of cells and 
synapses ‘should not be ignored’. Malabou concludes: ‘plasticity is able to momentarily characterize 
the material organization of thought and being.  It is my opinion therefore that we should certainly be 
engaging deconstruction in a new materialism’.19 
As adumbrated in the introduction to this chapter, assessing the political value of deconstruction 
is complex and contested, and well beyond the scope of this study.  However, I do want to present two 
incisive critiques of the political implications of Derridean construction, and argue for the way in which 
the ontological investigations of Malabou suggest resolutions of these issues. 
 
 
Assessment of Derrida in Relation to This Thesis 
In the context of the present inquiry, I evaluate the importance of Derrida and the value of his 
work in a number of ways.  First, Derrida’s work problematises concepts of nature, as we see in his 
productive reading of Rousseau.  This problematising has influenced social constructionist approaches 
to nature, as we have also seen.  Though the deconstruction of naturalising concepts has contributed to 
an intellectual milieu of scepticism in regard to the possibilities of a naturalist philosophy, it is not alien 
to what I see as a kind of social constructionism embedded in Murray Bookchin’s philosophy of nature, 
evident in his calling out such notions as that of the characterisation of the lion as the ‘king of beasts’, 
representing the projection of human social relations of domination. 
Second, I believe Derrida demonstrates a pronounced ethical sensibility, especially in his later 
writings.  Partly influenced by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, Derrida has spoken of his approach 
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as an attempt to answer the question posed by the other.   Derridean deconstruction has indirectly 
contributed significantly to overcoming oppressive hierarchical binaries, and has been useful for those 
active in overcoming gender-based oppression. In writings such as The Other Heading and Rogues, 
Derrida extends this ethical sensibility to an interrogation of Eurocentric and ethnocentric assumptions, 
and to political issues that emerge from a deconstruction of concepts of democracy and the sovereignty 
of political states. 
Third, Derrida’s decision to deconstruct concepts within the dominant Western tradition rather 
than challenge this tradition from some point ‘outside’ is also valuable, in that it ‘fissures’ this tradition 
in a more effective way—a way more productive of transformative possibilities, I argue, than a 
wholesale rejection, however principled.  Though Bookchin chose to work within the Western tradition 
as well, his effort is aimed at an architectonic structure, one relatively immune from immanent 
criticism.  Derrida’s approach is more open to the thought of the other and to the other’s thought, to the 
encounter with difference.  I further suggest that Derrida’s suspicion of closed architectonic 
philosophical structures potentially opens deconstruction to the possibilities explored in creolization 
theory as an anti-colonial discourse, discussed in Chapter 7.  Derrida’s deconstruction has been useful 
for anti-colonial activism, though it has been criticised for its dematerialised approach.  The openness 
of Derrida’s thought towards difference, nourished partially by his early alienation from the French 
communist party of his day, has encouraged a sensibility that tends to challenge dogmatism in whatever 
form, and this continues to be valuable within the contentiousness of a radical left that has not yet 
emancipated itself from factionalism. 
However, Derrida’s move towards an insistence and a prioritising of an immaterial and 
atemporal ‘messianic’ horizon from which to critique and deconstruct the Western metaphysical 
tradition remains a problematic site in terms of the political resonance of his thought.  Though 
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Derrida’s work has undoubtedly contributed to an enhanced appreciation of the self-deconstructing 
aporias of philosophical thought, and of ethics in relation to radical alterity, I would argue that the turn 
away from Hegel and dialectics following Heidegger has problematized coherent political thought in 
Continental philosophy in unfortunate as well as productive ways.  The primacy of a the project of 
deconstructing the Western metaphysical tradition over normative political concepts and distinctions 
has led, at least in the case of Derrida, to a questionable framing of the political dimensions of 
philosophic thought, ironically one that I would assert remains trapped in a disembodied quasi-
transcendental metaphysical and ultimately apolitical approach to ethical, legal, and social issues.  Next, 
I review an article that challenges Derrida on these issues. 
Nancy Fraser, in ‘The Force of Law: Metaphysical or Political?’, challenges the primacy of a 
quasi-transcendental approach to law over a critical theoretical approach based on normative political 
concepts.20 She first notes the way in which quasi-transcendental approaches take precedence over 
those of critical social theory in certain discourses influenced by the work of Derrida, the latter 
becoming deprivileged and seen as comparatively superficial.  She notes that those who defend the 
ethical disposition of Derridean deconstruction must confront the problem that normative conclusions 
cannot be derived from a quasi-transcendental premise.  She cites Derrida’s account of law and 
violence as inherent in the deep structure of judgement, wherein the underdetermination of legal 
judgement at the moment of decision requires that judgement can never be resolved by calculation but 
must always be a ‘leap’.  It is in this leap of radical freedom that the ‘madness’ or ‘violence’ of legal 
judgement resides. 
Fraser criticises Derrida’s account for its jump from the uncontroversial claim that legal 
judgement cannot be reduced to calculation to the ‘hyperbolic’ characterisation of such judgement as 
‘madness’, ‘mystique’, and ‘violence’, without acknowledging intermediate positions, such as the 
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Aristotelian conception of phronesis, which understands legal judgement neither as an algorithmic 
procedure, nor as the exercise of an irrational will.  She comments that when Derrida stylises judgment 
as ‘force’ or ‘violence’, he ups the rhetorical ante too quickly, risking the loss of important normative 
political distinctions between the presumably inescapable interplay of freedom and constraint in 
interpretation with contingent and alterable forms of individual and institutional coercion.  Her most 
serious objection is the way in which Derrida’s account of the constitutive violence in law is presented 
as independent of any specific social or institutional arrangements, and is thus not subject in principle 
to any possibility of change.  Ultimately, she opposes not the validity of this ‘metaphysical’ view of the 
force of law but its priority over a political approach, that would seek to identify and overcome the 
various levels at which masked structural violence distorts the institutional practise of legal judgement.  
Fraser argues that these priorities are exactly backward. 
 
Assessment of Malabou’s Contribution 
I argue that Malabou makes important contributions to some of the crucial problematic issues 
related to deconstruction sketched previously.  First, she contributes toward rematerialising 
contemporary Continental philosophy, thereby at least indirectly overcoming some of the limitations of 
Derrida’s approach.  In ways I analyse more closely in Chapter 5, she also performs an ontological 
investigation into the Kantian Transcendental with important implications for social ecology’s project 
of articulating a naturalism among a ‘shallow’ environmentalism that would not challenge the ‘grow or 
die’ dynamic of capitalism, a ‘deep’ ecology that would romanticise, reify, and detemporalise concepts 
of nature, as well as a social constructionist perspective that would deny the possibility of any stable 
concepts of nature at all beyond the projections of human social interests. 
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Malabou’s challenge to the atemporal Messianic horizon of Derrida’s thought is helpful in 
preserving within a materialist deconstructive practise a coherent ontological basis for the principled 
normative political concepts emphasised by Fraser above.  Her work is potentially valuable in 
interrogating atemporal legal judgements and political practices that would ‘freeze’ indigenous identity 
at the time of European conquest.21 This aspect of Malabou’s work has affinities with both a creolizing 
perspective that emphasises the creative and unforeseeable transformation of identities within a shared 
democratic project, and with the transformation of white identity encouraged by Linda Martín Alcott 
(see Chapter 7). 
 
Nature, Ethics and Politics in Jonas and Bookchin 
In addition to Malabou’s new materialism suggesting ways that social ecology theory can be 
transformed towards an increased openness to the thought of the other, how might Continental 
philosophy engage more closely with life, and with a new understanding of nature?  Hans Jonas in his 
The Phenomenon of Life, explores the way in which philosophy progressively divorced itself from the 
assumptions and concerns of a grounding in life that pervaded pre-Socratic thought, towards a 
preoccupation with that which is dead, the ultimate real of the inorganic constituents of life in the ‘new 
monism’ of scientific reductionism.22 Jonas laments the severing of the ideal, with its relative potency 
in accounting for such phenomena as consciousness and will, from the material substrate, as earlier 
idealistic systems and dualisms foundered and collapsed.  He posited the emergence of nihilism in both 
ancient Gnosticism and in the existentialist philosophy contemporaneous with his writing in the 
situation of the human being isolated within an indifferent nature (true even for the Gnostic and his 
transcendent God, alien to the realm of nature).  Jonas develops a systematic and comprehensive 
philosophical interpretation of biology.  He claims that mind and consciousness is prefigured 
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throughout organic existence, and that life-forms present themselves on an ascending scale of freedom 
of action, resulting in the capacity of humans for ethical behaviour (a theme he further expounds in his 
The Imperative of Responsibility).23 
Jonas seeks an ethical foundation in the study of organic existence that would protect against 
such ‘authentic’ existential actions as Heidegger’s embrace of the Third Reich.  For the early Heidegger, 
that we commit became more important than what we commit to.  Jonas suggests we must avoid a 
complete collapse into monism, whether objective or subjective.  We need objective measures 
grounded in the study of the natural world. 
Murray Bookchin’s work builds on and further develops these themes.  Already in the work of 
Jonas, we find the suggestion that the ‘problem of nature’ in Marxism and critical theory is not only a 
problem of the conceptualisation of nature, but also the conceptualisation of materialism.  A ‘new’ 
materialism with the metabolic resources of a philosophical notion of plasticity, may be able to suture 
the age-old splits and wounds of idealism versus materialism, while providing an ontological ‘helpline’ 
to Bookchin’s philosophy of social ecology.  New materialism as formulated by Malabou avoids the 
various reductionisms that Bookchin targets, such as a mystical focus on the ‘oneness’ of natural forms 
as forms of ‘energy’, that ignores their evolutionary co-development into richly differentiated forms. 
 
Ventilating the Closure of Social Ecology 
Murray Bookchin’s social ecology, examined closely in the preceding chapter as well as at other 
points in this thesis, offers a comprehensive and compelling vision, but critical questions remain.   
These questions hover around forms of rationality, logocentrism, ethnocentrism, the Enlightenment 
concept of the subject, and polemical forms of argumentation, and their relation to philosophic 
‘content’. 
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Bookchin argues strongly for an ecologised dialectic, as an alternative to mechanistic, scientific 
reductionism on the one hand, and to mysticism or intuitionism on the other.  Certainly there are other 
forms of rationality, however, than that of the conventional logic of essential identity and dialectic, 
such as the forms of destruction and deconstruction which Malabou explores, that can articulate, 
explicate, and meaningfully interrogate processes of change, especially those social processes already 
involving language, with its structures of difference and deferment.  We might accept the ontological 
premise of an active substance of life, as Malabou in fact does, providing additional support through 
her discussion of neuronal networks.  We might also support the goals of creating social and political 
institutional structures that oppose domination in all its forms and that advance democratic 
participation to the greatest degree possible.  Accepting these premises and goals does not mean 
however, that a specific form of thinking with its authorised interpretation is the only way to link the 
two. 
Derrida suggests reasonableness rather than rationality, the latter being too complicit with a 
history of white, male, European, logocentric authority.  Social ecology certainly presents a model that 
strives for theoretical closure, one that remains solidly within the metaphysical tradition with its 
emphasis on the positive, creative essence of ‘active substance’ and natural forms differentiating 
according to an immanent and directive sensibilité.  The polemical form of Bookchin’s writing impels 
an ethical either/or that eschews extended philosophical engagement with those traditions of thought 
that lie outside the ‘Western organismic tradition’ that he cites and hypostasises.  This form at times has 
the paradoxical effect of flattening the dialectic from a more open-ended process toward a more rigidly 
determined scheme, such that, one might be led to think that holding a particular view of nature, an 
understanding of nature inspired, let us say, by certain indigenous traditions, must inevitably be 
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associated with a reactionary social and political trajectory subsumed in some of Bookchin’s historical 
writing under the dismissive rubric of “shamanism”.  
I do not think such an attitude is conducive to building constructive alliances between 
predominantly white activists and Native activists, perhaps in the British Columbia example provided 
by Braun.  Social ecology would benefit from more explicit exploration of epistemological issues—for 
example, might the reliance on scientific support for social ecology arguments be complicit with a 
scientific ‘epistemology of rule’, privileging this knowledge over what has sometimes been 
characterised as ‘narrative knowledge’,29 especially if the history, social context, and implicit 
ideologies of official science are not directly questioned, as they might be within increasing calls for a 
‘science from below’. 
To be fair, Bookchin did derive a significant part of social ecology theory from non-European 
sources.  In his more historical and anthropological writings in The Ecology of Freedom he identifies 
ethical principles on the basis of a study of traditional indigenous societies and cultures, principles that 
characterise what he termed ‘organic societies’.30 If the science of ecology can be said to have 
established principles of interdependence and unity-in-diversity in and between natural eco-
communities, these principles can also be observed to characterise the awareness and norms of organic 
societies.  In addition, organic societies manifest ethical principles of reciprocity and complementarity, 
as well as the ‘irreducible minimum’, whereby the minimal needs of all members of a society must be 
met.  These principles may represent more expansive ethical ideals for social and political movements 
than even the concept of justice, which developed historically, according to Bookchin, with the 
emergence of warrior societies.  The horizon of freedom of newly subjugated peoples became 
constrained to notions of a nominal equivalence, ignoring the substantive ‘inequality of [juridical] 
equals.’ 




Implications for Praxis 
However, the relative lack of theory and writing in social ecology on ongoing forms of 
institutionalised and internalised colonialism, neo-colonialism, and racism may be said to condemn 
social ecology to its own performative self-contradictions.  In so far as social ecology theory is centred 
in the epistemological standpoint of the putative universal subject of Enlightenment thought in the 
interests of articulating a ‘general interest’, the ‘situated knowledges’ of those who have suffered the 
most from capitalism, patriarchy, colonialism, racism, and militarism, undergo their own version of 
‘cognitive erasure’.  The understandable call for moving beyond identity politics may result in ignoring 
the ‘inequality of equals’ by a theoretical stance that tends to minimise the substantive issues that need 
to be worked through.  On a practical level, this stance may result not only in alienating potential allies, 
but in reifying a praxis that holds itself aloof from the enormous contributions that members of the 
global south have to offer social theory and social movements. 
More promising in terms of creating broad multi-ethnic, trans-class, transformative movements 
free of gender-based oppression would be the Just Transition Assembly (JTA)-guided activism that has 
emerged out of People’s Movement Assemblies (PMAs) and the World and US Social Forum 
processes.31 These entities have developed organising strategies and principles that centre the 
experiences, voices, needs, desires, and decision-making power of frontline communities of colour.  
The need for an explicit orientation towards the perspectives of the Global South has become apparent 
through a movement history that has reproduced existing power relations, in which white voices have 
come to predominate and troublesome issues of racism and gender oppression are not given sufficient 
space to transform—dialectically or otherwise—into counter-institutional reconstructive forms.  Within 
the PMA and JTA processes, for example, resistance to the prison-industrial complex in the US has 
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evolved into a prison abolition movement, and issues of police violence and the violence of men 
against women have evolved past ‘community policing’ to a framework of self-organised ‘community 
safety’.  These movement experiences point to the ways in which subjectivities and agencies form in 
relation to specific struggles organised around difference, yet which evolve towards more 
comprehensive understandings and movement goals.  Asking individuals and communities to adopt 
from the start the perspective of the supposedly universal Enlightenment subject would be asking them 
to assume the very standpoint that, in many cases, they are struggling against.  As we shall see, 
however, creolization theory suggests that in encounters of groups from the Global South with agents 
of dominant culture aspects of the universalising Western tradition can and often are adopted in creative 
ways that undermine their colonising logic. 
Both the PMA/JTA and social ecology approaches recommend a focus on action in the local 
sphere; for example, offering arenas that remain less fully under the control of state and capitalist 
market forces.  However, these local efforts must be linked together in order to constitute a viable 
alternative to the politics of capitalism and the state.  Social ecology has articulated more explicit and 
concrete forms in which local efforts can be linked and coordinated.  Bookchin’s writing highlights the 
importance of what is defined as the authentic political realm, comprising [counter]institutional forms 
of decision making that emerge as a dialectical development or differentiation from social movement 
struggles.  Bookchin formulates this new politics as one of a ‘libertarian’ or ‘confederal’ municipalism, 
seeking to reclaim the potentiality of urban cultural space in overcoming ‘retribalization’, or a politics 
that remains an identity-based politics.   
The face to face assemblies characterising the proto-democratic decision-making processes at 
many points in history, going back to indigenous societies in pre-modern eras, would evolve into 
bodies invested in decision-making power in regard to the policies crucial to a particular area including 
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allocation and distribution of resources, while administrative functions would be carried out by 
workers’ councils and other groups.  These empowered assemblies at the local level would be 
confederated regionally, nationally, and internationally, with recallable delegates from the local 
assemblies mandated to represent the views of the majority of the local assembly at larger assemblies, 
an institutional mechanism designed to maintain decision-making power at the base of society.  
Ultimately, these forms of governance would restore the political realm displaced and appropriated by 
economic forces, through the decisive influence of corporate power in eroding any meaningful 
democracy.  Over time, and not without considerable struggle and almost assuredly violent 
confrontation at certain moments, they would supplant the institutions of capitalism and the state.   
Elements of these radical-democratic institutional forms have a broad history—for example, in 
networks of assemblies in indigenous societies, such as the Sioux Confederacy, in the confederated 
leagues such as the Swiss and German confederacies that posed alternatives to the emergence of the 
nation-state from the fourteenth to the eighteenth centuries, in the notion of confederation as it emerged 
within classical anarchism, and in the early stages of the international Green movement, before it 
became compromised by the tendency of chosen delegates to resist recall. These institutional forms are 
envisioned as emerging and developing dialectically; that is, they represent neither frozen forms of 
power relations nor haphazard improvisations, but are informed as the plastic realisation of the 
condition of social and political development.  In Malabou’s terms, these new institutional forms would 
literally embody a balance or equipoise in the slope of contingency and inner necessity, manifesting 
plasticity ‘somewhere between total malleability and absolute rigidity’.32   
Potentially, the social ecology vision of movement-educated, politically activated, and 
confederally linked communities suggests the development of new subjectivities and agencies within a 
politicised community. This revolutionary subject of the general interest of the diverse and politicised 
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community would supersede that of the worker within Marxist revolutionary praxis.  As Bookchin 
often observes, the worker historically has become generally domesticated to existing power relations.   
 
Relaunching a future 
Malabou has argued that the trace is convertible into form: 
 
To state that nothing is unconvertible amounts to claiming the philosophical necessity of the 
thought of a new materialism, which does not believe in the “formless” and implies the vision 
of a malleable real that challenges the conception of time as a purely messianic process.  It 
means that we can sometimes decide about the future . . . which means that there is actually 
something to do with it, in the sense in which Marx says that men make their own history.33 
 
Further, the political implications of being able to ‘sometimes decide about the future’ may 
correlate with a shift among both theorists and activists from trust in autonomian-style ‘spontaneous’ 
anti-capitalist mass movements34 to a recognition of a need for more conscious long-range vision and 
organizing approaches that would move beyond the relatively episodic and amorphous nature of recent 
Occupy and other movement efforts.   
Also implied, I suggest, is a recovery of the potentiality of the development of consciousness, 
of active subjectivities able to manifest agency for fundamental change.  In social ecology, self-
development emphasises the capacity to contribute to public life and a general interest, similar to the 
ancient Athenian notion of paideia.  This form of ethical self-development within and on behalf of 
community entails the ability to make arguments for positions within public assemblies, in other words, 
the capacity for political speech.  Bookchin here echoes some of the concerns of Hannah Arendt in The 
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Human Condition, in her question about what happens to political speech informed by science, in an 
era already evident in the late 1950s, when many discourses of science were not translatable to 
common speech and understanding.35 In addition, the importance of speech in articulating a positive 
expression of power in a political context in social ecology also suggests what Fredric Jameson has 
termed a form of political repression within poststructuralist thought, with its project of deconstructing 
logocentric speech as a will to [negative] power in the effort to master presence.36 
Murray Bookchin’s writing articulates as well a shift from the emphasis on ‘spontaneity’ in the 
1960s and 1970s in his embrace of anarchism in reaction to more centralised Marxist organisational 
forms.  Part of Bookchin’s later split with anarchism was motivated by recognition of a need for a more 
articulated vision of potential forms of popular power, under the name of Communalism.  Spontaneity 
versus organization, as Bookchin has commented, is part of a particular and ongoing historical dialectic.  
Bookchin’s social ecology can be framed as an attempt to articulate a revolutionary vision and strategic 
approach between a vanguardist dogmatism and a series of autonomian ‘spontaneous’ uprisings of the 
‘multitudes’. 
Adopting Malabou’s terminology and approach, we may appreciate the resources of a 
deconstructed social ecology in providing a conceptual link between natural and social development, 
one that might go beyond the social constructionist standpoints presented by Castree and Braun.  The 
latter, especially, may provide ideological cover for doing whatever we want in regard to environmental 
problems, as Bookchin notes. 
Guided by a relaunched dialectical naturalism, one more attentive to issues of colonialism and 
race, we might first ask in relation to the British Columbia example cited previously, what is part of 
prior existing developments, and what is new in terms of more recent developments.  This question 
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explores what new conditions—a new understanding of the limitations of previous models of resource 
development, for example—might dialectically make possible genuine advances toward goals that 
would truly realise both the well being of the forest eco-community and all its inhabitants, as well as 
those more distantly affected.  The more managerial, technocratic, and bureaucratic models of rational 
resource management might begin to make ground for a dialectical rationality along the lines put 
forward by Bookchin.   
Step by step, in an incremental way, this would initially mean effective movement building 
between European-American and Native communities that may indeed be facilitated by the use of such 
tools as indigenous map-making, as Braun describes.  The ‘hermeneutic pluralism’ put forward by John 
Russon in relation to his discussion of Hegel’s The Phenomenology of Spirit argues for a ‘equalising’ 
exchange of perspectives, none of which remain in a ‘pure’ state, given long histories of cultural 
mixing, appropriation, hybridisation, and creolization, moving towards increased systematicity or 
development.37 I believe something like this process can be observed in the culture of movement 
making, within the People’s Movement Assemblies and Just Transition Assemblies, for example.   
Ultimately, a social ecology perspective—‘relaunched’ in a form displaying more sensitivity to 
issues of race and colonialism—offers a broader and longer-term vision of ‘social hope’, one that may 
seem utopian in the sense of being unrealisable, but which may also appear as the articulation of 
concrete reference points for a necessarily incremental process which may advance at times in more 
radical disjunctions.  Thus in this example, activist networks might build on local successes to create 
larger zones of local control and participation in decision making, increasingly consolidating a 
powerful resistance to the corroding demands of both government and corporate pressures.  
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In this way, the decisive social ecology vision would be that of a movement, embodying among 
the many narratives a sufficiently shared narrative of liberation for effective solidarity, educated and 
ethically transformed by the culture of movement building itself and thereby strengthened in its sense 
of agency, finding its way audaciously, patiently, creatively and persistently to new [counter] 
institutional means of sustaining a genuinely post-capitalist society, a truly other future. 
In addition to (indirectly) suggesting an approach to movement-building around an anti-
capitalist future, I argue that Malabou’s work offers direct ontological resources for articulating a 
dialectical naturalism within contemporary thought.38 I now turn to the question of how to support a 
naturalism that avoids mysticism or naiveté on the one hand, and on the other, avoids providing a 
sophisticated modern rationale for naturalizing systems of domination or oppression. 
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Chapter 4.  Naturalism in Question, Part 1 
In the next two chapters, I examine the question of how a viable naturalism might be formulated 
for our time, a naturalism that might survive both deep ecology criticisms, and the suspicions about 
naturalising assumptions that inform deconstructive orientations toward the social construction of 
nature.  In order to avoid both these pitfalls, this new naturalism could draw from Murray Bookchin’s 
holistic reflections on nature and natural evolution, and from Catherine Malabou’s new materialism.  
The present chapter begins with a historical and philosophical framing of contemporary ethical 
discourse.  Next, I examine Bookchin’s response to his deep ecology critics.   I then assess what Glen 
Albrecht refers to as Bookchin’s ‘directionality thesis’ through the scientific lens of complexity theory.  
In this regard, I offer a brief survey of recent scientific research in the interests of updating scientific 
support for Murray Bookchin’s philosophy of nature, emphasising the shift from the primacy of genetic 
determinants to the increasing recognition of epigenetic factors in evolutionary theory. 
How are we to assess Bookchin’s attempt to ground an ethics in an understanding of nature and 
natural evolution, an ethics that would inform a revolutionary transformation of society and politics 
towards an ecological society where humans would live harmoniously with each other and with the 
natural world?  To begin such an assessment requires a transdisciplinary inquiry implicating a complex 
nexus or ecology of discourses among science and philosophy, Anglo-American and Continental 
philosophy, and academic critique and organic revolutionary polemic.  In this assessment I am inspired 
partly by Malabou in her inauguration of a conversation translated across multiple languages and 
idioms between neuroscience and a plastic reading of key philosophers in the Western tradition.   
In this chapter, I argue for social ecology as a non-reductive naturalism that avoids the 
limitations and dangers of at least some versions of deep ecology and both Marxist and post-
structuralist forms of social constructionism.  Nevertheless, I argue that the social ecology attempt to 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   113 
 
 
ground an ecological ethics in nature ultimately fails in terms of what has been termed Bookchin’s 
‘directionality thesis’.  In Chapter 5, however, I argue that Malabou’s work offers a way to think about 
the development of an ‘epigenetic model of rationality’ grounded in ‘the chance alliance of nature and 
freedom’, that has important implications for a plastic reading of the social ecology project of an 
ecological ethics. 
 
Contextualising Ethical Discourse 
A thoroughgoing analysis of the intellectual history and context of contemporary environmental 
ethics is well beyond the scope of this inquiry.  However, the question of an ontological ground for an 
ethics, especially with regard to continental philosophy, can be traced back to Nietzsche’s confrontation 
with nihilism, as interpreted by Heidegger.  In his Letter on Humanism,1 Heidegger rejects Nietzsche’s 
and Sartre’s proposed solutions to nihilism as the demand that we create value through willed acts of 
valuing.  For Heidegger, such a stance ignores the meaningfulness we find all around us, in the 
unconcealment that names the giving and the givenness of beings.  Being, rather than the 
ontotheological image of a Being supplying us with beings or forms of understanding, is instead the 
dynamic event of beings presenting themselves to us, as well as the ‘space’ in which they become 
manifest.  Heidegger writes, ‘The self-giving into the open, along with the open region itself, is Being 
itself’’.   
Consciousness does not actively constitute the world and imbue it with value, as with Kant’s 
Copernican Revolution as extended by Nietzsche.  Our openness is not of our doing; the relation of 
thinking to Being is the gift of Being.  Our ultimate ways of thinking which define us as recipients of 
our particular epochal understanding of Being form the foundation for our thought, but they themselves 
cannot be justified or grounded, because they determine what counts as justification in the first place.  
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This does not rob them of legitimacy, but instead is the only possible source of legitimacy.  Heidegger 
uses the phrase ‘groundless ground’ to describe the ways in which these ultimate ways of thinking are 
located within the wider context of the destiny of truth. 
In the disclosure of truth as aletheia or unconcealedness, we ‘stand in the clearing of Being 
amongst beings rather than being closed up in some kind of inner mind’.   Heidegger refers to this 
standing in the clearing of Being as ‘ek-sistence’, a term by which he attempts to go beyond the 
traditional metaphysical opposition of essence and existence: ek-sistence is existence understood in 
light of its etymological roots in ‘ecstasis’, or ‘standing outside oneself’. 
The dynamic disclosing of beings is historical in the sense that Being is revealed in radically 
(and incommensurable) ways in different epochs, ‘the ek-sistence of man is historical as such’.  
Heidegger discusses ethics in terms of its etymological origin in ethos, or ‘dwelling place’.  The place 
where we dwell in our thoughts and our actions points to the clearing.  This thinking of ethics adapts 
the perfectionism of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, in which we find what activities make us 
distinctive (our ergon), and then perform these activities with excellence (arête).  For Heidegger, our 
distinctive activity reveals Being, therefore being a good person is to reveal Being well; thus, thinking 
about the truth of Being is the original ethics. 
Tragically, thinking about the truth of Being, absent certain standards as advanced by Kant and 
others in the modern era and dismissed by Heidegger as derived and secondary, led to an anti-
modernism as well as to an embrace by Heidegger during the Nazi era not merely of traditional 
German conservatism and of a virulent antisemitism, with its volk-based invocations of ‘blood and soil’, 
but also of the ideology developed by a whole generation of German ‘conservative revolutionaries’, of 
whom Ernst Jünger is the most significant.  Like Heidegger, Junger was deeply influenced by 
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Nietzsche’s critique of ‘European Nihilism’.  Richard Wolin writes, ‘In fact, it would not be much of an 
exaggeration to say that [Heidegger’s] ‘option’ for National Socialism in the early 1930s was based on 
the supposition that Nazism was the legitimate embodiment of the Arbeiter-gesellschaft (society of 
workers) prophesied by Jünger and which, as such, represented the heroic overcoming of Western 
nihilism as called for by Nietzsche and Spengler’.2 
Though Bookchin shares the project of finding a ground for thought beyond the arbitrary willed 
projections of isolated subjectivities, he moves in quite a different direction, beginning with a view of 
Pre-Socratic thought not as a golden age of the disclosure of Being, but rather as one in which ethical 
thought in terms of Dike or justice and other concepts was seen as inherent within the natural world.  
Bookchin seeks to rearticulate the link between ethics and the natural world, but not in terms of an anti-
modernism; he looks instead to support from more recent non-positivistic science. 
Bookchin attempts not only to move beyond forms of nihilism but also to overcome the way in 
which the Enlightenment divested the natural world of the ethical content evident in the Hellenic 
sensibility, producing an objective cosmos that had order without meaning.  In this regard, Alasdair 
Macintyre criticises contemporary moral discourse because of the persistence of the Enlightenment 
concept of the autonomous moral agent and individualistic language of rights in a social and historical 
context in which it no longer has practical relevance.3 Such a condition, according to Macintyre, has 
produced an ‘incoherent’ scheme for ethical thought where there is now no relevant context or ethos 
where our ethical concepts can meaningfully be put to work.  Resolution of conflicts about competing 
rights occurs through ‘manipulative modes of relationship’.  Ethics in general is in a state of despair, 
especially given the relativism and nihilism of the prevailing postmodern moods. 
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Bookchin, as we have seen, tends to dismiss rather than to engage substantively with 
‘postmodern’ philosophy, caricaturing it as ‘yuppie nihilism’.  He might have included deconstruction 
in the same category, but of course Derridean deconstruction is anything but nihilistic.  Derrida was 
deeply influenced by the thought of Emmanuel Levinas, a onetime student of Heidegger, who reacts to 
the latter by formulating an ethics as primary over ontology, on the basis of the originary opening to the 
‘face’ of the Other.  But Derridean deconstruction, to the extent that it has shaped nature constructionist 
discourse, has imparted a caution against any attempt to ground an ethics in nature, given the 
complicity of any such effort with the essentialising metaphysical tradition.  In its influence on 
feminism and critical race theory, this has become disseminated as a critique of the odious history of 
the naturalising of gender and race concepts. 
As noted in previous chapters, Bookchin develops a philosophy of nature that can be seen as 
navigating a course between ‘nature-endorsing’ perspectives such as deep ecology, and more recent 
‘nature-sceptical’ or social constructionist perspectives, whether informed by post- or neo-Marxist 
concepts or by recent Continental philosophy, deconstruction in particular.  Bookchin does not engage 
directly with nature-constructionist thought, but participates in often acrimonious debates with deep 
ecologists.  How successful was Bookchin’s critique of deep ecology? I now turn to this question. 
 
Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology 
In Recovering Bookchin Andy Price presents a critical assessment of Bookchin’s philosophy of 
nature, the primary aim of which is to rescue the integrity and coherence of Bookchin’s thought from 
the caricature created by his deep ecology critics.4 In addition, Price defends Bookchin’s philosophy of 
nature against more substantive critiques from a deep ecology orientation, such as those of Robyn 
Eckersley.  Eckersley argues that Bookchin ignores the ‘Achilles’ Heel’ of environmental ethics, 
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namely, the basic fact/value distinction—the difficulty of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.5 The 
operating procedures of nature as revealed or supported by the sciences of natural evolution can never 
be an a priori guide for establishing a set of values.  The relatively ‘blind’ choices of organisms in the 
natural world cannot be equated or meaningfully linked to the conscious creation of values and systems 
of ethics in the human world.  Price defends Bookchin’s position, however, calling it an ‘ongoing 
protest against the myth of methodology; notably, that the techniques for thinking out a process can be 
separated from the process itself’.6 Price observes that Bookchin purposively intended to blur the 
separation of the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’.  This separation for Bookchin 
 
would deny speculative thought the right to reason from the “what is” to the “what-should-be.”  
This positivistic mousetrap is not a problem in logic as it is a problem in ethics and the right of 
the ethical “ought” to enjoy objective status [ . . .] .  To remain within the “is” in the name of 
logical consistency is to deny reason the right to assert goals, values, and social relationships 
that provide a voice to the claims of ecology as a social discipline.7 
 
As Price observes, Bookchin’s holism is nothing less than a direct challenge to the ‘is/ought’ 
separation.  In his view of the graded continuum of natural evolution, from the simplest organism to the 
complex expression of nature in the consciousness of humanity, Bookchin does not privilege one or the 
other.  The ‘is’ of their existence and their process creates not only the material reality of nature but the 
ability of nature’s most conscious expression—humanity—to identify this reality and on it to ground a 
system of values. 
Other deep ecology criticisms centre on the allegation that Bookchin claims to have discerned 
the ‘one true path’ of evolution despite the historical evidence that many trends can be observed.  Price 
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responds by emphasising that Bookchin never denies the existence of counter-trends in evolution, 
arguing that of course in the natural world ‘coercion does exist [ . . . ] so does pain and suffering’.8 The 
capacity for the emergence of these conditions could be termed a potentiality, and an ethics could be 
built thereon, as happened most strikingly with Hitler’s fascism.  In comparison with the continuous 
natural and social directionality toward increasing complexity, however, instances of natural and social 
coercion appear sporadic, and do not provide enough material, according to Bookchin, from which a 
potentiality can genuinely be elicited.  He argues therefore that these instances evidence a capacity that 
inheres in evolution rather than a potentiality. 
Another criticism of Bookchin’s natural philosophy is that he makes use of analogies such as 
the growth of an oak tree from an acorn or a bird from an egg that are simplistic, and inadequate for 
understanding the complexities of historically conditioned social processes.  As Price notes, however, 
such analogies serve only an incidental illustrative role in his discussions of dialectical development; 
the drawing out of the social and political implications of his philosophy is the main focus of his work 
as both a theorist and an activist.  In his social and political writings as we shall see, Bookchin is as 
alert to the historical complexity of social processes as any contemporary writer on political economy, 
if not more so.  Nor, of course, does he view social and historical processes as governed by a ‘hard’ 
teleology in the same way that the acorn contains DNA for an oak tree and nothing else, however much 
genetic mutations, epigenetic factors—and sheer environmental contingency—may play a role.  
Bookchin is decidedly not a naturalistic or biological determinist, and indeed argues passionately 
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Bookchin’s Response to Eckersley 
An additional criticism of Bookchin’s natural philosophy from a deep ecology perspective is 
that it is deeply anthropocentric, privileging humanity over nature in its advocacy of human 
stewardship.  Price quotes Robyn Eckersley: 
 
are we really that enlightened?  Can we really be sure that the thrust of evolution, as intuited by 
Bookchin, is one of advancing subjectivity?  In particular, is there not something self-serving 
and arrogant in the (unverifiable) claim that first nature is striving to achieve something that has 
presently reached its most developed form in us—second nature?10 
 
In addition, Price quotes Eckersley’s assertion that Bookchin misunderstands deep ecology’s 
biocentric or ecocentric orientation toward ‘non-favouritism’ in the natural world.  Eckersley argues 
against what she sees as Bookchin’s critique of deep ecology, clarifying that 
 
this does not imply the passive surrender of humans to the natural order as Bookchin has 
claimed, since humans, like any other organism, are recognised as special in their own unique 
way and are entitled to modify the ecosystems in which the live in order to survive and blossom 
in a way that is simple in means and rich in ends.  In this orientation, it is not inconsistent for 
humans to act in their own self defense by keeping in check or eradicating life threatening 
organisms where there is no alternative (and where the action is taken with reluctance).11 
 
Price observes that Bookchin refuses both the anthropocentric opposition of humanity and 
nature, and the subsuming of humanity into one undifferentiated ‘whole’, wherein there is no 
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difference but rather a ‘biospheric egalitarianism’.  If a life-form needs eradication or preserving, only 
one species has the capability to do so: 
 
Whatever rights or other ethical formulations that we develop in an ecological ethics, the fact 
remains that we as a species are the sole ethical agents on the planet who are able to formulate 
these rights, to confer them, and to see that they are upheld.  Whether these rights are 
formulated and upheld, I must insist, depends overwhelmingly upon the kind of society we 
create and the sensibility it fosters.12 
 
Price comments astutely: 
Herein lies the fundamental failing of Eckersley’s critique of Bookchin: while the major 
complaint is that Bookchin privileges second nature as “arrogant”, in the very moment she 
makes the complaint, she appeals to those same characteristics, albeit unwittingly.  That is, it 
appears that Eckersley applies these values piecemeal: on the one hand, she denies them their 
importance and potential as grounds for the human ordering of the world along ecological lines, 
while simultaneously on the other hand, appeals to them in determining what would make up 
the characteristics of a “life threatening organism” and when and where to eradicate such 
organisms.  However, it should be noted that there is no difference in her notion of deciding 
whether there is “no alternative” in eradicating organisms in the natural world, or that it must be 
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Directionality in Nature: Glen Albrecht 
However, if we accept Bookchin’s critique of deep ecology, even its more sophisticated 
articulations from Robyn Eckersley as assessed by Price, the question remains of how social ecology 
can avoid the pitfalls of a naturalism founded on a teleological understanding of nature.  Concerns 
about such teleological nature philosophies form one of the currents of various ‘nature-sceptical’ social 
constructionist approaches.  Bookchin himself criticises social Darwinism for its teleological 
underpinnings.  Yet he claims that we can identify in natural evolution a nisus or tendency towards an 
increasing complexity and potential for subjectivity, choice, and freedom. As we examined in Chapter 2, 
Bookchin argues that this tendency forms an objective potentiality on which to base an objective 
ecological ethics, and he marshals some of the scientific research of his time to support this claim.  
However, can this claim be supported today from a scientifically informed philosophical perspective in 
the light of more recent biological and evolutionary research and thought? 
The issue of a directionality in nature that may serve as an objective ground for an ecological 
ethics is explored in a well-constructed article by Glenn Albrecht in ‘Ethics and Directionality in 
Nature’.14 He notes that despite Darwin’s ambivalence towards normative evaluations of the theory of 
evolution in his own work, there has been no shortage of theorists prepared to derive some notion of 
ethics from evolution, beginning with Herbert Spencer in his 1851 Social Statics.  Life in nature and in 
society was seen as a competitive struggle for the ‘survival of the fittest’ at the expense of ‘less fit’ 
humans.  Social Darwinists and neo-Malthusians have followed Spencer in reading a competitive and 
individualistic ethics from nature. 
Contemporary ecoanarchists and others, following Peter Kropotkin’s conception of mutual aid, 
have seen a different story in evolution.  Murray Bookchin presents perhaps the most philosophically 
sophisticated argument for viewing a tendency or overall directionality in nature towards increasing 
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diversity and complexity and the potential for freedom, from which can be discerned an implicit ethics.  
Drawing as previously discussed from then-current bioevolutionary literature, including work by 
Cairns-Smith, Trager, Margulis, and Lewin,  Bookchin sees symbiotic relationships and cooperation as 
a more important feature of natural evolution, propounding an ethics that informs his social and 
political philosophy based on this understanding of evolution.  Bookchin grounds an Aristotelian and 
Hegelian view of the spontaneous unfolding of potentialities in life in a naturalistic understanding, 
when he writes: 
 
Hence our study of nature . . . exhibits a self-evolving patterning, a “grain”, so to speak, that is 
implicitly ethical. Mutualism, freedom, and subjectivity are not strictly human values or 
concerns.  They appear, however germinally, in larger cosmic and organic processes that require 
no Aristotelian God, no Hegelian Spirit to vitalize them.15 
 
These implicit values in nature must be made explicit by us, through the use of our capacities 
for self-reflexive rationality that are themselves the product of natural evolution.  We can self-manage 
our own affairs in such a way as to remake society along lines that restore the harmony between the 
natural and the social, guided by the ethical impetus inspired by a realist understanding of how life is 
structured and how organic processes work.  Social ecology promotes efforts that go with the ‘grain’ of 
natural evolution, such as ecocommunities that make use of humanly–scaled renewable energy sources 
and organic food production, organised by directly democratic and confederated forms of self-
management, artfully integrated into local environments.   
Bookchin argues that the social values that arise out of a naturalistic ethics—unity in diversity, 
spontaneity, and non-hierarchical relations—are objectively grounded in this understanding.  He claims 
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they are ‘the elements of an ethical ontology, not rules of a game that can be changed to suit one’s 
personal needs’.16 Bookchin is thus arguing for an ethical realism in which the source of value exists 
independently of any human value, and can be discovered along with other facts of nature.  Despite his 
criticism of ‘scientism’ and reductionist science, his theories align with the intellectual project of a 
scientific realism. 
Albrecht proceeds to examine some of the chief objections to Bookchin’s directionality thesis in 
contemporary ecophilosophy.  He suggests that new developments in complexity theory may 
strengthen and expand Bookchin’s thesis.  In terms of the various ways that Bookchin characterises 
nature and natural evolution this may be true, as we argue next; but can the central thesis of an overall 
directionality be sustained? The remainder of this chapter examines these questions from the 
perspectives of complexity science and recent evolutionary theory. 
 
Scientific Support Updated 
Increasingly, as we shall see, the sciences are arriving at what are recognised as philosophical 
problems, and the ‘evidence’ upon which a philosophy of social ecology must stand or fall is more than 
empirical observation of facts that are simply given.  Especially since the so-called Kuhnian revolution 
in the understanding of paradigm shifts in scientific knowledge and research, it is increasingly 
acknowledged that scientific approaches are theory-laden.  As one instance, philosopher, sociologist, 
and writer on complexity Edgar Morin in ‘Restricted Complexity, General Complexity’ traces the 
emergence of the paradigm of complexity from a number of earlier sources.17 Some of the features he 
associates with complexity theory have clear affinities with social ecology—for example, the creativity 
of life, the recognition of ‘the organizing complexity of physicochemical matter between reductionism 
and vitalism’, the notion of an ‘evolutionary creativity’, the importance of contextualization for the 
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production of knowledge, and the potential renewal of the idea that science and philosophy are part of a 
joint (though independent) intellectual project, and that the advanced sciences have arrived at 
philosophical problems they thought to have left behind, and can help to solve them, along with 
philosophers.   
Murray Bookchin articulates a coherent set of claims about nature, a ‘nature’ understood 
primarily in terms of a philosophical interpretation of natural evolution, informed as we have seen by 
the work of a select group of scientific researchers.  These scientists, such as Lynn Margulis, may not 
even today be said to represent fully the mainstream or majority view of evolutionary theory.  It can be 
argued however, that the aspects of evolution they emphasise—acknowledgement of the way in which 
organisms actively shape rather than passively adapt to their environmental contexts, recognition of the 
importance of cooperation, and of symbiosis in natural evolution—continue to gain support. 
I argue that the research of Lynn Margulis on symbiosis and Peter Corning’s writing on the 
‘Synergy Hypothesis’ both represent elaborations of mutualism in natural evolution.  The notion of 
mutualism derives from Peter Kropotkin, who was a naturalist as well as an anarchist theorist.  In 1902 
Kropotkin published Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution, a series of essays emphasizing the role of 
cooperation and reciprocity in animal and in human societies.  In these essays Kropotkin argues against 
the theories of social Darwinism that were based on notions of a competitive ‘survival of the fittest’ as 
the motor of natural evolution.  Kropotkin’s work is seen as a catalyst for the biological study of 
cooperation, and it greatly influenced anarchist thought, as well as Bookchin’s reading of natural 
evolution and his social philosophy.  
Mutualism in nature can be seen in recent research into symbiosis in biology. Though biologists 
generally consider symbiosis a broad category that includes relationships that are mutualistic, parasitic, 
or commensal (in which one organism benefits while the other is neither hurt nor helped), mutualism 
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remains a symbiosis.  The work of evolutionary cellular biologist Margulis centres on symbiosis, the 
term coined by the German botanist Anton deBary in 1873, and defined as the ‘living together of 
differently named organisms’.  Margulis argues that long-term cohabitation results in certain cases in 
symbiogenesis, the appearance of new organs, new bodies, and new species.  More strongly and more 
controversially, she asserts that most evolutionary novelty arose and still arises from symbiosis.  She 
characterises this as the development of individuality by incorporation.  Her theory is now known as 
serial endosymbiosis theory (SET).  SET is based on four provable postulates, each of which involve 
symbiosis, incorporation, body fusion, and symbiogenesis.  
In addition, discussions of ‘synergy’ in nature can invoke concepts of  mutualism and 
cooperation in natural evolution.  In his book Nature’s Magic23 Peter Corning offers his ‘synergism 
hypothesis’ of natural evolution. Synergy may seem an overly amorphous concept, but Corning defines 
it more convincingly in relation to his ‘Holistic Darwinism’, encompassing ‘Neo-Lamarkian selection’, 
which identifies synergism at many levels and in many forms, including  the symbiogenesis associated 
with the work of Lynn Margulis, and an enhanced role of cooperation in natural evolution.  Ultimately, 
Corning supports a middle way between the interpretation of evolutionary development as the 
expression of a deep natural ‘law’ and an aimless narrative, citing but rejecting Stephen Jay Gould’s 
portrayal of evolution as a process of pure contingency.   
Accordingly, we must supersede “neo-Pythagorean” reductionist monocausal and mathematical 
accounts and view evolution as shaped by four distinct influences: chance, necessity, teleonomy, and 
selection.   Teleonomy is internal biological purposefulness rather than external teleology.  Further, 
these influences need to be understood within principles of a hierarchical organisation, wherein unique 
boundary conditions or constraints at each level are irreducible to lower-level laws.  It should be 
remembered that ‘hierarchical organization’ in this sense is distinct from the social ecology definition 
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of social hierarchy as enduring and institutionalized social systems of command and obedience 
maintained by actual or threatened coercion.   
Corning supports the importance of cooperation in natural evolution, which he expresses in 
terms of his synergy hypothesis.  He notes, however, that cooperation and competition are intertwined, 
that many forms of cooperation are related to improving competitive abilities, and that the same 
animals may cooperate for certain purposes and compete at other times.  Over all, though, he argues 
that mutually beneficial reciprocity as a form of synergy predominates.  
In addition to mutualism, Bookchin further characterises nature in terms of spontaneity and 
self-organisation.  Potentially supporting these aspects of Bookchin’s naturalism,  Stuart Newman has 
recently theorised the non-Darwinian self-organising processes of organisms, also giving new 
credibility to the idea of an orthogenesis, supposedly abandoned as ‘Lamarckian’, that may provide 
evolutionary synthesis with a coherent theory of form.18 His views support the active and self-
organising role of organisms, beginning at the dawn of the evolutionary drama. Newman hypothesises 
the way in which life self-organised about a billion years ago using ‘toolkit’ genes to transform from 
single-celled highly plastic organisms into multicellularity in the Cambrian explosion when virtually all 
of today’s modern animal forms first appeared.  These toolkit genes, some of which, called dynamical 
patterning modules (DPMs), mobilise basic physical forces and processes, along with others, termed 
developmental transcription factors (DTFs), which enabled multicellular animals such as metazoas a 
millimetre in size to build cavities, layers of tissue, segments, extremities, and primitive organs.  
Newman claims these processes—especially those regulated by DPMs—are more central in evolution 
than is Darwinian natural selection.  Echoing Malibou’s rejection of ‘neuroscience ideology’ in What 
Should We Do With Our Brains, Newman has warned of political warping of scientific research under 
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capitalism.  ‘Genetic determinist ideology’, he writes, ‘comports well with the worldview of advanced 
capitalism’.19 
A number of epigentic mechanisms have recently been researched that move beyond the 
paradigm of genetic determinism. As summarised recently by Eva Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb,20 
these include self-sustaining feedback loops that enable daughter cells to inherit patterns of gene 
activity in the parent cell.  Structural inheritance refers to forms that carry hereditary information in 
their structure, including heritable self-perpetuating membranes that template the formation of more 
cellular membranes with the same structure; and prions or proteins with abnormal conformations.  
Other types of epigenetic inheritance system or EIS mechanisms include chromatin-marking systems 
such as heritable methylation patterns that influence how easily genes can be turned on and off.  
Chromatin-marking systems include study of the ways in which combinations of differently modified 
nucleosomal histones form marks that affect the binding of specific regulatory factors.  A fourth type of 
EIS is RNA interference (RNAi), which results in stable and heritable silencing of specific genes. 
Further, Jablonka and Lamb assert that natural evolution is now better understood as the 
interplay of four distinct but reciprocally influencing inheritance systems, which together comprise an 
‘evolution in four dimensions’ or E4D model.  In addition to the genetic and epigenetic systems, they 
include a behavioral inheritance system (BIS) and a symbolic inheritance system (SIS), the last 
referring to human evolution. 
The social ecology emphasis on the way organisms play an active and creative role in shaping 
their ecological niches is now widely supported by evolutionary scientists.  Jablonka and Lamb 
summarise the studies of Barbara McClintock in this regard.  Her research has been influential for 
social ecologists in terms of evidencing the innovative and creative role of organisms in their own 
evolution. Through her work on maize cytogenetics, McClintock discovered transposition and the role 
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of genes in turning physical characteristics on and off.  McClintock’s work has been referenced 
recently by molecular biologist James Shapiro, in his Evolution: A View from the 21st Century.  Shapiro 
writes: 
 
How does novelty arise in evolution? Innovation, not selection, is the critical issue in 
evolutionary change. Without variation and novelty, selection has nothing to act upon.21 
 
The social ecology critique of assertions of social hierarchy as somehow ‘hardwired’ by natural 
evolution can be argued based on recent research.  Though researchers have identified varying patterns 
of dominance hierarchy in primates and other mammals, birds, fish, and even eusocial insects, social 
ecologists argue that these cannot be used to naturalize enduring and institutionalized human systems 
of command and control, domination and oppression.  Much interpretation of animal behaviour is 
contaminated by projections of institutionalised human hierarchy.  Though various patterns of 
dominance hierarchy among primates can be seen, the variability of these patterns, from the rigid 
hierarchy of baboon groups to the relatively ‘egalitarian’ social relations of bonobos, argue against the 
assumption that social hierarchy can be seen as genetically determined.   
The consideration of hierarchy includes how we interpret biological systems at many levels, 
including the human brain.  Our understanding of the brain has shifted from one of fixed regions of 
command and control during the period of Fordist production, to one of relatively decentralised 
neuronal networks during the period of neo-liberal capitalism, with its decentralised system of “just-in-
time” production.  Recent neuroscience research has supported a view of neuronal networks in the 
brain as operating in a spontaneous and non-hierarchical fashion.  In her philosophical reflections on 
the neuroscience of the brain in What Should We Do with Our Brain?, Malabou relates notions of both 
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hierarchical brain centrality and the decentralised flexibility of neuronal networks to changing regimes 
of capitalism, and deconstructs both, especially regarding the way in which ‘neuronal ideology’ 
naturalises neo-liberal capitalism.  Neuroscientific research into neuroplasticity has exposed the limits 
of the hierarchical and cybernetic models of the brain, but the notion of flexibility reinscribes a ‘spirit 
of capitalism’ in the form of demands for flexibility on the job, in one’s schedule, in factories and so 
forth.  However, these meanings of flexibility fail to grasp the full range of Malabou’s plasticity, the 
capacity to give form, to create, to invent and also to erase an impression—not merely to receive a 
form in a docile way without exploding.  For Malabou,  
 
securing a true plasticity of the brain means insisting on knowing what it can do and not simply 
what it can tolerate.  By the verb to do or to make [faire] we don’t mean just ‘doing’ math or 
piano but making its history, becoming the subject of its history, grasping the connection 
between the role of genetic nondeterminism at work in the constitution of the brain and the 
possibility of a social and political nondeterminism, in a word, a new freedom, which is to say: 
a new meaning of history.24 
 
Assessing Evolutionary Directionality 
A significant body of recent research may thus offer support for Bookchin’s dialectical 
naturalist view of nature defined in terms of natural evolution, and exhibiting features of spontaneity 
and self-organisation, creativity, mutualism, and non-hierarchy.  The question of overall directionality, 
however, is more problematic.  In an influential text, Into the Cool, Eric Schneider and Dorian Sagan 
argue for the directionality of evolution towards increasing complexity, driven and shaped by the 
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continuing overcoming of energy gradients in non-living and living systems, according to a revised and 
enlarged understanding of the second law of thermodynamics.25  
Schneider and Sagan argue that thermodynamics is a necessary but not sufficient explanation of 
the emergence of complex natural systems; we need evolutionary understanding as well.  However, 
they assert that ‘the facts of life’s increase in evolutionary complexity . . . which tend to be disregarded 
because there is no place for them in orthodox evolutionary theory, make sense when we consider life 
along with other natural systems of energy flow’.26 In their study of ecosystems, Schneider and Sagan 
show how the autocatalytic structures produced in the thermodynamic process allow organisms to 
prosper on a variety of gradients.  They argue that ‘ecology and evolution show similar directional 
tendencies’, and that evolution is pushed or ‘sucked’ (drawing on terminology used by Lynn Margulis) 
in the direction of ecological succession.  They differentiate short-term factors in ecosystems with a 
relatively fixed gene pool versus evolution as a whole, but point out that both exhibit energy-shaping 
influences on complex systems.  Ecosystems generally go through an initial start-up phase, followed by 
a phasing out of rapid growth, as the initial phase gives rise to increased cycling and diversity.  
Ecosystems exhibit many features of what may be characterised as unity-in-diversity, with increasing 
diversity resulting in increased evolutionary rates and pathways.  This last assertion made by Schneider 
and Sagan of unity-in-diversity supports another of Bookchin’s frequent characterisations of 
ecocommunities and natural evolution. 
Linking ecosystem analysis to consideration of the long history of evolution, Schneider and 
Sagan argue that a  
suite of factors—energy efficiency, energy throughput, biomass storage, species diversity, 
cycling, homeostasis, and residence time of biologically important elements—are involved in 
ecosystem development . . . [and this] same suite of factors also increases over evolutionary 
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time, thus giving directionality to the evolutionary process . . . ecological and evolutionary 
processes exist along a temporal continuum.  Thus we are entitled to assert an overall 
directionality to natural processes, guided by both thermodynamic energy gradients and 
evolutionary factors.28  
 
This argument for directionality is challenged however by biologist, behavioral geneticist, and 
science writer Peter Corning (cited previously in relation to his synergy hypothesis).  He critiques 
Schneider and Sagan, not convinced that the purpose of life is to overcome energy gradients.29  ‘Real-
world biology’ he writes, imposes limitations and complications on ‘monolithic thermodynamic 
determinism’.  Corning asserts that Schneider and Sagan conflate energetic order or available energy 
with physical order and use the term ‘organisation’ for both.  However, there is a fundamental 
difference between living cells and Benard cells—the former imply cybernetic properties, 
engineering/functional design, information and feedback; the latter do not.  Here, Corning evidences an 
orientation towards systems theory in his approach, an approach that resurfaces issues of the limitations 
of a functionalist, managerial, and engineering approach towards understanding ‘life’. 
According to Corning, there is a longer list of ‘sufficient conditions’ than Schneider and Sagan 
acknowledge, including nitrogen fixing (here Corning cites Lynn Margulis’s studies of bacterial 
engineering), which are often more important than available energy in accounting for ecosystem 
constraints.  Rather than thermodynamic energy gradiants superimposing causal determinations, the 
‘multi-faceted problem of survival and reproduction takes priority, and energy is a means’.30 
For one thing, Schneider and Sagan ignore the anti-entropic action of gravity.  Entropy and 
energy gradients may be a small consideration compared to the role of gravity through nucleosynthesis, 
dark matter, and dark energy in the universe.  We do not yet understand gravity well enough to posit a 
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suite of physical forces guiding and constraining evolution that would include its effects as well as 
those of energy gradients.  Corning argues that we need to keep the Second Law in its place as an 
influence secondary to more compelling biological purposes. 
 
Progressive Evolution Challenged 
The sceptical “foil” confronting supporters of Murray Bookchin’s directionality thesis is 
personified most eloquently by Stephen Jay Gould. Gould and Niles Eldredge put forward their theory 
of “punctuated equilibrium” (PE) in the 1970s.  In greatly simplified form, their argument can be stated 
thus: there is significant evidence for a relative stasis of phenotypic variation in clades over geological 
time.  If most species in a clade are in stasis, then most evolutionary change in morphology is not 
occurring within species, but between species.  If this is the case, then evolutionary trends must mostly 
be the result of sorting among species, and not simply the extension of within-species anagenesis (the 
gradual evolution of a species that continues to exist as an interbreeding population).  This conclusion 
requires at least some degree of distinct hierarchical levels of change operating in the evolutionary 
process, and an emphasis on speciation that the Modern Synthesis of Neo-Darwinian evolution did not 
feature.  Gould argues firmly for contingency in evolutionary processes, against any naturalisation of 
the notion of progress: 
 
[The] most fundamental question . . . [is] does the history of life have an intrinsic direction 
(toward greater morphological complexity, increased diversity, etc.).32 
 
He emphatically denies the affirmation of anthropomorphically conceived progress in evolution: 
‘Progress is a noxious, culturally embedded, untestable, nonoperational, intractable idea that must be 
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replaced if we wish to understand the patterns of history’.  Gould finds mentally liberating the 
metaphor of evolutionary ‘bushes’ rather than constraining ‘ladders’. 
 
Humans are not the end result of predictable evolutionary progress, but rather a fortuitous 
cosmic afterthought, a tiny little twig on the enormously arborescent bush of life, which, if 
replanted from seed, would almost surely not grow this twig again, or perhaps any twig with 
any property that we would care to call “consciousness”.33 
 
In addition, models of progress in science are problematic, according to Gould, in that they tend to 
excoriate the past merely for being old and therefore primitive in the pejorative sense. 
The theory of punctuated equilibrium is widely acknowledged to have played a creative role in 
moving evolutionary theory beyond the parameters of the Modern Synthesis, even if the theory has 
been challenged in many respects as insufficient, especially with regard to the causal basis of the 
punctuations and stasis that individuate species in geologic time.  Yet Gould’s scepticism toward the 
notion of progress has been influential.  Peter Corning comments that ‘the very notion of some 
overarching form of “progress” in evolution (in the normative sense) is now widely criticized by 
biologists.  . . . A doleful Jacques Monod concluded: “Man knows at last that he is alone in the 
universe’s unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance”.34 
Bookchin challenges Gould’s views, pointing out that the contingency Gould stressed can be 
seen as a necessary precondition for the variety and fecundity of life.35 I argue that Bookchin’s 
response to Gould’s challenge quoted in the next section reveals a prescient insight into the co-
implication of contingency and teleonomic necessity that I attempt to elaborate more explicitly next, 
and in subsequent chapters.  Here, I will say, it is one thing to argue that necessity and contingency 
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operate in such a balanced way in natural selection so as to produce areas of rich species diversity such 
as the Burgess Shale.  It is another thing to claim that underlying this evolutionary process is a 
‘tendency’—a teleological excess of necessity—understood as a directionality toward increasing 
‘complexity’, however defined. 
 
Rethinking Directionality 
Corning acknowledges Gould’s famous characterisation of natural evolution as a ‘drunkard’s 
walk’ of ultimate contingency, noting that ‘the high priest of this paradigm—also rather surprisingly—
is the late Stephen Jay Gould’.   Corning quotes Gould: ‘Evolution follows the syncopated drumbeats 
of complex and contingent histories, shaped by the vagaries and uniqueness of time, place, and 
environment.  Simple laws with predictable outcomes cannot fully describe the pageant and pathways 
of life’.36 
Corning pushes back somewhat on this paradigm. He writes: 
 
I submit that the truth lies in the middle.  Science and history need each other.  Evolutionary 
history is not simply an expression of a clutch of deep “laws”.  Nor, at the opposite extreme, is 
it an aimless narrative—a disconnected series of entries in a cosmic Day Timer.  The vision of a 
random, chaotic historical process is just as one-sided as is the image of an all-encompassing 
law, or laws of everything.  . . . Evolutionary biology provides a preeminent example of a 
science that is grounded in history, but so are ecology, paleontology, geology, climatology, and 
cosmology, among others.  The great twentieth-century evolutionary biologist Theodosius 
Dobzhansky pointed out many years ago that evolution via natural selection is really an “anti-
chance” theory.  It involves a cumulative historical process in which novelties of various kinds 
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are converted into stable functional designs that persist over time. . . . In effect, evolution has 
been a cumulative learning process, and there have been innumerable “progressive” 
improvements over time in relation to the needs and functional capabilities of living 
organisms.  . . . In short, a science of history must also account for the shaping influence of 
history itself, inclusive of natural selection.37 
 
In supporting the general thrust of Corning’s views, I add that the evolutionary ‘shaping 
influences’ are being increasingly understood in terms of a ‘4D’ model of evolution that includes the 
symbolic dimension of human cultural evolution.  Of course, as we shall explore later, the many issues 
raised by such views have to be examined philosophically as well.  In a philosophical idiom explored 
by Catherine Malabou, what Corning is postulating, via the quote from Dobzhansky, can be stated as 
the ‘becoming necessary of contingency’. 
Corning highlights the need to focus on ‘architectonics’ beyond holism and reductionism, the 
joint effects produced by the relationships that arise between things or organisms (again, relationships 
that might more meaningfully be explored and expressed through dialectical concepts, I suggest).  
Nature is a vast structure of synergies.   Humans are an integral part of a creative process, not a 
preordained script (or text) or score, but an ‘unfinished symphony’ of synergistic instruments; humans 
are, in the words of Teilhard de Chardin, ‘evolution become conscious of itself’.38  This last quote 
echoes Bookchin to some extent, though Bookchin was careful to comment, as previously noted, that 
humanity is not yet nature rendered self-conscious in a fully rational sense. 
Crucially, however, I note that even Corning’s more moderate views do not support a ‘strong’ 
teleological interpretation of Bookchin’s directionality thesis of a progressive natural complexity 
leading to an objective basis for an ecological ethics.  In fact, Bookchin at times distances himself from 
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the teleological implications of the idea of an overriding, overarching directionality in nature, and at 
other times claims that the ethics he advocates are indeed ‘objective’.  I do not believe that the strong 
version of this claim holds up, even in light of a summary exploration of recent science providing 
significant supporting evidence for the way in which Bookchin characterises nature and natural 
evolution in terms of spontaneity and self-organisation, unity-in-diversity, mutualism and cooperation, 
the active and creative role that organisms play in shaping their environments, and non-hierarchy in the 
strict social and anthropological sense of the term.   
Biologists Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin have challenged the lack of any adequate 
metric to define notions of evolution towards increasing complexity.  They ask,  
 
how are we to measure the complexity of an organism? In what sense is a mammal more 
complex than a bacterium? Mammals have many types of cells, tissues, and organ systems and 
in this respect are more complex, but bacteria can carry out many bio-synthetic reactions, such 
as the synthesis of certain amino acids, that have been lost during the evolution of the 
vertebrates, so in that sense bacteria are more complex.39 
 
They note that while structurally more complex forms may have appeared later in the evolutionary 
sequence, they have not replaced the less complex forms but rather coexist with them.  
Social ecologists can indeed point to considerable recent scientific research that supports the 
characterisation of nature and natural evolution in terms of the influence of teleonomy or purposiveness 
of organisms, for synergy, symbiosis, epigenesis, and behavioral and symbolic learning, and even 
Corning’s ‘cumulative learning processes’ (a very dialectical concept), all of which can be seen to 
encourage the evolution of biological complexity in specific ways, at least for life on this planet.  
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However, the claim that a single, overarching telos—even one smuggled in as a nisus or tendency—
guides evolutionary processes cannot be supported in either complexity theory or new views of 
evolution, even with our revised notion of matter. 
These characteristics may serve as bases for reflection on aspects of nature that are well 
supported by current science, and these in turn may serve the choice of ethical formulations that 
resonate with them. They cannot, in my view, be seen as decisively conditioning an overriding 
directionality that provides any form of self-evident foundation for an objective system of ethics.  
Instead, they provide a ground for philosophical reflection on nature and ethics that would need to 
include a thoroughgoing philosophically argued ethical position that would minimally require 
perspectives from diverse and contingent lived experience in order to be considered an adequate ethics 
for our time, despite Bookchin’s desire for an objective ethical foundation independent of human 
experience.  Certainly we can introduce an ‘ought’ in relation to an ‘is’ in our thinking, but this ought 
cannot be deduced directly or seen as ‘self-evident’ from the ‘is’ of even the more recent scientific 
study of nature. The question in part involves the difficulties of simply exporting a model of scientific 
objectivity related to causal explanations in physics or biology to the social scientific or philosophical 
interpretation of human behaviour.  To be fair, Bookchin’s social ecology presents a somewhat more 
nuanced account of historical social and cultural development, without falling prey to a cultural 
relativism.   
Too much historical and intellectual baggage is attached to teleological notions associated with 
ideas of progress, and too little scientific support exists for such claims.  Indeed, the notion of 
progressive macroevolutionary trends has fallen under increasing disrepute in the years since Bookchin 
developed his theories.40 As noted in chapter 2, Bookchin was partly influenced by the ‘climax’ models 
of evolutionary succession, associated with Charles Elton and others, popular during the time he was 
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writing.  The emerging inter- or transdisciplinary field of historical ecology has decisively abandoned 
such notions.  Historical ecologist Emily Southgate writes in opposition to 
 
[T]he implicit assumption that once freed of active human management, vegetation would 
develop along lines dictated by natural forces, trending toward the hypothetical climax 
composition; the past human element could essentially be ignored.  In other words, there is a 
teleological tendency in nature that is unaltered and unalterable by human actions, assuming 
that climate is constant.  This attitude continues to influence ecology in the United States.  For 
example, the United States National Vegetation Classification system has distinct categories for 
“natural” and “cultural” vegetation, not acknowledging that historical, cultural activities may be 
critical for determining even the vegetation classified as “natural” and that there is abundant 
evidence that climate and other forcing factors do not remain stable long enough for extensive 
climax vegetation to develop.41 
 
Social ecologists can argue for the scientifically supported principles touched on earlier in this 
chapter, without falling into either relativism, or on exaggerated claims, with all their covert 
authoritarian implications.  However appealing, Bookchin’s directionality thesis of a progressive 
evolution as something that can simply be read from the fossil record, must be decisively rejected.  
However, this need not mean abandoning or rejecting all of the claims about the relation between 
humanity and the non-human natural world, or claims about natural evolution.  Humanity has indeed 
evolved through complex evolutionary processes, including what Jablonka and Lamb term the 
Symbolic Inheritance System, to evince the potentiality for ethical thinking, including a stewardship 
ethics, as discussed previously with reference to the deep ecology versus social ecology debate.  
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   139 
 
 
Nevertheless, we cannot say that this evolution is guided or directed by semi-teleological or 
necessitarian tendencies in nature. 
Andy Price has argued effectively for the social ecology ethic of stewardship in relation to deep 
ecology.  An updated scientifically informed social ecology can argue persuasively against an extreme 
constructionist view of nature that, in fact, there are important things we can and need to say about 
nature and natural evolution, without dismissing social constructionist insights about the pernicious 
naturalisation of concepts emerging from social hierarchy and domination that have informed both 
constructionist perspectives and social ecology theory as well.  Glenn Albrecht observes that 
Bookchin’s arguments depend on objective scientific evidence.  However, the relation between theory 
and evidence in science is not straightforward, given the ‘theory-laden’ nature of scientific research that 
Edgar Morin highlights.   Assessing the objective status of social ecology claims about the natural 
world, means also unpacking some of the meanings of objectivity. 
Objectivity and Diversity 
Critical theorists have sought to unmask the ‘false ideologies’ that obscure objective 
understanding and reify social forces.  A critical perspective informed by this approach has been termed 
‘standpoint’ theory.  Sandra Harding and others have extended standpoint theory to feminist and post-
colonial subjects.42 Harding argues against the notion of a ‘value-free’ construction of objectivity, and 
claims that inclusion of the perspectives of those who have experienced various forms of oppression 
leads to ‘strong objectivity’, thus linking objectivity to social and cultural diversity, in her call for a 
‘science from below’.  
However, Harding’s consideration of issues of objectivity and diversity in science would be 
enriched by greater concrete consideration of the need for institutional and structural changes to how 
science is practised in dominant culture, as well as what Malabou suggests regarding the plastic 
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transformation of disciplinary boundaries among sciences and between sciences and ‘the humanities’.43 
Harding’s arguments provide support for the value of social and cultural diversity as well as ecosystem 
diversity, arguments that have not been adequately explicit in a positive sense within later social 
ecology writings, though present in Bookchin’s earlier work.  Social and cultural diversity provide both 
theoretical and practical value, as Harding argues in her support for indigenous knowledge systems as 
genuine ‘science’.   
Many of us want to look to science as an ‘impartial’ arbiter, and this role becomes acute in the 
instance of scientific evidence and arguments for the reality and severity of the effects of rapid, 
androgenic climate change. Supporting the importance of the integrity of current scientific methods 
requires acknowledging the ways in which these are always subject to contestation as part of the logic 
of the overall progress of scientific knowledge. Increasingly, there are pressures that make it difficult 
for scientists to remain aloof from public debates, given the urgency of scientific information in the 
context of climate change and of a global pandemic disproportionately affecting the poor and 
communities of color, and the dismissal of scientific expertise by a disturbingly large segment of the 
population, especially in the US.  
Following Harding and standpoint theory, then, Bookchin’s philosophy of nature can be 
considered as more, not less objective, to the extent that it is articulated from the perspective of the 
oppressed.  As John Russon has observed in relation to Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, the slave 
position tends towards ‘epistemic pressures’ toward accuracy in interpreting what the master demands, 
thus arguably moving toward a certain aspect of objectivity.44 The increased presence of diverse voices 
in social ecology theory can augment its claims to objectivity in the strong sense identified by Harding. 
 Objectivity must also be seen as context-dependent; in other words, it has an historical 
dimension. Harding notes the post-WWII historical forces that led to the valorisation of a ‘value-free’ 
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science in the context of a reaction against Nazi and Stalinist scientific regimes.  As noted, recent 
decades have seen a reliance on a ‘managerial’ notion of objectivity associated with quantification, 
along with a relativist scepticism of the possibility of any meaningful notion of objectivity.  From a 
social ecology ‘standpoint’ informed by the writings of Hannah Arendt in The Human Condition, this 
may be related to the eclipse of the political realm and the realm of what Arendt terms ‘work’ as 
distinct from ‘labour’ or the ‘mere’ replication of biological life.45 Both the political realm and the 
domain of work or craftsmanship bring concerns of objectivity to the fore, and the decline of both 
within neoliberal economy and culture in the US and Europe has resulted in reducing pressures toward 
objective ways of thought.  Concerns of objectivity reemerge as we take up the challenge of thinking a 
broad ethics and philosophy of the political; defining objectivity is a political act, in the case of social 
ecology, an act grounded on philosophical arguments for the objectivity of potentiality.   
However, the most important implications of this critical assessment of Bookchin’s 
directionality thesis point to the need for a rethinking of necessity and contingency in both evolutionary 
research and in social ecology.  As discussed in the next chapter, I argue that Malabou’s work can be 
helpful towards this end; there, I examine questions of a new naturalism from a more philosophical 
perspective.  
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Chapter 5:  Naturalism in Question, Part 2 
This chapter turns to the question of a philosophical evaluation—both ontological and 
epistemological—of Murray Bookchin’s fundamental assertions about nature.  Responding to what I 
have identified as a lacuna in social ecology regarding epistemological concerns, I briefly examine 
Anglo-American realist epistemologies, but ultimately argue that Malabou’s reading of the Kantian 
Transcendental offers a more promising notion of a ‘mobile’ contact point for the claim that a 
rationality is inherent in nature, not simply imposed arbitrarily.  Her reading suggests an explicit 
rethinking of necessity and contingency that could help us to evaluate Bookchin’s directionality thesis 
in a way that avoids both the problematic aspects of a teleologically-guided process on the one hand, 
and a sheer randomness in nature that would fuel an ethical relativism on the other.   
Glen Albrecht’s comments on how Bookchin’s project runs counter to the Humean, Kantian, 
and Moorian traditions in the structure and logic of the way that the question of a directionality is 
considered, thereby raises the issue of how such an argument, together with the scientific evidence 
cited, can be evaluated philosophically.  In particular, this means drawing an ‘ought’ from (the 
investigation of) an ‘is’, thus violating Moore’s ‘naturalistic fallacy’.  Can the issue be adequately 
resolved in such an empirical fashion as suggested by the focus of the preceding chapter?  I argue that 
the question of the validity of Bookchin’s reading of nature and natural evolution requires addressing a 
lacuna with regard to epistemology in his work, though certainly an epistemology intimately related to 
ontological concerns.  How indeed do we know nature, and how do we know that we know? Again, the 
question asserts itself, how can we be sure we not merely interpreting scientific evidence in a way that 
supports our philosophical, ethical, and political biases? 
As Albrecht presents the case, the scientifically informed arguments for and against 
directionality in nature pivot around a number of key issues, including the nature of matter, the status 
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of the postulate of an emergent principle of self-organisation within both living and non-living systems, 
the acceptance of the still-evolving conclusions of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, and the role of 
non-genetic factors in understandings of the processes of biological evolution.  All these areas of theory 
and research continue to grow within complexity science as it develops within and among various 
scientific disciplines, and many of these areas have been taken up by philosophers as well. For now, I 
note that Bookchin stresses the first of these factors, the nature of matter as a developing, not merely 
moving or changing substance, whose most dynamic and creative attributes are its unceasing capacity 
of self-organisation into increasingly complex forms.  Bookchin initially rejected all forms of systems 
theory, including the work of Prigogine, but seems indeed to have softened his initial scepticism in later 
years, perhaps because of pushback from some of his students, as such theories themselves evolved 
into less ‘mechanistic’ forms.1 
Albrecht states that Bookchin argues for objective evidence independent of the observer, which 
situates his project within the general ontological framework of a scientific realism.  This statement 
elides a host of philosophical problems briefly explored in the next section; we might provisionally 
clarify that Bookchin would certainly oppose a hyperconstructionist (and either radically idealist or 
logically incoherent) assertion that the objects of scientific knowledge do not exist independently of the 
observer.  Despite his explicit rejection of the alleged ‘epistemological turn’ of Kant’s philosophy, 
however, Bookchin does acknowledge the positive role of Kantian philosophy in the ‘elaboration of an 
epistemology and the introduction of the subject as both observer and participant in cohering 
knowledge’.2 The trajectory of this chapter will reinforce Malabou’s demonstration that we are not yet 
done with Kant.  First, however, with regard to the need for an ‘elaboration of an epistemology’, we 
must further critique the notion that Bookchin’s philosophy of progressive evolution can be founded on 
a simple ‘given’ that can be read from the fossil record. 
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Anglo-American Efforts towards an Adequate Naturalist Epistemology 
We may cite the Anglo-American philosopher Wilfred Sellars for his influential ‘myth of the 
given’, as a challenge to any attempt to ground a philosophy of nature on ‘self-evident’ observations of 
the fossil record or any other natural fact or feature.  Wilfred Sellars’s work builds on that of his father, 
Roy Wood Sellars.3 Roy Wood Sellars offers epistemological positions that would be challenged by 
contemporary Kantian-oriented thinkers, such as the Humean assertion that space and time are ‘built-
up’ through an accumulation of sensory experience. Wilfred Sellars moves much closer to a Kantian 
perspective on epistemological issues than does the elder Sellars.   
 Wilfred Sellars presents an admirably rigorous epistemology and philosophy, and his 
critique of the myth of the given offers an attack within the Anglo-American tradition on any form of 
foundationalism.4 Though the detailed argument is patient and thorough, Sellars’s master argument 
against the given can be schematically summarised as follows: 
 
1. The doctrine of the given requires that for any empirical knowledge that p,  some epistemically 
independent knowledge g is epistemically efficacious with respect to p. 
2. For any x  and y, x can be epistemically efficacious with respect to y only if x can serve as a 
reason for y. 
3. For any x and y, x can serve as a reason for y only if x can serve as a premise in an argument for 
y. 
4. For any x, x can serve as a premise in an argument only if x has propositional form. 
5. Therefore, the nonpropositional is epistemically inefficacious. 
6. Therefore, what is not propositional (e.g. material objects, sense data and other particulars, 
sensings and other events, universals) cannot serve as what is given. 
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7. All propositionally structured candidates for the given we will call beliefs. 
8. No inferential belief of a subject is epistemically independent. 
9. Any empirical, noninferential belief x of a subject S is justified for S only if (a) x is a reliable 
response to the empirical condition x reports and (b) S knows that x is a reliable report of that 
condition. 
10. Therefore, no noninferential belief is epistemically independent. 
11. All empirical beliefs are either inferential or noninferential. 
12. Therefore, no empirical belief is epistemically independent. 
13. Therefore nothing propositional can serve as what is given. 
14. Therefore, nothing can be given. 
Wilfred Sellars’s argument against the notion of an epistemically independent given or 
empirical belief is an important contribution to any effort to form a naturalist epistemology adequate to 
the intellectual context of a ‘postmodern’ moment informed by critical theory standpoint approaches 
and contemporary continental philosophy.  
Sellars moves toward Kant and thus towards a continental philosophy perspective in his 
appreciation of the Kantian distinction between sense intuitions and concepts of the understanding.  
Ultimately, however, he argues for the primacy of the scientific image in his synoptic vision, which 
unfortunately may limit the space for critique of what we may call scientific ideologies from a Marxist 
or other standpoint perspective.  From a continental philosophy perspective, Heidegger’s writings in 
The Essence of Truth and The Origin of the Work of Art challenge Sellars’s reliance on the already 
opened and thus derivative standard of truth of the ‘correctness of propositions’.  Heidegger sees such a 
standard as neglecting the primordial essence of truth as the ‘unconcealment of beings’.  Experiencing 
beings in terms of a scientific image veils them in concepts that obscure the access to the Being of 
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beings that can be found by looking deeply at art or at mood.  The philosophy of Wilfred Sellars could 
at least provide important elements of a naturalist epistemology, but the primacy of the scientific image 
would need to be relinquished by an encounter with continental philosophy, one which might result in 
the navigation of multiple images, rather than in the hegemony of one. 
 
Roy Bhaskar, a Realist Theory of Science 
The evolutionary naturalism and critical realism of Roy W. Sellars and Wilfred Sellars in 
service to science has largely been eclipsed by the critical realism associated with Roy Bhaskar.  
Bhaskar aims to build a philosophy of science that will enable its emancipatory potential.  His work has 
greatly influenced social science and contemporary Marxism. 
In his 1975 A Realist Theory of Science, Bhaskar seeks to develop a comprehensive alternative 
to the positivism that was seen at the time to continue to dominate the image of science.6 Bhaskar’s 
critical realism (CR) challenges the adequacy of the Humean theory of causal laws constructed by 
associations in the mind on the basis of the observation of regular or constant conjunctions of events.  
According to CR, not only is such a theory not a sufficient condition for a scientific law, but it is not 
even a necessary one.  To demonstrate this, Bhaskar advances a transcendental argument from the 
nature of experimental activity. 
A condition of the intelligibility of experimental science is that the experimenter is a causal 
agent of a sequence of (experimental) events, but not of the causal law that the sequence of events 
enables the experimenter to identify.  This leads Bhaskar to affirm an ontological distinction between 
causal principles and patterns of events. In order to establish a law or principle, scientists require a 
theory, containing a putative cause or explanatory link to account for a sequence of events that is thus 
considered other than accidental; this implies a non-reductionist conception of theory.  At the core of 
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theory is an image or conception of a natural mechanism or structure at work.  These postulated 
mechanisms can come to be established as real under some conditions, thus providing the objective 
basis for ascriptions of natural necessity. 
Only under the assumption of the real independence of the mechanisms from the 
events they generate are we able to justify the assumption that they will continue to operate 
outside of the closed experimental conditions that allow us to determine them empirically.  In 
addition, it is only under such an assumption that the idea of the universality of a known law 
can be sustained, and experimental activity made intelligible.  Thus, positivism not only 
depreciates theory, but it is also unable to account for the significance of (experimental) 
experience.  It is only under the assumption that these mechanisms and structures prevail 
outside of the experimental context that we account as well for their applicability in open 
systems, where no constant conjunctions prevail.  Thus, a constant conjunction of events 
cannot be necessary for the assumption of the efficacy of a scientific law. 
This argument further shows the need for a distinction between real structures and 
mechanisms and the actual structure of events.  The latter can be out of phase with the 
former, which is why experimentation is needed in the first place.  In a similar way, the 
intelligibility of perception requires that we understand that events occur independently of 
experiences. Experiences are often out of phase with events, and can lead to misidentification. 
Because of the epistemic implications of this, scientists need education or training to access 
the empirical significance of experimental experience. 
Bhaskar is thus led to identify three domains of the real: the domain of the empirical, 
consisting of experiences; the domain of the actual, consisting of events and experiences; 
and the domain of the real, consisting of mechanisms, events, and experiences.  The real 
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basis of causal laws is the domain of the generative mechanisms of nature, the tendencies of 
which may or may not be manifest in any particular outcome or invariant pattern.  Once we 
allow for open systems, laws can be interpreted in a non-empirical or transfactual way, 
independent of any particular sequence or pattern of events.  We can then arrive at an 
ontological basis for a concept of natural necessity quite independent of human activity.  
Bhaskar contends that open systems are the rule, and closed systems are the rare and 
generally artificially generated exceptions. 
CR operates from a philosophical position characterised as transcendental realism, 
differentiated from both an empirical realism and a transcendental idealism, both of which are seen to 
fall prey to the epistemic fallacy, in which statements about being are always transposed into statements 
about our knowledge of being. Bhaskar argues that the concept of the empirical world embodies a 
category mistake, which depends on a barely concealed philosophical anthropomorphism.  This leads 
to a neglect of the question of the conditions under which experience is significant in science, 
especially the importance of antecedent social activity.  The prevailing model in this case contains an 
‘implicit sociology’ based on an epistemological individualism in which humans are seen as passive 
recipients of given facts and recorders of their given conjunctions.  Against this view, Bhaskar argues 
that knowledge is a social product, realised by means of antecedent social products.  The intransitive 
objects of knowledge produced in this way, however, exist and act independently of humanity.   
Science is thus an ongoing social activity in a continuing process of transformation.  Science is 
concerned essentially with possibilities, and only derivatively with actualities.  Statements of scientific 
laws are best seen as tendency statements, tendencies that may be possessed unexercised, exercised 
unrealised, and realised undetected by humans.  They may also be transformed.  If generative 
mechanisms or structures are real, then the criterion for distinguishing between a necessary and an 
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accidental sequence is as follows:  such a sequence is necessary if and only if there is a generative 
mechanism or structure that when stimulated by the initial event in the sequence produces a subsequent 
event in the sequence.  We can thus have knowledge of natural necessity a posteriori, which 
accomplishes a kind of non-Kantian ‘sublation’ of empiricism and rationalism.  Bhaskar summarises: 
[I]f science is to be possible the world must consist of enduring and transfactually active 
mechanisms; society must consist of an ensemble of powers irreducible to but present 
only in the intentional actions of men [sic]; and men must be causal agents capable of 
acting self-consciously on the world. They do so in an endeavour to express to themselves 
in thought the diverse and deeper structures that account in their complex manifold 
determinations for all the phenomena of our world.7  
In his later work directed at a theory for social science in the form of TMSA (‘Transformative 
Model of Social Action’), Bhaskar addresses issues related to the ontological depth of the social world, 
wherein emergent properties and causal structures are mediated by human agency.  The duality of 
structure and agency involves both mediation of agency by structure and the reproduction and 
transformation of structure by agency.  Dialectical critical realism emphasises non-identity and absence 
rather than the positive full presence of the Western metaphysical tradition.  Instead of identity thinking, 
entity relationism is conceptualised. ‘Whatever is’ is intrinsically not itself; a fluid dialectical sense of 
identity allows us to see the ordinary notion of identity as an abstraction from geo- and socio-historical 
process, and also from the internal relationality of entities that initially appear separate and distinct.  
Bhaskar’s critical realist dialectic here conceives of four dialectical moments: starting with the first 
moment of ordinary understanding leading to the second, a negative moment of critique encompassing 
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the desedimentation of the superstructures that both hide and reflect the economic and political 
interests of dominant forces in society, followed by a third moment of critical realist-informed social 
scientific mediation of this critique leading to a dialectical ethics, and, finally, resulting in a fourth 
moment of praxis. 
Roy Bhaskar’s project is an ambitious and influential one, and offers many useful resources for 
social theory in a plurality of contexts.  We may draw on CR for a realist view of nature that aligns with 
scientific research and the discussion of nature in complexity theory, which also acknowledges the 
importance of and social embeddedness of theory.  Unfortunately, there is a tendency within Bhaskar’s 
critical and dialectic realism towards misreadings and tidy, schematic oversimplifications, as with his 
dismissal of the Kantian ‘epistemic fallacy’ and the Hegelian ‘ontic fallacy’.  With regard to the former, 
Guus Duindom has written a perceptive summary and critique.8 We might further note that, for a 
number of years now, an effort has been made by a number of thinkers to accommodate deconstruction 
to realist discourse, an effort once described as ‘sleeping with the enemy’.9 The realist discourse in this 
instance is chiefly associated with the work of Bhaskar in his critical and dialectical realism. 
Might critical realism as developed by Bhaskar offer a substantial contribution toward such an 
articulation? If so, it will still be subject to the deconstruction of its concepts, which of course never 
amounts to their simple negation.  More promising to me is the work of Malabou, which suggests the 
possibility of grounding deconstruction not in the generally schematic ‘realist’ categories associated 
with Bhaskar, but in a new materialism that suggests a new naturalism as well.  Before examining 
Malabou’s study of Kant in some detail, I summarise this initial assessment of Bookchin’s 
directionality thesis in the light of complexity science and realist epistemology by focusing more 
closely on the question of necessity and contingency, which implicates also the question of teleology 
versus evolutionary or historical randomness. 




Between Necessity and Contingency 
I now turn to the question of how rethinking necessity and contingency can help us rethink the 
core ethical concerns in Bookchin’s directionality thesis.  As presented in chapter 2, Bookchin’s 
dialectical naturalism is based on the notion of a concept of matter as active and self-organising 
expressed in his interpretation of Diderot’s notion of sensibilité. The development of organisms and 
eco-communities is seen to emerge according to a Hegelian dialectic naturalised in biological, 
ecological, and evolutionary terms.  The directionality in natural evolution for which Bookchin argues 
must be held in tension with his emphasis on the unique capacities of humans—for example, the ways 
in which natural evolution has shaped our tendencies to intervene in natural processes and the potential 
stewardship role that humans can play in fostering the fecundity and diversity of life.  Central to this 
directional pathway is the evolution of nervous systems, consciousness, subjectivity, choice, and the 
evolution of symbolic evolutionary systems—in short, the ability of humans to reflect on nature and 
make conscious choices according to considered values.   
We can affirm that the considerable evidence supporting the development of epigenetic 
mechanisms extending beyond gene-based determinism in natural evolution supports a historical 
evolutionary narrative of a relative increase in freedom, as defined in the operational terms of a 
movement beyond ‘mechanical causation’.  However, can we say, for example, that an underlying nisus 
with its connotations of an overarching necessity has been a causal determinant in any way for the key 
moments of mammalian evolution, from its reptilian therapsid ancestors, to the proliferation of 
mammals subsequent to the Cretaceous-Paleogene extinction event, whatever the causes of this event?  
Is it credible that such an underlying or overarching tendency explains the many crucial developments 
in hominid evolution, such as bipedalism, encephalization, sexual dimorphism, and ulnar opposition?   
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I argue for rethinkimg necessity and contingency in relation to a philosophy of nature, in a way 
that extends even further than social ecology’s efforts to undermine the conception of nature as a ‘realm 
of necessity’.  Necessity and contingency arise together in life, and mutually support each other.  As 
cited previously, Bookchin saw this in relation to his comments on the Burgess Shale, in arguing that 
the immense diversity seen there has resulted from many contingent factors—that this diversity in fact 
demonstrates the fecundity of life, rather than the pure contingency argued by Gould.   The mutual 
support of necessity and contingency in nature needs to be more explicitly considered in terms of 
Bookchin’s directionality thesis, so that an acknowledgement of contingency does not equate with an 
ethical relativism.  I argue further that Malabou can help us rethink the categories of necessity and 
contingency in relation to life. 
 
Catherine Malabou’s (Deconstructive) New Materialism 
More recently, at least in Continental philosophy, a new effort is being made to engage with 
epistemological and ontological questions in relation to the material and natural world under the banner 
of a ‘new materialism’ articulated by a number of thinkers, notably Catherine Malabou.  The new 
materialism has been situated in the context of the decline of historical materialist, existential, and 
phenomenological approaches, as Anglophone analytical and continental poststructural and social 
constructivist approaches have problematised more straightforward approaches to matter and material 
existence as naively representational and naturalistic.  Although these constructivist approaches have 
been useful in clarifying arguments and raising awareness of the way power is involved in any attempt 
to portray material reality, they have also encouraged a neglect of new approaches toward material 
reality and processes that have important political implications.  Malabou’s new materialism, I argue, 
implies a critique of the limitations of constructionist discourses of nature. 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   157 
 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, theorists such as Jane Bennett, William Connolly, Elizabeth Grosz, 
Sara Ahmed, and Rosi Braidotti have articulated various new materialisms arising together with non-
reductionist understandings of matter developed in systems theory, chaos theory, and complexity theory, 
biology and ecology.  These new understandings of matter are transforming disciplinary boundaries.   
Malabou has called for engaging deconstruction with a new materialism, developed in her case through 
a focus on Heidegger, Hegel, and Derrida.10 Murray Bookchin would not have endorsed the neo-
vitalism, the diffusion of the concept of agency, and the posthumanism of new materialist discourses in 
general.  Malabou’s work however, may offer sophisticated and important theoretical resources to 
social ecology, more congenial partly because of her initial focus on Hegel, a focus I pursue in the 
following chapter concerning the nature and status of the dialectic. 
Malabou explores questions of nature and freedom in Before Tomorrow, in which she examines 
the writings of Kant, a philosopher whose ‘epistemological turn’ Bookchin lamented. Malabou’s 
reading of Kant within the perspectives of subsequent critiques opens a space for speculative thought 
within biology, and offers indirect support for the general direction of Bookchin’s thesis even within 
Kantian philosophy regarding a view of nature as a potential ground for an ecological ethics. 
 
Malabou’s Productive Reading of Kant: The Transcendental Changes 
Malabou’s reading of Kant centres on the figure of what he terms ‘an epigenesis of pure reason,’ 
introduced in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, published in 1787. Much of Kant’s 
concern in the second edition is to counter criticisms of the ‘subjectivity’ of his theory of knowledge 
following the publication of the first edition in 1781.  No doubt Kant was concerned in the 
Prolegomena, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, and in the revised edition of his first 
Critique to rebut the claim of the Feder-Garve review that his Critique of Pure Reason articulated a 
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version of subjective idealism along the lines of Berkeley.  However, as scholars such as Paul Abela21 
and Michael Friedman22 abundantly demonstrate, Kant maintains a long-standing interest and 
orientation towards objective forms of knowledge, from his earliest scientific treatises to the 
investigation and partial revision of the status of chemistry as a science in the Opus postumum.   
By introducing the concept of an epigenesis of pure reason in the second edition of the Critique 
of Pure Reason, Kant is concerned with elucidating his arguments for both the objectivity and the 
stability of our knowledge of the natural world.  In The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science 
Kant includes a note in which he mentions a review in which a ‘Professor Ulrich’ expresses doubts 
about the basis of the Transcendental Deduction.  Kant acknowledges the legitimacy of these doubts 
and attempts to provide a further answer in the second edition to the question of the legitimation of the 
a priori agreement between the categories and the objects of experience.  The epigenesis analogy 
allows Kant to explain that the categories are truly the a priori form of appearances, and to adequately 
represent their objective reference, which can only come from a generative production—the 
spontaneity of the understanding.  Kant writes, 
 
[T]here are only two ways in which a necessary harmony of experience with the conceptions of 
its objects can be cogitated.  Either experience makes these conceptions possible, or the 
conceptions make experience possible.  The former of these statements will not hold good with 
respect to the categories (nor in regard to pure sensuous intuition), for they are a priori 
conceptions, and therefore independent of experience.  The assertion of an empirical origin 
would attribute to them a sort of generatio equivoca.  Consequently, nothing remains but to 
adopt the second alternative (which presents us with a system, as it were, of the Epigenesis of 
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pure reason), namely, that on the part of the understanding the categories do contain the grounds 
of the possibility of all experience.23 
 
The relation of the concepts of the understanding to objects of experience must thus be neither 
innate nor empirically constructed.  In the former case, the categories ‘entirely lose that character of 
necessity which is essentially involved in the very conception of them’.  The latter case corresponds 
analogically to the biological theory of ‘equivocal generation’ (generatio equivoca), already largely 
discredited in Kant’s day, in which the a priori categories would miraculously appear out of an 
inorganic origin, an idea that ‘contradicts the very idea of generation’, as Malabou notes.  As she 
further notes, the concept of epigenesis allows Kant to ally the architectural foundational solidity and 
coherence of an ‘architectonic of pure reason’ with the intrinsic solidarity of a growing organism, as in 
embryonic development. 
In a process of increasing conceptual complexity, Malabou further follows the morphological 
development of the motif of epigenesis from its textual embryo in 27 of the Critique of Pure Reason to 
its other occurrences in Kant’s work.  She examines previous attempts to defend the a priori ‘purity’ of 
the transcendental which assert a ‘minimal preformationism’, as well as opposing attempts that react 
against the ‘theological’ implications of preformationism by arguing for a ‘biologisation’ of the 
transcendental along the lines of a neo-evolutionism or mental Darwinism, attempts that argue for an 
adjustment of the categories to objects through an adaptive process.  She concludes that both positions 
undermine Kant’s critical position and deprive the transcendental from ownership of epigenesis.  She 
then asks if in referring to ‘a system of the epigenesis of pure reason’ Kant was concerned less with the 
objective process of engendering the relation between categories and objects and more about the way in 
which the subject appropriates the generating power of the understanding and becomes its subject.24 
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Epigenesis would thus foreground a figure of textual hermeneutics or musical interpretation.  If the 
origin of epigenesis is inaccessible, it also frees up a facticity and a movement of becoming at the 
intersection of the epigenesis of the subject of cognition, the practical autonomy of the subject, and the 
creativity of life, as explored in Kant’s three Critiques.  Malabou writes, ‘Epigenesis is thus the origin 
born of the lack of origin, the lack of meaning of the origin, the spontaneity of its silence’.25 
The specificity of a living being requires an originary limitation of its structures, analogous to 
an originary genetic code, or to a text prior to interpretative practises.  From this inaccessible source 
epigenetic development moves beyond divine predestination on the one hand, while also defining a 
space of meaning that is resistant to its biologisation on the other.  Epigenesis thus proceeds from a gap 
between an unknowable originary organisation and self organisation, according to a temporal order that 
is oriented but not determined.  This is the space of a writing that is previously oriented but not 
programmed, and a history that ‘exists precisely because history is not given’. 
Malabou’s interpretive trajectory in Before Tomorrow follows the rhythm of epigenetic growth, 
moving from specific readings that question the foundational stability of the transcendental to general 
interpretations, mapping out a reception of Kant within current philosophical trends.  Her study is 
guided by three questions: the question of the philosophical status of temporality, which seems to have 
disappeared as the leading question of philosophy after Heidegger; the question of whether an 
‘impassable abyss’ can be maintained between the logical and biological origin of thinking, given 
recent neurobiological discoveries; and the question of the status of Kant as the guarantor of the 
identity of continental philosophy, and whether it is now necessary to ‘relinquish’ the transcendental.  
In particular she analyses the ‘speculative realism’ of Quentin Meillasoux,26 who claims that a priori 
synthesis—or what he terms ‘correlation’—cannot in the last instance legitimate the universality and 
the necessity of the laws of nature on the basis of the laws of the understanding.   
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A Critique of Speculative Realism 
In After Finitude, Meillasoux argues against the ‘correlationist’, who starts from a relation-to-
the-world in the present and then makes projections to the past or to the future.  No concept of time can 
be authentic, according to Meillasoux, in a philosophy such as that of Kant and Heidegger, that starts 
from synthesis and retrojects the past based on the present.  The discourses of genealogy and 
deconstruction could not establish that a truly post-critical philosophy could do so, because they were 
also versions of correlationism.   The correlationist fails to consider a past prior to synthesis, prior to 
the relation, that is indifferent to life and to being thought.  For Meillasoux, it is the principle of the 
agreement that is problematic.  It is never possible to justify the agreement other than factually.  The 
agreement is observed and described; it cannot be deduced.  Whether the transcendental is 
transformable or not, it is contingent, though not in the way that Hume and other sceptics thought, for 
both Hume and Kant assumed causal necessity, though accounting for it in different ways.  Meillasoux 
wants to think an absolute contingency, meaning that there is no reason for anything to be the way it is, 
that the laws of nature could change for no cause or reason whatsoever.  Even the category of chance, 
with its associated notion of probability, is not contingent enough to unsettle the categories of the 
possible and the necessary.  Meillasoux takes the problem beyond Kant and Hume to the mathematical 
notion of the ‘transfinite’, based on the mathematical impossibility of totalising possibilities under the 
name of the infinite.  This form of radical contingency cannot give rise to any positive knowledge of 
the possible, conceived as a totality of conditions, as with the Kantian transcendental.  Relinquishing 
the transcendental for Meillasoux’s speculative realism involves a more radical move than does the 
argument for its biological malleability, as with an evolutionary ‘mental Darwinist’ approach, or for its 
historical becoming, as with Foucault’s approach.  Speculative realism attempts to move beyond even 
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Heidegger’s ‘destruction of metaphysics’.  We must think a world utterly foreign to experience, to our 
experience. 
Malabou responds to the question of relinquishing the transcendental by putting Meillasoux, 
Heidegger, and the neurobiologists in conversation.  For Heidegger, Meillasoux’s references to dating 
systems referring to the facts of events prior to the advent of life would mean assuming a domain of 
knowledge already opened, without considering the ontological question of the opening.  Thought in 
this domain would thus lack both origin and originality.  In addition, Heidegger would have pointed out 
the error of confusing articulation—the neutral synthesis that holds together the difference and juncture 
of the before and after, without relation to a psyche—and correlation, the synthesis of subjectivity and 
time, two syntheses that are linked but not reducible to each other.  Malabou comments, ‘What the play 
of their engagement reveals is that time is not intrinsically mathematical’.  Heidegger discusses four 
dimensions of time in Time and Being; its fourth dimension is the articulation that holds its moments 
originally united and ‘holds them apart thus opened and so holds them toward one another in the 
nearness by which the three dimensions [of time] remain near one another’.  This idea of the proximity 
of the moments of time derives from Kant, and depicts the type of organised unity referred to by 
epigenesis. 
Malabou finds Meillasoux’s attempt to prove the contingency of the world unconvincing.  
Against the transcendental solution to the stability of the world, Meillasoux refuses to adopt a theory of 
chaos.  He argues: 
 
The only necessary proper to chaos is that it remain chaos, and hence that there be nothing 
capable of resisting it—that what is always remain contingent, and that what is never be 
necessary.  However—and here we come to the crux of the matter—our conviction is that in 
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order for an entity to be contingent and un-necessary in this way, it cannot be anything 
whatsoever. . . . [I]n order to be contingent and un-necessary, the entity must conform to certain 
determinate conditions, which can then be construed as so many absolute proprieties of what 
is.27  
 
This refusal of chaos leads to the division between the rational authenticity of unreason, and the 
vulgarity of anything whatsoever, a division that ultimately saves ‘the order and the proper of the 
world’, reducing radical contingency to the merely thinkable or mathematically possible.  There is no 
‘after’ to finitude that provides a genuine alterity. 
 
Heidegger’s Abandonment of the Question of Time 
Further, Malabou examines the earlier relinquishing of the transcendental in Heidegger.  The 
meaning of the Turning (Kehre) is that Heidegger questions the ‘connectionist’ perspective in his own 
way.  Being and Time, he came to feel, runs the risk of anthropologising the question of being because 
it is based on the connection of Dasein and time. However, Heidegger’s later thinking of a still more 
primordial ‘givenness’ did not bring to light a renewed concept of time, nor did it result in a post-
metaphysical unity between the ideality and naturality of time; in fact it never moved beyond the 
difference between the authentic and the inauthentic. 
 
A critique of neurobiological reason 
As a third ‘dead end’ of the attempt to relinquish the transcendental, Malabou critiques 
neurobiological reason.  She acknowledges that we can argue a ‘far more convincing’ idea of 
progressive change and transformation of the laws of nature based on an empirical derivation of the a 
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priori than can be found in Meillasoux’s arguments for an absolute contingency, an absolute 
contingency that cannot be verified in nature. In contrast to Meillasoux’s occurrence-based notion of 
contingency, stabilised neuronal connections can be destabilised and reorganized and remodelled, 
resulting in a gradual and non occurrence-based contingency. In addition, Neurobiological approaches 
allow a systematic economy that extends beyond the distinction between ‘authentic’ and ‘vulgar’ time.  
Time evolves through the process of rememoration from a somatic and postural given to the time of 
thought.  However, this neurobiological approach lacks critical concepts: 
 
What the neurobiological perspective lacks fundamentally is the theoretically accounting for the 
new type of reflexivity that it enables and in which all of its philosophical interest lies.  Again, 
the problem is not so much, as is too often assumed, the reduction of the cultural to the 
biological, but rather the relation of the neuronal subject to itself, the way in which it sees itself, 
perceives itself, or is auto-affected—a problem that has never been considered on its own count.  
Critique, understood here as thinking the brain, is still necessary.28 
 
The Critique of Practical Reason illuminates the engendering point of epigenesis for the 
objective reference of practical causality.  Kant argues that Hume renders the objective reality of 
causality theoretically null and thus useless for practical—moral and ethical—applications.  There is 
thus an equality between speculative and practical reason in the epigenetic source of the objective 
validity of the categories.  This epigenetic link between speculative and practical reason opens a space 
within Kant’s philosophy for Bookchin’s notion of an ‘ought’ within the movement of natural evolution, 
though his speculative presumptions may not have been approved by Kant.  They would likely have 
been allowed by Hegel, and of course Bookchin was right to have based his philosophy on a 
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naturalistic reading of Hegel; what the opening of a space even within Kant through a close and 
rigorous reading of his texts does accomplish, however, is the overcoming of an extensive nexus of 
scepticism decidedly not overcome by the historical transformations of Kantianism. 
 
An Epigenetic Paradigm of Rationality 
Malabou calls for an epigenetic paradigm of rationality negotiated with, rather than against 
Kant.29 She argues that epigenetic development occurs upon the contact between the categories and 
experience, and is a ‘surface structure’ rather than the ‘improbable base’ that commentators have sought. 
The contact point of epigenetic development is a moving one between a retrospective present and a 
future in the making, restoring the question of a temporality distinct from the progression from a past 
towards a present that characterises the notion of the a priori as genesis.  This concept of epigenesis 
becomes more complex through the process of the self-differentiation of reason itself, as Kant 
considers creativity and life in the third Critique.  Art and organisms in nature, examined in the 
Critique of Judgment, introduce the question of a facticity that presents itself as self-organised, 
independent of thought yet soliciting thought to the highest degree. 
Previous commentators have asserted the instability of the transcendental because they have 
sought a genesis from an always more originary and authoritative source; thus, the transcendental a 
priori vacillates between preformation—an understanding more compatible with the mechanical 
causality treated in the first critique—and a view of the transcendental that would allow for the role of 
experience in shaping evolutionary adaptations more compatible with the discoveries of neuroscience.  
Those critics who have stressed too much the role of experience in the development of the categories 
have been led to an understanding of these as innate or preformed; those who minimise the role of the 
innate predispositions discussed by Kant have tended to give too much latitude to experience.  
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However, if the transcendental occurs as an epigenetic development at the contact point between the 
categories and experience, then the transcendental acquires a mobility that displaces the contentious 
issues surrounding a presumed static originary and genitive foundation.   
 
Temporal Mobility and the Question of Time 
Further, the temporal mobility of this epigenetic contact point between a retrospective present 
and a formation of a future dissolves the opposition between a primordial time announced by 
Heidegger, and a natural time subject to archaeological dating systems; they occur at one and the same 
time.  The meeting point as the place of interpretation signifies a meaning of the past as not simply an 
anthropomorphic projection but as a reading of traces of life, what Malabou terms an architrace.   
Before Tomorrow thus brings Malabou’s deconstruction of Heidegger’s temporality to a 
decisive point.  In The Future of Hegel, she contests Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s philosophy only 
looks backward, based on a ‘vulgar’ notion of time, by showing how Hegel’s concept of a plastic 
relation between the subject and his accidents can be seen as a structure of anticipation.  Malabou then 
explores how time has disappeared from Continental philosophy, and she researches the significance of 
a neurobiological concept of time in What Should We Do Our Brain?.  In Before Tomorrow, Malabou 
writes: 
 
It is impossible to separate epigenetic temporality from the biological process it refers to, from 
organic growth, from the future of the living being.  However, insofar as its movement is also 
the movement of the reason that thinks it, insofar as there is no rationality without epigenesis, 
without self-adjustment, without the modification of the old by the new, the natural and 
objective time of epigenesis may also be considered to be the subjective and pure time of the 
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horizon by and for thought.  In this way, there would no longer be a difference between 
primordial temporality and objective temporality. . . . Between an authentic temporality without 
maturation and a chronological vulgarity without ecstasy, epigenetic temporality unfolds at its 
own rhythm.  Henceforth, all it asks is to be conceptualized.30 
 
However, if natural and objective time meets at one and the same time as primordial time, then 
the epigenetic reading of the Kantian Transcendental links with life and materiality.  Further, this new 
materialist understanding would also apply to Husserl’s platonic concept of mathematical and logical 
concepts.  ‘Certainly there are objects that exist only in thought’, writes Malabou, but these do not 
inhabit a separate ideal realm outside of time.  Time (or space-time) as understood in relativity science, 
is part of matter, which can bend it.  Further, this new materialist perspective would undermine an 
idealist reading of the Messianic time of Levinas or Derrida.  In addition, such a perspective opens to 
the Marxist analysis of the reification of ‘universal’ time as the abstract time of time measurement, as 
well as the ideological use of time in terms of ‘time and motion’ studies. Time may thus be a more 
effective dimension with which to challenge ideality than the real, whether Lacanian, critical, or 
speculative.31 
 
Bookchin and Malabou 
Certainly, Malabou’s epigenetic paradigm of rationality encourages an increased philosophical 
engagement with recent biological science, and other scientific explorations into complexity.  However, 
in the risk of her philosophical journey, she transforms horizons of thought.  Bookchin in his Hegelian 
approach wishes to bypass the narrowing of philosophy into epistemological interpretations of science 
interpreted along the lines of a reductive empiricism, or of epistemological determinations based on the 
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rigid concepts of the understanding.  In failing to engage more directly with these questions, however, 
he limits the contemporary resonance and transformative potential of his thought. 
In Malabou’s account of Kant’s own journey, the movement from the examination of 
mechanical causality in the first critique to a teleological or teleonomic causality that can account for 
life and creativity in the third critique is nothing other than the epigenetic development of rationality 
itself.  Beyond the constitution of objects by the form of the concepts of the understanding, reason 
encounters in art, natural beauty, and life a rationality that appears to be able to do without reason, that 
appears indifferent to being judged, that makes meaning independently and for itself as an end.  In 
Hegel’s phrase (in relation to the Philosophy of Nature), ‘thought becomes redundant’. The awareness 
of an organised being in nature forces reason to identify a purposeful nature as a regulative concept for 
the reflecting power of judgement.  Self-organising beings whose parts form a whole do not develop 
according to a law of the mind; they are self-sufficient in their specificity.   
The increasing complexity of purposefulness calls upon the epigenetic development of the 
category of causality towards the recognition of another kind of lawfulness in nature, another principle 
of causality.  This kind of necessity has no opposite: its denial does not contradict the stability of the 
laws of nature as previously understood. Yet it modifies the transcendental to accommodate a necessity 
defined as transcendental contingency.  As Malabou puts it, the unique rationality of life is one in 
which ‘meaning is given without us, in the chance alliance of nature and freedom’.  
Malabou transforms the categories of necessity and contingency in a way that deconstructs the 
opposition between an overarching metaphysical teleological principle of necessity and a pure 
contingency, as conceived by Meillasoux and, to a certain extent, by Gould as well.  The result is what 
Malabou talks about as the way in which brain plasticity confers a margin of improvisation with regard 
to genetic determinism: ‘Today it is no longer chance versus necessity, but chance, necessity, and 
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plasticity—which is neither the one nor the other’.  Though she does not use the term plasticity in 
Before Tomorrow, Malabou’s reading of Kant extends the capacities of giving, receiving, and annulling 
form to all of life. 
The importance of Malabou’s study of Kant for Bookchin’s social ecology, I assert, is that it 
reinfuses the dimension of the aleatory, essential for an epigenetic understanding of life and an 
epigenetic model of rationality, back to a philosophical naturalism in danger of listing too much in the 
direction of a steep ‘slope’ of necessity, especially with what we are calling social ecology’s 
directionality thesis.  This ‘transcendental contingency’ occurs in the self-organising activity of 
organisms as they form a whole, in the ‘chance alliance of nature and freedom’ [emphasis added]. This 
transcendental contingency names a rationality not merely projected randomly onto nature but 
developing self-sufficiently as a principle of epigenetic freedom from the genetic.  An epigenetic 
rationality forms at the surface point of contact of mind and world, as concepts are led to transform 
themselves to accommodate new recognitions, fresh categorical metamorphoses.  The epigenetic model 
of rationality inspired by Malabou’s study of Kant encourages the recognition of the need for core 
social ecology concepts to be open themselves to self-transformation.  As we proceed in the next 
chapter to bring together epigenesis and the dialectic, we will see that the way in which these concepts 
transform is shown by the need to remain even closer to the Hegelian speculative concept, in which the 
dialectic waits on experience, rather than imposing the still relatively rigid standpoint of the Kantian 
understanding.  Malabou can be of help here too, in her (earlier) study of Hegel in The Future of Hegel.  
Bringing to light the movement of the speculative proposition and of Absolute Knowledge in Hegel has 
important ethical and political implications as well. 
Meaning and rationality are inherent in and not simply projected onto nature, a fact that 
overcomes not only a radical nature constructionist view but a nihilism associated with Nietzsche, and 
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evident in Sartre.  Both Heidegger and Bookchin sought to overcome this perceived nihilism; 
Heidegger as noted in ways that led to conservative and highly reactionary political implications, and 
Bookchin in a radical and revolutionary left political project.  The evolution and plasticity of the human 
brain facilitates an agency obscured by both biocentric, deep ecology perspectives and a Messianic 
waiting, yet possesses in its epigenetic articulation with all of life, an agency beyond the pure 
voluntarism of an ‘ethics of the built world’ as offered by Steven Vogel. 
Malabou supports what might seem a reading that transgresses the ‘merely regulative’ status of 
the reflecting power of teleological judgement by quoting Kant’s distinction between the ‘technical 
unity’ of a schema arising empirically and a schema that arises directly from an idea: 
 
For its execution the idea needs a schema, i.e., an essential manifoldness and order of the parts 
determined a priori from the principle of the end.  A schema that is not outlined in accordance 
with an idea, i.e. from the chief end of reason, but empirically, in accordance with aims 
occurring contingently yields technical unity, but that which arises only in consequence of an 
idea (where reason provides the ends a priori and does not await them empirically) grounds 
architectonic unity.32 
 
She comments that epigenesis occurring as a sensible presentation of a concept of the 
transcendental arises in consequence of the concept as most apt to illustrate it; it is not a mere 
subjective creation or technical invention.  ‘Hence’, she writes, ‘the epigenesis analogy is constitutive, 
the illustrated expression of the concept that springs up spontaneously from the concept’.  The analogy 
restores time to the transformation of the a priori, and is an ontological and not merely epistemological 
movement. 
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Additionally, Malabou embodies in the trajectory of her argument from specific readings to 
larger conditions of contemporary thought a postulate of the ‘existence of an epigenetic mode of 
transmission and heritage of philosophy’ among the interpretive dialogues presented.  She calls for a 
new thought of finitude, seen not as the exhausted remnant of the transcendental associated with Kant 
or the existential finitude explored by Heidegger, but as a finitude of the living being in which meaning 
arises because it is not pre-coded.  The specific mobility of the transcendental allows a contact point, an 
articulation between nature and freedom, brain and meaning, across the bridge of their encounter in 
purposiveness.  This mobility provides a flexible but resilient foundation or ground, one that ‘sways in 
the wind’ as it were, and provides a way forward for the thought of nature and freedom in the context 
of Continental philosophy: 
 
It is true that it was time to speak out against the contemporary impoverishment of philosophy, 
condemned for so long to poetic-messianic waiting, ignoring the most serious scientific 
revolutions of our time.  But, as I have sought to demonstrate, the positivist or reductionist 
temptation is none other than the flip side of the same failure.33 
 
This articulation of brain and meaning, nature and freedom across the contact point of an 
epigenetic rationality allows a way forward past a long history of scepticism, between a reductionist 
scientism on one hand and on the other, a reductionist understanding of Kant’s transcendental and 
messianic deconstructive approaches that nullify any possibility of thinking dialectical development 
informed by biological evolution, as something other than the saving of the same. The epigenetic mode 
of transmission of the heritage of Kant, in terms of his very intentional concept of epigenesis, is able to 
be assimilated more easily today with the growth of scientific epigenetics.  In a similar way, the gaps 
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and lacunae in Bookchin, especially with regard to epistemology, provide an opening for other thought, 
including the thought of Malabou, which has the philosophical resources to help relaunch his project.  
It is not a matter of ignoring science and science-supporting epistemological investigations in favour of 
a philosophy that would hold the place of a hegemonic or hierarchical vocation; as Malabou, insists 
with regard to Continental philosophy, we must no longer avoid the most serious scientific revolutions 
of our time. 
Malabou’s plastic reading of Kant suggests a plastic reading of Bookchin’s philosophy of social 
ecology, one able to respond to the ethical dilemmas sketched in the contextualising discussion at the 
start of the previous chapter.  The assertion of a rationality evident in the teleonomy of organisms in 
nature affirms an ethical basis beyond mere willed human projections onto the natural world, as with 
the alleged nihilism of Nietzsche, or with a strict social constructionist approach.  At the same time, the 
articulation of a different kind of causality and a new notion of contingency inseparable from 
epigenetic growth permits an interpretation of Bookchin’s directionality thesis that moves beyond the 
opposition of a pure contingency as conceived by Gould and Meillasoux to teleological progress, an 
opposition that obscures any consideration of the ‘chance alliance of nature and freedom’.  The 
epigenetic model of rationality that Malabou proposes retains an appreciation of purposiveness in terms 
of organisms in nature across the mobile contact point of the transcendental without resorting to 
teleological justification according to an underground authoritative “code”, with all of its authoritarian 
implications that would contradict the chance alliance with freedom.  In emphasising rationality, this 
model suggests a rational basis for ethics, one Bookchin admires in Kant.  Bookchin admires Kantian 
categorical ethics partly in terms of its associations with the democratic project of a general interest, to 
be examined later, though I argue that such universalistic and individualistic ethical formulations need 
to be more explicitly transformed through a ‘creolized’ reading of Hegelian ethics, one that would also 
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respond to Alastair Macintyre’s concerns with the inadequacies of the Enlightenment legacy of 
individualistic rights.   
Here, I underscore the importance of a rational basis for ethics in relation to the tragic 
consequences of the ethical failures of Heidegger and other ‘conservative revolutionaries’ of the period 
of National Socialism in Germany.  Malabou’s deconstruction of Heideggerian temporality offers a 
means for deconstructing his thought in relation to the hypostatisation of ‘authenticity’ and the 
correlative denegation of the inauthentic, which all too easily slips into a denegation of the they from 
which might emerge a broader democratic general will.  In addition, the way in which she articulates a 
convergence not only between authentic time and natural time, but also between philosophical and 
scientific discourse concerning epigeneity, serves to strengthen the potential of a scientifically informed 
philosophical project toward a rational model of ethics.  Social ecologists would add that the capacity 
for increasing reflexivity in the epigenetic development of human rationality, a capacity underlying the 
potential for the development of an ethics and a politics, has endowed humanity through the 
evolutionary process with the question not whether to intervene in nature, as with the biocentric 
perspectives of deep ecology, but how to intervene in a way that fosters ecological and human diversity 
and well-being. 
The convergent play across the epigenetic contact point of this notion of the transcendental 
presented by Malabou dissolves the sharp conflict between Kant and Hegel and offers well articulated 
ontological and epistemological resources for Bookchin’s philosophy of nature.  The way forward for 
Continental philosophy as envisioned by Malabou frees us from the spell of the definitive origin and 
the authoritative code, yet retains the articulation of nature and the potentiality of freedom. There is a 
ground of rationality in nature, though we need not seek for an ‘underground’ authoritative and genitive 
origin and source, especially given the authoritarian implications of a certain kind of ‘arguing from 
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nature from the perspective of various ‘epistemologies of rule’, borrowing Bookchin’s phrase. The 
mobile ground of an epigenetic model for rationality as argued by Malabou offers both stability for 
reason and the conditions for its continued growth: she asserts that in Kantian philosophy the 
transcendental “is that which ensures both the stability and the transformability of the whole”.34 
Between scientism and the deconstruction, it becomes possible to say something about nature 
with a carefulness sharpened by social constructionist perspectives, yet also with a confidence born of 
this convergence of complex science and the epistemological mobility of epigenesis. According to the 
convergent schema introduced by Malabou, we may say that meaning and agency,  as well as an 
epigenetic rationality, develop in the struggle of consciousness against the biological matrix of the 
brain, and a dialectical development occurs in the ongoing struggle between the self-maintenance of a 
particular form and the self-overcoming of that form necessary for growth. Bookchin frequently 
employs this characterisation of overcoming immediate forms to illustrate dialectical development, 
though he lacked both the neurobiological and theoretical conceptual resources to argue this 
development with sufficient complexity and sophistication.  Critically, he lacks a sufficient 
appreciation of what Malabou identifies as the necessity of contingency in epigenetic development.   
Such an appreciation, emerging from both biological epigenesis and an epigenetic paradigm of 
rationality, underscores the importance of a deconstructive approach in elaborating contingency, 
difference, and alterity—in relation to freedom, an approach that would preserve freedom against the 
alliance of identitarian thinking and teleological justification. 
Bookchin sees Kant as a long sceptical detour from a dialectical naturalism that could only be 
reconstructed from an ecologised Hegelian dialectical approach, a dialectic rescued even from its role 
in ‘correcting’ Kantianism.  Nonetheless, he might have appreciated Malabou’s reading of Kant, with 
its argument for a mobile, ‘surface ground’ for a rationality in nature, as well as a rationality growing 
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epigenetically.  The epigenetic unfolding occurs in the place of a dual objectivity that no longer 
concerns simply the objects of nature ruled by a mechanistic determinism, but also organised beings.  
However, this is also the place not merely for a transcendental and an empirical subjectivity, but for a 
living subjectivity as well.  What resources might an epigenetic dialectic offer for overcoming dualism? 
How might the dialectic move thought from the ‘is’ to the ‘ought’, an ought which is not that of the 
‘infinite striving of an abstract sollen’ criticised by Hegel, but an ought that could be understood 
dialectically and actualised incrementally? Such an imperative is crucial to the social ecology project 
for holding the contingency and complexity of these living parts together, through a process that, 
borrowing from Malabou, we can think of as a process of the embryogenesis of reason itself.  
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Chapter 6:  The Dialectic in Question 
In the previous two chapters, I looked at how complexity science and Malabou’s thinking of a 
‘new necessity and a new contingency’ in her study of the epigenetic development of causality in Kant 
from the first to the third Critique suggest a critique, elucidation, and transformation of social ecology’s 
concepts of nature.   I argue especially for a transformation of Bookchin’s concepts in relation to what 
has been termed his ‘directionality thesis’, informed by Malabou’s complex rethinking of necessity and 
contingency in nature.   
This chapter explores a further dialogue between Bookchin and Malabou on the question of a 
dialectic of nature and on the nature of the dialectic, continuing the conversation across the boundaries 
of science and philosophy, and building on the concept of epigeneity towards introducing a way in 
which the dialectic can open more fully and explicitly to alterity.  The discussion is particularly 
complex philosophically and historically.  I attempt to weave together diverse streams of thought in a 
way that increases the resonance of reading Bookchin and Malabou reading Hegel.  I first examine 
dialectic as defined by two scientists, albeit scientists writing from a neo-Marxist perspective: Richard 
Levins and Richard Lewontin.  I then move to the question of a dialectic of organisms in nature, 
informed by epigenetics and neuroscience, suggesting how this discussion supplements the dialectic as 
understood by Levins and Lewontin.  Next, I am prompted by the criticisms of John Clark of 
Bookchin’s ‘neo-Aristotelian’ and ‘pseudo-Hegelian dialectic’ to analyse Bookchin’s and Malabou’s 
treatment of Hegel, arguing that Malabou provides a reading of Hegel that avoids a dialectic of 
identitarian closure.  Further, her reading offers a plastic reading of Hegel’s Absolute Knowing.  As 
Gillian Rose has argued, such a reading of Absolute Knowledge is crucial for an appreciation of the 
political implications of the speculative concept.   Finally, I place these reflections in the context of 
Andrew J. Douglas’s thoughts on restaging the dialectic of the social and political in a dimension more 
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‘tragic’ rather than ‘comic’—‘comic’ meaning the happy and peaceful resolution of conflict and 
contradiction, a notion of dialectical resolution rejected by Nietszche and his heirs.  Bookchin’s 
dialectical naturalism in this transformed perspective offers important resources for a radical 
democratic politics. 
 
Another Dialectic of Nature 
Levins and Lewontin, two biologists influenced by Marxist perspectives, ‘reluctantly’ attempt 
to loosely formalise their approach to dialectics.1 They are reluctant partly because of the way in which 
formalisations of dialectic can easily seem rigid and dogmatic.  They are reluctant also because they 
want to avoid the assumption that dialectics are rules derived simply from nature.  They point to a 
dialectical view of dialectics, in which they see their efforts as a negation and transformation of ‘the 
prevailing ideological framework of bourgeois science’, which they identify as the Cartesian 
reductionist perspective.  They characterise the Cartesian perspective as made up of four ideological 
commitments: A natural set of units or parts comprise any whole system; these units are homogenous; 
these units or parts are prior to the whole; and causes can be separated from effects without ambiguity.  
Further, Levins and Lewontin elaborate three dialectical principles.  The first is that a whole is a 
relation of heterogeneous parts having no prior independent existence as parts.  From this principle 
flows the second, that the properties of parts have no prior fixed existence but are acquired by being 
parts of a particular whole.  As an example, they observe that humans cannot fly on their own as 
individuals, but only because of the social organisation of aircraft, pilots, fuel, and so forth.  The 
limitations of individuals are negated by social interactions.  The whole thus acts on the parts.  The 
authors note that increasing emphasis on wholes is shared by other movements that rebel against the 
fragmentation of life under capitalism, such as the holistic health and ecology movements.  As with 
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Bookchin in his criticism of deep ecology’s invocation of a quasi-mystical ‘oneness’ with nature, they 
argue for the need within these movements to go beyond reliance on harmony, balance, or ‘oneness’ 
with nature to a more dynamic and dialectical understanding.   
The third dialectical principle is that the interpenetration of parts and wholes is a consequence 
of the interchangeability of subject and object, cause and effect.  They contest the tendency of 
evolutionary theory to see organisms as the objects of evolution through natural selection.  Similar to 
Bookchin’s emphasis on the active and creative role of organisms in evolution, Levins and Lewontin 
emphasise that organisms are both the subjects and the objects of evolution: they both make and are 
made by the environment and are thus actors in their own evolutionary history.  With regard to the most 
central concept of dialectical thought, contradiction, they argue that contradiction is not only epistemic 
and political, but also ontological in the broadest sense.  Contradictions between forces are everywhere 
in nature, producing organic form as a temporary, dynamic balance of opposing forces.  As with the 
analysis in the previous chapter, they see evolution resulting from the interaction of both random and 
deterministic processes.   
Levins and Lewontin’s dialectic shares many of the principles of social ecology; however, in 
discussing evolutionary processes, they rely on the almost exclusively genetic arguments that were 
prevalent at the time they were writing. Both their perspective and social ecology theory can now be 
enriched by more recent research into epigenetics. 
 
Epigenesis and the Dialectic 
The question I now turn to is that of the relevance of epigenesis and epigenetics, as we now 
understand it, to Bookchin’s project of articulating an ‘ecologised’ dialectic.  How do these concerns 
relate to the epigenetic model of rationality suggested by Malabou, the ‘epigenesis of reason itself’?  
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How might Malabou’s work contribute to an ecological dialectic that highlights difference and 
contingency? 
We must first distinguish epigenesis, including its historical significance, from the current 
science of epigenetics.  Epigenesis in biology refers to the process by which plants, animals, and fungi 
develop from a seed, spore, or egg through a sequence of steps in which cells differentiate and organs 
form.  As contrasted with theories of preformation, epigenesis has been part of a perennial discussion 
that has taken various historical and philosophical shapes.  Does the individual start in some preformed 
or predetermined way, or does the individual begin with unformed material, and form emerges 
gradually over time?  The epistemological debate has centred on questions of observation versus 
inference, and the metaphysical or ontological debate includes the question of what it is that exists—
form?, or also the unformed that becomes form?  Today the question sometimes plays out as a debate 
over nature versus nurture, or genetic determinism versus the effects of environmental plasticity.  The 
questions raised by these debates have important implications for the question of when life begins, and 
thus for example, policies related to abortion and genetic engineering. 
Conrad Waddington invented the term “epigenetics” in the late 1930s to refer to the hidden 
webs of connections among genotypes and phenotypes. The term was soon widely taken up; however, 
it acquired meanings Waddington had not intended.  In the late 1970s epigenetics became associated 
with the new work on methylation and gene activity.  Some scientists limited its use to changes in gene 
function transmitted through cell division, and others explored a broader notion of epigenetics.  
Jablonka and Lamb use the following definitions: 
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Epigenetics is the study of developmental processes in prokaryotes and eukaryotes that lead to 
persistent, self-maintaining changes in the states of organisms, the components of organisms, or 
lineages of organisms. 
Epigenetic inheritance is a component of epigenetics.  It occurs when phenotypic variations that 
do not stem from variations in DNA base sequence are transmitted to subsequent generations.  
Variations can be transmitted in mitotically dividing lineages of cells, in lineages of organisms 
that reproduce asexually, and in lineages of sexually reproducing organisms. 
Epigenetic mechanisms are the mechanisms that produce persistent development effects.  They 
underlie developmental plasticity and canalization.  At the cellular level, they establish and 
maintain the changes that occur during cell determination and differentiation in both 
nondividing cells, such as brain cells, and dividing cells, such as stem cells.  At higher levels of 
biological organization, epigenetic mechanisms underlie self-sustaining interactions between 
groups of cells, and between the organism and its environment.2  
 
Jablonka and Lamb refine their broad definitions of epigenetic inheritance for sexually 
reproducing organisms in the following way: If a phenotype is inherited because a cellular variant 
somehow survives meiosis and all the processes involved in gamete production, they use the term 
‘gametic epigenetic inheritance’.  For inheritance that bypasses the gametic route, they use the 
expression ‘soma-to-soma transmission’.  In a far broader sense, Jablonka and Lamb acknowledge that 
each of the four inheritance systems they discuss overlap, and thus ‘epigenetic inheritance’ can refer to 
any of the non-genetic systems: consisting of the behavioural system, the symbolic system, the 
epigenetic inheritance system proper, or all three.   
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In this broader sense, the increasing complexity of our understanding of epigenetic factors in 
neuroscience and in natural evolution informs Malabou’s epigenetic model of rationality.  The question 
for a dialectical naturalism now is how this model is to be understood dialectically.  Most critically, 
how do we conceive potentiality, fundamental in differing ways for Aristotelian and Hegelian dialectics, 
and for Bookchin’s philosophy as well, in ways that are adequate to our current understanding of 
evolutionary factors beyond the strictly genetic? 
 
Necessity and Contingency Evolving 
John Clark criticises Bookchin for his ‘neo-Aristotelian’ dialectic modelled on ‘simple’ 
analogies of plant and embryonic growth, in which potentiality is actualised (quoting Levins and 
Lewontin) as the ‘already known’.3 Bookchin’s extensive writings on Aristotle in The Politics of 
Cosmology reveal that he is anything but naïve about the numerous issues that swirl around notions 
such as potentiality, entelechy, necessity and contingency, and telos.  He presents a nuanced and 
historically enriched appreciation of Aristotle’s thought in relation to Greek society and “the tradition”, 
as is evident in the following passage concerning John Dewey’s writings on Aristotle: 
 
John Dewey’s one-sided treatment of the Aristotelian corpus in Reconstruction in Philosophy 
could be regarded as the received wisdom of the 1920s and 1930s on Aristotle, an overview that 
still predominates in the academy today. After examining the geocentric, fixed, unchanging 
“tight and pent-in” cosmos that was reared in Aristotle’s name during the long centuries after 
the philosopher’s death, Dewey takes us through a journey of changes that are locked into 
predetermining teleologies . . . a “hierarchy of Being” divested of any novelty in which a 
modern word like potentiality “never means as in modern life, the possibility of novelty, of 
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invention, of radical deviation, but only that principle in virtue of which, the acorn becomes an 
oak”.4 
Bookchin strongly contests this portrait of Aristotle’s thought, in terms that illuminate the link to Hegel 
and to his own social ecology project. 
 
That Dewey’s survey is actually a reading of a highly Platonized Aristotle is a recent evaluation 
that is replacing its Christianized caricature.  Our present understanding of potentiality is more 
complete, thanks largely to Hegel in my view, than Aristotle’s; but without Aristotle’s concept 
of dynamis Hegel’s notion of potentiality would seem like a bolt out of the blue. . . . Nor do 
novelty and spontaneity disappear from the authentic Aristotelian corpus.  Despite his attempt 
to retain logical necessity within nature itself, Aristotle nevertheless tells us in “On 
Interpretation”, an integral part of the logical Organon that “It is therefore plain that it is not of 
necessity that everything is or takes place; but in some instances there are real alternatives, in 
which case the affirmation is not more true and not more false than the denial; while some 
exhibit a predisposition to and general tendency in one direction or the other, and yet can issue 
in the opposite direction by exception”.5 
 
Bookchin was thus clearly not naïve in relation to philosophical issues of potentiality, necessity 
and contingency, whether in Aristotle, in Hegel, or in their heirs.  He thought the increasing focus in 
modern and postmodern thought on contingency, attributable at least in part to the perceived collapse 
of faith in overarching narratives of progress constructed on various forms of necessitarian telos, 
whether Hegelian, Marxist, or bourgeois scientific, was already overdone by the late twentieth century 
as he was developing his social ecology.  For Bookchin, this absenting of any sense of necessity in 
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nature, history, or logic was leading to a relativist ethos of ‘anything goes’, and an apolitical and 
incoherent pluralism unable to consolidate a new ethics and politics capable of effectively contesting 
the hegemonic material and ideological capitalist forces ravaging both human society and the natural 
world.   
In supporting recent philosophical efforts to rethink and transform the meanings of these terms, 
I argue subsequently for the validity and importance of these transformations not only in general, but 
also in fact for relaunching the philosophical project of social ecology.   Here, I focus on moving 
beyond the ‘straw man’ of John Clark’s caricature of Bookchin’s thinking in regard to these concepts. 
 
Contingency and Complexity 
Returning to the scientific perspective of recent epigenetic research, we are increasingly able to 
appreciate that such processes as the maturing of an acorn into an oak tree or an egg into a chicken, are 
anything but simple and predetermined.  As one example of the complexity and contingency at the 
cellular and intracellular level, Jablonka and Lamb summarise recent epigenetic research into varieties 
of yeast: 
 
Another example of adaptive diversity that is related to methylation diversity is found in the 
flower-living yeast Metschnikowia reukaufii.  This is a clonal yeast that can live on a very wide 
range of nectars from many different species.  It is spread from flower to flower by insect 
pollinators, and the various flowers it encounters have nectars that differ in the composition and 
concentration of their sugars.  The rapid adjustment necessary for the yeasts to exploit the 
different nectars is associated with changes in DNA methylation, not DNA base sequence. . . . 
There is . . . plenty of good evidence that adaptations can be transmitted to the next generation 
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through epigenetic inheritance systems. . . . Often this type of transmission is referred to as 
“adaptive transgenerational plasticity”.6 
 
In considering the difficult question of how to think a Kantian a priori necessity in 
transcendental formation and the role of chance in the formation of the living being, Malabou quotes 
Georges Canguilhem: 
 
In a 1962 essay, Georges Canguilhem shed light on this difficulty in a remarkable fashion.  He 
suggested that epigenesis is a “forming without preformation”.  By contrast, “‘contrary to 
common sense, [preformationism] implies that the germ is already what one day it is destined to 
become’”. But, in order to prove the legitimacy of Canguilhem’s thesis and to deny this 
predeterminism, those who argue in favor of epigenesis must emphasize the role of the 
unforeseeable at work in all generative becoming.  They must demonstrate that the individual 
who will be born will necessarily be surprising.  That this individual cannot be born before 
tomorrow.  If embryonic growth has to respect an order, it is equally true that all life in gestation 
is “the conquest of its figure, volume, and form”.  And this achievement includes a dimension 
of contingency.  If “there is no future for a preformed being”, there is at least the unpredictable 
in epigenetic development.7 
 
How then might we conceive of a ‘dialectic’ in natural evolution according to what Wilfred 
Sellars termed a ‘scientific image’, informed by the study of epigenetics?  Organisms in the process of 
development must meet the demands of genetic and epigenetic factors through their chemical and other 
mechanisms, leading to self-stabilisation on the one hand, and to change, growth, and decay on the 
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other.  Conrad Waddington in the 1940s began to visualise these as constituting an ‘epigenetic 
landscape’ of hills and branching valleys descending from a high plateau.  The plateau represents the 
initial state of the fertilised egg, and the valleys are developmental pathways leading to particular end 
states, such as a functioning eye or heart.  Perhaps we might also think of the varying slopes of these 
valleys as ‘slopes of necessity/contingency’ as presented by Malabou in relation to the Hegelian 
dialectic in The Future of Hegel.  We shall consider Malabou’s treatment of contingency, necessity and 
freedom more closely in her reading of Hegel later.8 
Some of the steeper valleys in this image may lead to characters that are less variable; the end 
products of broader valleys may vary more.  Waddington pictures the landscape in terms of ‘guy wires’ 
attached to ‘pegs”’ in the ground.  He thinks of the pegs as genes and the wires as representing the 
chemical tendencies of both genetic and epigenetic forces leading to development outcomes of various 
kinds.  The many ‘wires’ attached to individual ‘pegs’ or genes indicate that any specific chemical or 
morphological change can be compensated for by a sort of adjustment to the tension on remaining 
wires, even if one of the pegs is knocked out (say by forces that lead to the expression of an allele of a 
certain gene).  This image portrays a dynamic developmental ‘buffering’ or canalisation that buttresses 
phenotypic stability.  A huge number of potential phenotypic variations resulting from changes in 
nucleotide sequences and other changes, can thus be compensated for and effectively neutralised, 
resulting in increased phenotypic stability. 
On the other side of an epigenetically understood ‘dialectic’ from stabilising factors is plasticity, 
understood in the general “scientific image” of variability and malleability, and not of course in 
Malabou’s philosophical register, in which plasticity is not sheer malleability but retains a resistance to 
polymorphism and the ability to auto-annihilate itself completely.  Biologists have long known that 
multicellular organisms, including human beings, have a lot of developmental plasticity: their 
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phenotype depends on a multitude of environmental factors in addition to their DNA.  The web or 
network of interactions in an organism can itself be seen as a unit of selection—rather than as 
properties of single genes.  This unit becomes more robust in terms of both stability and flexibility, that 
is, its canalisation or stability in the face of environmental perturbations and its plasticity or ability to 
respond to changing conditions.  It is not difficult to conceive of this process as a cumulative dialectic 
of canalisation and plasticity often leading to increased complexity and evolutionary success.  Yet here 
too, the process combines genetic necessity and epigenetic freedom, and is not to be conceived 
according to an overarching teleological notion. 
Jablonka and Lamb look at West-Eberhardt’s studies of phenotypic and genetic accommodation 
in terms of the evolution of the dialectic of canalisation and plasticity.  West-Eberhardt argues that if an 
adaptive developmental response in the form of a phenotypic accommodation occurs repeatedly over 
many generations, it may lead through natural selection to genetic changes, or genetic accommodation.  
The result would be increased canalisation, increased plasticity, or amelioration of harmful side effects 
of the response.  In all three cases, phenotypic adjustment comes first, and genetic change follows.  The 
evolutionary dialectic evoked here would thus have the quality of what Malabou characterises as an 
epigenetic process at the surface contact point of organism/environment, rather than the more linear 
process governed by an underground origin or source.   
Not only is there unpredictability in epigenetic development, but the momentary unity-in-
diversity that constitutes emerging individuality is a ‘taking hold of’ in a complex network of different 
competing/cooperating forces.  Difference precedes sameness or identity. However, this unity-in-
diversity of the emerging subject only reveals a further aspect of the dialectic, as the subject actualises 
itself in its internal self-differentiation.  Bringing epigenetics into dialectic adds a new dimension, from 
Bookchin’s grounding of the dialectic in natural evolution, to Malabou’s rethinking of the biological as 
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a site of resistance to sovereignty shaped by capital and the state.  I return to the question of the 
biological as a site of resistance in the next chapter. 
 
Elements of a Dialectic 
As a refinement of dialectical elements presented by Levins and Lewontin, we might condense 
the essential characteristics of dialectic into processes of reflexivity, contradiction, and narrative.  For 
the project of an ecological dialectic, we may add the elements of cumulative structure, evident in 
Hegel’s discussion of habit and simplification, and the process of moving from potentiality to actuality.   
In the most general terms, Levins and Lewontin define dialectic as the interplay of opposing 
forces in the natural world, achieving only temporary equilibrium, a definition that would apply to the 
Hegelian dialectic, though less to the historical materialist dialectic of Marx.  Malabou’s dialectic of 
self-maintenance and self-transformation in What Do We Do with Our Brain? (see next section) is 
relevant at the level of the organism in nature.  Bookchin wants to understand a dialectic of nature as a 
rationally developmental process and not mere change, which allies him more with aspects of the 
Hegelian dialectic of self-grounding reason, rather than with a historical dialectic that is at least partly 
empirical, as in Marx.   
For Bookchin’s social ecology, this is a dialectical concept of form in nature becoming 
increasingly differentiated, organised, and imbued with subjectivity.  Reflexivity itself is a graded 
process from nascent subjectivity to human rational reflection.  Contradiction can be conceived as 
forces that would oppose continued growth and differentiation, whether ‘inner’ or ‘outer’, though these 
terms can be deconstructed.  Evelyn Fox Keller, for example, challenges the dichotomy of inner/outer 
and nature versus nurture as used to describe genetic evolution, including ideologies of bodily 
‘innateness’ that have supported eugenics and misogyny.9 Regulation of gene expression cannot be 
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divided into nature or nurture.  The entanglement of nature and nurture means there is no causal role of 
a gene without environment.  This naturalistic argument can be compared to Malabou’s ontological 
discussion of Hegel’s treatment of the dialectical identity of necessity and contingency. 
 
A Neurobiological Dialectic  
Malabou asserts the possibility of seeing the relationship between genetics and epigenetics as 
itself dialectical.  Epigenetics as a science studies non-genetic changes or modifications, changes that 
do not alter the DNA sequence.  Originally, epigenetics covered all mechanisms that control gene 
expression, and that make possible the passage from the genome to the individual physical structure 
and appearance of each living being.  By extension, epigeneticists study the changes (as in the brain) 
that are attributable to experience or education.  Because of its plasticity and the epigenetic character of 
an important part of its development, the brain is not a mere biological organ.  It can also be considered 
a historical organ. 
In What Should We Do with Our Brain? Malabou explores a concept of plasticity that can 
provide a resistance to an ‘ideological norm advanced consciously or otherwise by a reductionist 
discourse that models and naturalises the neuronal process in order to legitimate a certain social and 
political functioning’.10 She cites the work of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello, who, in their analysis 
of the ideologies of neo-liberal capitalism, emphasise the way in which forces of capitalist production 
mobilise concepts and tools from scientific research, such as neuroscience research.  In particular, 
neuroplasticity is interpreted in terms of flexibility, supporting the demand for lean, decentralised and 
mobile networks of production, replacing the notion and the material reality of centralised hierarchical 
power, just as the hierarchical model of the brain is superceded by images of decentralised, flexible 
neuronal connections.  Employees must be flexible, ready to relocate geographically, respond to ‘flex 
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time’.  Critical opposition to this ideology of neuroscience must provide a coherent alternative 
understanding of the brain and consciousness, one that moves beyond both the uncritical 
neuroscientific accounts themselves and intellectual opposition anchored in nothing more than ‘anti-
reductionist’ sentiments.  How can we create not only an all-new brain but a new identity that fosters a 
revolution in ourselves and in our lives?  How can we develop a convincing challenge to the 
ideological hegemony and colonising effects of Western science, that is critical and not simply 
rejectionist? 
Malabou proposes that we need a new type of plasticity in addition to developmental, 
modulational, and reparative plasticity, an intermediate plasticity between the proto-self and the 
conscious self.  This plasticity would define a plasticity that ‘holds its shape’ and provides a resistance 
to the polymorphism of the ideology of flexibility, a tension that makes genuine transformation 
possible.  Malabou describes this neurobiological dialectic: 
 
The plasticity of the self, which supposes that it simultaneously receives and gives itself its own 
form, implies a necessary split and the search for an equilibrium between the preservation of 
constancy . . . and the exposure of this constancy to accidents, to the outside, to otherness in 
general (identity, in order to endure, ought paradoxically to alter itself or accidentalise itself).  
What results is a tension born of the resistance that constancy and creation mutually oppose to 
each other.  It is thus that every form carries within itself its own contradiction.  And precisely 
this resistance makes transformation possible.11 
 
In addition, this resistance marks a historical philosophical shift not only within Continental 
philosophy in terms of its resistance to a thinking of the brain, but also between Continental and Anglo-
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American philosophy in the latter’s concern with the project of articulating a ‘scientific image’ in 
empirical neurobiological terms.  Reading Malabou’s epigenetic paradigm of rationality retrospectively 
into her dialectic of constancy and creative self-overcoming, we may say that rationality, while not 
collapsing into a simple identity with its neurobiologically explicated proto-self, remains within a ‘one 
nature’ in which life makes meaning ‘all on its own’. Epigenetic rationality, with the fused tension of 
its retrospective-prospective temporality, has its own economy of transformability. The emergence of a 
‘second nature’ does not mark an ontological gap or the breach of a messianic transcendence. 
That ‘every form carries within itself its own contradiction’ is exactly the way in which Murray 
Bookchin speaks of the dialectic of becoming, as the negation of a current form established by self-
maintenance to a new form, mediated by exposure to contingent events.   Bookchin, however, wants to 
emphasise the cumulative, sublating character of the dialectic to describe processes of growth and 
development, in a process extended across an evolutionary continuum, however marked by radical 
disjunctions.  Though he fails to explicate the meanings of ‘potentiality’ consistently at the level of 
second nature, and show how it differs or represents a process of emerging complexity and contingency 
in relation to growth and development in first nature, the dialectic of self-maintenance and self-
overcoming extends over both.  Still, how might the social ecology dialectic respond more effectively 
to its most persistent critics on the question of openness to alterity, given a dialectical understanding of 
the relation between genetics and epigenetics? 
 
John Clark’s Critique of Bookchin 
In responding to this question, I now examine a notably harsh critique of Bookchin’s 
dialectical naturalism.  In ‘Domesticating the Dialectic’ John Clark claims that ‘Bookchin does not 
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in fact develop an ecological dialectic, but instead uses dialectic . . . in a purely instrumental 
manner to legitimate a fundamentally neo-Aristotelian and non-dialectical metaphysics’.12 Clark 
reminds us that ‘authentic dialectic’ remains the ‘ruthless critique of everything existing’, and that 
Bookchin’s ‘instrumentalisation’ of dialectic ‘domesticates it in the sense that it robs it of its 
wildness, its ferociousness, its bite’.13 He critiques Bookchin’s attempt to stay within an immanent 
dialectical logic of the unfolding of truth wherein the challenge of praxis is simply to overcome the 
barriers that stand in the way of that unfolding, barriers which Bookchin tends to see more on the 
left, creating a sectarian politics.  Clark asserts that ‘He never treated adherents of contending 
positions as subjects worthy of dialogue, or their positions as possible sources of truth to be 
developed dialectically.  Rather he saw them as mere obstacles’.14  
In Clark’s account, Bookchin sees himself as a defender of dialectical reason and reason 
itself against the dangers of tendencies ranging from neo-primitivism to postmodernism.  Clark 
quotes Marcuse’s observation that ‘it is the idea of Reason itself which is the undialectical element 
in Hegel’s philosophy’.  By equating dialectic with the most non-dialectical dimensions of Hegel 
and other dialectical philosophers, unperceptive critics have unfairly dismissed dialectic altogether. 
Bookchin, according to Clark, engages in a ‘similar travesty of dialectic’. He quotes a 
passage from Hegel that he accuses Bookchin of invoking repeatedly to show the true meaning of 
dialectic: 
Because that which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly passes into change, yet it 
remains one and the same, for the whole process is dominated by it. The plant, for example, 
does not lose itself in mere indefinite change. From the germ much is produced when at first 
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nothing was to be seen; but the whole of what is brought forth, if not developed, is yet 
hidden and ideally contained within it.15 
 
Clark comments that here Bookchin ‘tames’ Hegel’s dialectic by reducing it to a model of internal 
teleology, thus shielding it from ‘that wild dialectic that threatens all fixed concepts and dogmatic 
thought’.  Accordingly, the only contradiction usually admitted by Bookchin is that between a 
being’s potential and the actualisation of that potential.  Clark writes: 
 
Levins and Lewontin have identified a major failing of ‘‘bourgeois thought’’ to be its 
undialectical, ideological perspective in which ‘‘change is often seen as the regular 
unfolding of what is already there”. This criticism also identifies perfectly the failing of 
Bookchin’s conception of dialectic. Levins and Lewontin note that the problem they 
pinpoint ‘‘also contaminates socialist thought when the dynamic view of history as a history 
of class struggle is replaced by the grand march of stages”. The dialectical clash of 
heterogeneous yet interrelated elements is replaced by the orderly unfolding of what is 
already known by the revolutionary ideologists to be there. Bookchin is a paradigm case of 
the leftist variety of this malady. Such identitarian thinking contaminates not only his view 
of the sweeping course of history but his interpretation of social and natural phenomena in 
general.16 
 
Despite Bookchin’s denials of (full) teleology in his philosophy, Clark insists that it is 
indeed teleological in the broader standard sense as ‘the philosophical doctrine that all nature, or at 
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least intentional agents, are goal-directed or functionally organised’.  Bookchin adopts Aristotle’s 
idea of an ‘internal teleology’ in which each kind of being has a final cause and ‘entities are so 
constructed that they tend to realise this goal’.  Thus, Bookchin’s use of such terms as nisus or 
tendency would evidence this neo-Aristotelian viewpoint that he mistakenly labels as constituting 
an ecological dialectic.  In addition, Clark points to a more problematic implication of Bookchin’s 
teleological thinking when he writes that he does not have recourse to theistic ‘perfection’ to 
explain the almost magnetic eliciting of a ‘development’.  When Bookchin’s teleological thinking 
and voluntarism appear to draw the entire evolution of life and of social development towards the 
social and political order he champions, ‘one must wonder whether some unidentified God is not 
lurking somewhere in the background with a large magnet’.17 
Clark attacks Bookchin’s presentations of a stark dichotomy between ‘conventional reason’ 
and dialectical reason.  He writes:  ‘Bookchin’s contention that conventional reason (whether 
analytical, theoretical, deductive, inductive, instrumental, technical, or empirically scientific) 
cannot take into account changes of one thing into another is just unthinking nonsense.  Ordinary 
chemistry . . . [and] biological science does [this] quite well and in minute detail’.18 
Clark further critiques Bookchin’s emphasis on the ‘objectivity of potentiality’ in terms of 
his analogy of a bird egg, which ‘patently and empirically exists, even though the bird whose 
potential it contains has yet to develop and reach maturity’.  Clark accuses Bookchin of 
formulating his ‘ultimate telos’ in terms of the ‘presently nearly non-existent’ libertarian 
municipalist movement as the form in which humanity would realise its freedom and creative 
potential, a movement that ‘unfolds very much as his proverbial seed grows’.19 A more genuine 
dialectic would ‘tarry with the negative’, to paraphrase Hegel.  Clark cites examples of this radical 
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dialectic: Hegel’s master-slave dialectic (which he interprets in Marxist terms); Marx’s dialectical 
view of labour, the tetralemma of the Indian Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna; Adorno’s 
recognition that otherness is not mere opposition but leaves a remainder; the shifts of perspective 
expressed in Slavoj Zizek’s concept of the “Parallax View”; and Gary Snyder’s reflections on 
nature, in which he looks not at the immanent unfolding of the organism but at the creative 
possibilities of “conditions”, whereby we can say “Huckleberries and salmon call for bears.”20 
Finally, Clark accuses Bookchin of arguing a defective form of naturalism as well as of 
dialectic, as when Bookchin writes ‘dialectical naturalism asks which is truly real—the incomplete, 
aborted, irrational “what-is”, or the complete, fully developed, rational “what-should-be”.  Clark 
comments, ‘to call a view “naturalism” that maligns “what-is” as aborted and dismisses it as 
“irrational” is a bit ironic’.21 
 
A Social Ecology Response to John Clark 
John Clark’s attack on Bookchin’s social ecology occurred in the context of a long series of 
polemics, in which Clark turns bitterly against his former mentor.  Predictably, there have been replies 
from the social ecology community to yet another caricature of Bookchin and his philosophy. 
Bookchin’s long-time partner Janet Biehl replies to Clark’s article in Capitalism, Nature, Socialism in a 
subsequent edition of the same journal, a response that I build on.22 Biehl notes that Bookchin was a 
careful student of history and of the social-revolutionary tradition—far from espousing an ahistorical 
voluntarism, he was acutely aware of social and cultural conditions and their history and development.  
He sought to develop this tradition, learning from the past and addressing new conditions.  Thus, he 
articulates a cogent critique of Marxism and the Marxist dialectic, though he admires certain aspects of 
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it, especially the dialectical treatment of the commodity relationship.   
Most crucially, he endeavors to address the growing awareness of the ecological crisis, and he 
does this by bringing ecology into revolutionary thought by means of a dialectic that encompasses 
increasing differentiation and complexity, leading to increasing subjectivity and consciousness and the 
potential for increasing conscious choice. This dialectic culminates in human rationality and the 
potential to reconstruct society along rational lines that would foster increasing degrees and dimensions 
of freedom, despite historical setbacks, digressions, and defeats. 
Biehl rejects Clarks positing of the Buddhist or Zen dialectic, whose dialectical contradictions 
speak to the vita contemplative rather than to the vita activa.  She acknowledges that Bookchin uses 
simple analogies from plant growth for heuristic purposes—as does Hegel and Aristotle.  However, 
Bookchin certainly acknowledges that the ‘distinct directionality of conscious beings’ (in contrast to 
the growth of plants) is ‘purpose as will’.  Clark’s claim that ‘it seems not to have occurred to 
Bookchin that there is a crucial difference between determining the reality of a bird’s egg and 
determining those inherent in a social phenomenon’ is a ‘piece of straw’ in the straw man he chooses to 
present as Bookchin the philosopher.  Biehl writes that Clark ‘goes on to chastise Bookchin for failing 
to provide any evidence that any process in human society is “analogous to the healthy growth of a 
plant or animal across its life cycle”.  Yes, Bookchin did not do so—because he didn’t believe they 
were analogous in that way, and only Clark has said, falsely, that he did!’23 Clark thus scolds Bookchin 
for failing to live up to the caricature he has created of him. 
As we have seen, Bookchin’s readings of philosophy are close, accurate, historically informed, 
and attentive to primary sources.  He dissociates himself for good reason from Aristotle’s notion of 
final cause as ‘the end, that for the sake of which a thing is done’.  Biehl notes the Gary Snyder quote 
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that Clark includes in which ‘salmon call for bears’ is more appropriately characterised as neo-
Aristotelian than Bookchin’s writings.  She concludes: 
 
Did Bookchin really present no ‘‘normative basis on which to judge that any particular 
development of humanity constitutes what ‘should be’”? Of course not. He often wrote 
about the ethic of complementarity, usufruct, the equality of unequals, and reason as the 
basis for ethics—see most notably The Ecology of Freedom. Did Bookchin really ‘‘make no 
attempt to relate ‘the history of freedom’ to the specific social conditions that might make 
freedom and justice into historically grounded realities?’’ Even a passing familiarity with 
Bookchin’s works shows that he made more than an attempt, and readers of everything from 
‘‘The Forms of Freedom’’ in Post-Scarcity (1971), to The Limits of the City (1974), The 
Spanish Anarchists (1977), The Rise of Urbanization (1982), and The Third Revolution 
(1996_2003) will be surprised to hear anything to the contrary. Did Bookchin really ignore 
the fact that ‘‘the dynamics of a political movement can exist only in relation to specific 
state formations’’ as Clark alleges? Fulfilling Clark’s demand to provide ‘‘specifics’’ and 
more ‘‘specifics’’ would make all theorizing impossible, yet Bookchin was entirely concrete 
about his aims.24 
 
Biehl’s recovery of Bookchin’s project from Clark’s caricature is an able and worthy one in the 
main. Unfortunately, her taunting of Clark for his Zen references may reinforce for many readers the 
point he is making about social ecology’s hostility to Eastern thought and Asian philosophy.  Her 
riposte concerning Gary Snyder’s ‘neo-Aristotelian’ comments is a misreading: bears in no way 
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represent the actualisation of the potentialities of huckleberries or salmon, or vice-versa; Snyder is 
merely asking that we endeavour to see evolutionary interrelationships from a fresh perspective.   
A more incisive critique of Clark would be to expose the way in which he presents hasty and 
one-sided readings to mobilise his attack on Bookchin.  The selection from Levins and Lewontin that 
Clark cites reads thus: 
In bourgeois thought change is often seen as the regular unfolding of what is already there (in 
principle in the genes, if not physically preformed); it is described by listing the sequence of 
results of change, the necessary stages of social or individual development.  This shift from 
process to product also contaminates socialist thought when the dynamic view of history as a 
history of class struggle is replaced by the grand march of stages, from primitive communism 
through slavery, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and on into the glorious sunset.25 
 
In responding to this passage, I first note that Levins and Lewontin are initially talking about 
the bourgeois thought of change, rather than about any particular formulation of the dialectic.   The 
mention of ‘regular unfolding’ from genes suggests, I again argue, the way in which a philosophical 
assimilation of epigenetics might challenge such ‘bourgeois’ thinking.  When the authors extend their 
point about product over process in the third sentence to talking about the way in which the ‘vulgar’ 
versions of the Marxist dialectic of class struggle present a ‘grand march of stages’, they are offering a 
critique of Marx that Bookchin has already articulated with unmatched eloquence, sophistication, 
historical nuance, and power.   
One of Bookchin’s seminal writings in this regard is ‘Marxism as Bourgeois Sociology’ in 
Toward an Ecological Society, in which he pointedly critiques Marxist scientism (evident in the 
supposed lawfulness of the trajectory of evolutionary ‘stages’), ethical shortcomings, and orientation 
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towards the conquest of nature.  Indeed, the subtlety of Bookchin’s dialectic, which navigates skilfully 
between the ‘overdetermination’ of accounts of social forces and sheer volunteerism, emerges most 
strongly in his historical writings, in such works as The Ecology of Freedom, Toward an Ecological 
Society, Urbanization without Cities, and The Third Revolution. 
Given this, some elements of John Clark’s criticisms remain valid and significant.  Among these 
are the critique of the strict dichotomy between ‘conventional’ and ‘dialectical’ thinking, a dichotomy 
that calls for deconstruction (see chapter 3); and the generally identitarian thinking in which 
Bookchin’s dialectic is cast.  Further, his ecological dialectic would benefit from further elaboration of 
the connection between natural life and rationality.  Here, Catherine Malabou’s work as a whole, not 
only her work on Hegel, offers valuable resources towards articulating Bookchin’s project in relation to 
contemporary thought in a sympathetic, rather than a hostile and dismissive critical inquiry.  Next, 
before turning again to Malabou, I look more closely at Bookchin’s writings on Hegel. 
 
We are not done with Hegel 
In The Politics of Cosmology, Murray Bookchin devotes considerable space to Hegel.  In 
commenting on Hegel’s system, Bookchin focuses on an organic approach vs. a ‘mechanic-
mathematica’ approach, a contrast he locates in classic Greek thought.  He finds Aristotle more 
‘developmental’ than Plato. Bookchin examines Marcuse’s assertion in Reason and Revolution that 
Hegel’s philosophy is largely a reinterpretation of Aristotle’s ontology, freed from ‘the distortions 
of metaphysical dogma’ and linked to the demand of modern rationalism that the world be 
experienced as a medium for the freely developing subject’.  Bookchin finds this view limited, and 
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examines how Hegel departs from the ‘Aristotelian ontology’, beyond a mere ‘reinterpretation’ of 
it.   
Additionally, Bookchin presents a historically informed, if still somewhat conventional, 
appreciation of Hegel’s accomplishment: 
 
Against the prevailing physical mechanism of the Enlightenment, Hegel asserted a highly 
nuanced philosophy of organism that has not been supplanted in our time by the so-called 
“spiritual” mechanism of systems theory in all its forms.  The atomism (physical, social, 
and psychological) that we have still inherited in many different forms from that era are 
replaced in the Hegelian dialectic by contextuality and a rich sense of development.27 
Bookchin elucidates—also in conventional terms—the cumulative formal process of the 
dialectical movement in which the Philosophy of Nature ‘overcomes the division between Nature 
and Spirit and assures to Spirit the knowledge of its essence in Nature’. Wirklichkeit or Actuality is 
a key category for Bookchin, as the rational fulfilment of a potentiality, not merely the existential 
‘is’ or realitat.  The concept grasped in this way allows for the eduction of the ‘what-should-be’ 
from the ‘is’.28 However, he remarks that if actuality is embodied rationality, he must wonder, 
along with Marx, why the logic has ontological priority over nature.  Bookchin further comments 
that the transition from pure reason to externality and otherness is ambiguous.  He quotes Marx’s 
well known satirical remarks in The German Idealogy: ‘[T]his whole Idea which behaves in such a 
strange and singular way, and which has given the Hegelians such headaches, is from beginning to 
end nothing else but abstraction . . . the mystical feeling which drives the philosopher forward from 
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abstract thinking to intuiting is boredom—the longing for content’.  Bookchin finds Marx’s 
criticism compelling and rejects any attempt to explain away the Platonic (and Plotinian) 
implications of Hegel’s writings by shifting around the relationship of the logic to nature 
philosophy as aspects of a larger totality.  He further announces his departure from the idealism of 
Hegel’s thought, in a strategic rejection that also defines his own project: 
 
It is important to note here, that Hegel’s idealism, his logos, impedes a radical naturalism 
that could make for an ecological ground for freedom.  Herein lies one of his greatest 
failings, from my viewpoint, and the paralysing consequences of his teleological 
approach.29 
In another passage, Bookchin interprets Hegel’s concept of Geist in ways that move towards 
a concept not only of his dialectical naturalism, but also of a concept close to Malabou’s concept of 
plasticity, naturalistically considered: 
 
The cosmic Geist advanced by Hegel would be form as such, but form conceived as 
dialectical in character, hence a form that becomes ever-differentiated, organized, and 
subjectivised.  We approach here a dialectical naturalism that I have advanced as the 
philosophy of social ecology.30 
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Together these passages reveal an ambivalence in Bookchin’s thought between a Hegelian 
speculative approach and a ‘more radical naturalism’, a naturalism that moves uncertainly between an 
empirical scientific realism and what we might term (somewhat ironically given Bookchin’s tendency 
to dismiss Kant), a Kantian-based Marxism—that is, a Marxist ‘realism’ based on what Hegel saw as 
the rigid categories of the Kantian understanding, as distinct from Malabou’s epigenetic reading of 
Kant.   
 
Malabou on Hegel 
I now turn to Malabou’s treatment of the Hegelian system, beginning with an extended prelude 
that first contextualises her work within the climate of anti-Hegelianism and suspicion of the dialectic 
in contemporary Continental philosophy.  Next, I consider briefly an influential study of Hegel by 
Gillian Rose that focuses on where we must ultimately look for the political significance of Hegel’s 
critique of Kant—namely, Hegel’s concept of the infinite or the Absolute.   Malabou’s plastic reading 
of Hegel—especially of Hegel’s Absolute Knowing—is then positioned to resonate most effectively in 
its political significance, which Malabou does not address directly in her study of Hegel but does in 
other works.31 I conclude with a sympathetic appraisal of Andrew Douglas’s thoughts on ‘restaging’ the 
dialectic, an appraisal that includes Douglas’ discussion of the concept of amor fati with which he 
responds to Nietzsche, and which can serve as the basis for a social ecology response to some of John 
Clark’s harsh criticisms of Bookchin. 
 
Anti-Hegelianism in Twentieth Century Continental Philosophy 
Influential French writers in the early twentieth century, in particular Jean Hyppolite and 
Alexandre Kojeve, considered themselves to be working within a Hegelian problematic.  The former 
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attempts to accommodate Hegel’s works to existentialism, and the latter to Marxism.  Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty and numerous others were inspired by the lectures of Kojeve in France on the Phenomenology of 
Spirit from 1933 to 1939.  Contemporary German writers of the Frankfurt School in Germany, such as 
Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, generally accepted Hegel’s view of the subject, even as they 
attempt to expand its limits.  Heidegger and Gadamer, in contrast, had earlier rejected Hegel’s view of 
self-consciousness, and argued for what they considered a less metaphysical approach.32 
Heidegger in particular has been a primary inspiration for a later marked turn against Hegel in 
France, which has included such figures as Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Bataille, and Lacan.  David 
Sherman provides a striking intellectual overview and interpretation of this phenomenon against the 
background of the historical/cultural moment:   
The movement away from Hegel in France, which began in the 1950s, was precipitated by a 
number of factors, not the least of which was the changing historical landscape.  Unlike earlier 
French thinkers, such as Kojeve and Sartre, who saw in Hegel’s dialectic the possibility of using 
philosophy for the purpose of bringing about historical change (like the Left Hegelians of the 
past century), more recent French figures came of intellectual age during the Cold War and the 
failure of the New Left during the 1960s—both of which suggested the relative intractability of 
history.  Accordingly, for more contemporary French thinkers, history is not an opportunity, but 
a burden; it is either to be escaped or theorized in its intractability (which amounts to the very 
same thing).  Indeed, this is in keeping with the French poststructuralist attack upon self-
consciousness, for if there is an efficacious subject, it would be (in Sartre’s terms) ‘bad faith’ to 
disclaim the ontological possibility of recreating society.33  
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Dialectics became increasingly suspect in the various reactions to Hegel’s project, from 
Nietzsche to Heidegger.  Nietzsche, only superficially acquainted with Hegel’s works, scorns the 
‘Hegelian worship of the real as the rational,’ within the unfolding stages of the dialectic, which 
supposedly amounted to a ‘deification of success’.  Heidegger attempts to go beyond what he sees as 
Hegel’s effort to present being within a system organised by a ‘vulgar concept of time’, by exploring a 
renewed opening of the questions of time and being.  Derrida’s deconstructive readings emphasise 
heterogeneity rather than a system built on ‘the imprisonment of difference within sameness’ [of the 
unity of the dialectic]; and recognize multiple gaps and fissures instead of the dialectical gap bridged 
by aufhebung. As noted previously, Derrida rigorously demonstrates the way in which meaning is 
mutable, an effect of the play of différance a neologism that gestures to a play of deferrals and 
differentiations within meaning, and that, through interrogating these meanings, may suggest new 
possibilities for thought and politics.  
 
Hegel’s Critique of Kant 
An important writer who emphasizes the political dimensions of Hegel’s thought is Gillian Rose.   
In her Hegel Contra Sociology, though she does not champion an ‘ahistorical return to Hegel’, she 
brings to light quite thoroughly the importance of Hegel’s critique of Kant, a critique Bookchin often 
references in terms of the presumption to ‘know the unknowable’.   Rose illuminates the political 
significance of Hegel’s critique, a critique she feels the neo-Kantianism of the Marburg and Heidelburg 
schools fails to grasp fully.  Proceeding from a more historical if also more conventional reading of 
Kant than Malabou, Rose writes, 
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In the name of a neutral method which seeks solely to justify knowledge, transcendental 
philosophy justifies infinite ignorance not finite knowledge.  It subjects the objects of both 
theoretical and practical knowledge to the “domination of the discursive concept”.  We can only 
turn from our limited knowledge of the finite to an insatiable yearning for the unknowable and 
inaccessible infinite.  But this irrational relation to the infinite makes a rational relation to the 
social and political conditions of our lives impossible.   The limitation of “justified” knowledge 
of the finite prevents us from recognizing, criticizing, and hence from changing the social and 
political relations which determine us.  If the infinite is unknowable, we are powerless.  For our 
concept of the infinite is our concept of ourselves and our possibilities.34  
 
Rose’s analysis of Hegel’s critique of Kant may be transposed to Bookchin’s work in a way that 
acutely defines the contours of his project—specifically, his attempt to recover a rational approach to 
fundamental questions raised by philosophical reflections on the natural world, beyond the limitations 
of reductive ‘justified’ scientific knowledge and the ‘New Age’ mysticism he felt was infecting so 
much of the thought of his day.  Today, this path might be characterised as the challenge of clearing a 
route towards a Hegelian-inspired project of fundamental social and political transformation through an 
even more stark opposition between the unknowability of nature presumed by certain versions of social 
constructionism, and the increasing hold of irrationality in a time of ‘alternative facts’ and resurgent 
religious fundamentalisms. 
Nevertheless, I argue again that Bookchin vacillates somewhat between the speculative 
dialectics of Hegel and what I have termed a Kantian-based Marxism, perhaps out of concern about the 
mystical or Christian implications of the ‘ghostly’ Geist or Spirit in Hegel.  This approach contrasts 
with some social ecologists who look for a more traditional scientific-oriented epistemology for the 
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naturalism of social ecology.  I support Bookchin’s philosophical sophistication in choosing a Hegelian 
approach. If anything, he is not Hegelian enough, especially in drawing out the implications of Hegel’s 
Absolute Knowing, as Rose encourages; however, I focus more on the difference and contingency that 
can be read in this concept, rather than on the general notion of a rational relation to the infinite. 
 
Recovering a Future 
Catherine Malabou’s The Future of Hegel is helpful in providing arguments for a renewed 
appreciation of dialectics and speculative philosophy in a more ontologically focused way, yet one that 
enables a renewed political thinking of a radical democracy.37 In addition, she provides support for the 
denial of a merely retrospective interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy.  A decisive focus, though not the 
ultimate focus of her book on Hegel, is to develop a strategy to contest the influential view of 
Heidegger, who claims in his 1930 lectures on The Phenomenology of Spirit that time for Hegel has 
always already “passed away:”   
 
Undoubtedly [Hegel] occasionally speaks about having been, but never about the future.  This 
silence fits with the fact that (for him) the past is itself the decisive character of time, and for a 
good reason: time is both the passing itself and what passes; it has always passed away.38 
 
As Malabou observes, the alleged absence of a conception of the future in Hegel’s philosophy 
implies the absence of a future for the philosophy of Hegel.  Malabou’s strategy is not to thematicise 
temporality as such, but to shift the horizon of discussion by transforming a concept that has a defined 
and delimited role in Hegel’s philosophy, into a comprehensive concept that can ‘grasp’—in the sense 
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of both ‘seizing’ and ‘comprehending’—the structure of the system as a whole, thus providing 
‘conditions of intelligibility’ for how temporality is conceived.39  
The concept Malabou refers to is that of plasticity.  Plasticity in its ordinary meanings entered 
the German language in the eighteenth century as Plastizität.  Significant among the attributes of 
plasticity are the ability to both receive form (clay is a plastic material in its malleability) and to give 
form, as does a plastic surgeon.  Plastic materials are not simply polymorphous; they resist deformation 
and hold their shape, and even reform after a lesion, as with histological plastic tissues.  Plastics of 
course have a negative ecological connotation (and reality) in being generally non-biodegradable.  
Malabou’s philosophical appropriation of plasticity, however, builds upon the ability of ‘plastic’ forms 
to evolve and adapt in supple ways, as in the instance of neuroplasticity.  Finally, plastic in itself is an 
explosive material made up of a nitroglycerine and nitrocellulose base.   
These meanings and definitions form a ‘hermeneutic circle’ that allows for the exportation of 
the concept outside of its original domain.  Hegel speaks of the relation of the subject to its accidents as 
‘plastic’ in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.  In the Philosophy of Spirit he speaks of 
plasticity in relation to the ideal of Greek sculpture, in which the universal essence is captured or 
portrayed in the individual form; later he expands the notion of plasticity to describe the heroic figures 
of ancient Greece, such as Pericles and Sophocles, who self-formed and embodied a universal and 
essential character upon the foundation of their accidental individualities.  Still later, Hegel speaks of 
the plasticity of the dialectical concept itself. 
For Malabou’s reading of Hegel, plasticity is a power that can fashion its own content, 
including the evolving nature of temporality.  She cites the work of recent French commentators, such 
as Bernard Bourgeois, who critiques and revises the previous interpretations of Koyre and Kojeve who, 
while insisting on the future orientation of Hegel, acknowledge that the system as they understood it 
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could only be completed when time came to an end.   These previous interpretations led to 
‘unresolvable contradictions’ in relation to temporality in Hegel.  Bourgeois and others, however, have 
demonstrated the dynamic unity in Hegel of ‘eternity’ and historical becoming.   
For Malabou plasticity goes beyond an intentional Hegelian strategy and represents rather the 
unforeseen of Hegelian philosophy.  Hegel sees the future as the relation that subjectivity maintains 
with its accidents.  Time dialectically differentiates itself and thus temporalises itself, and forms the 
anticipatory structure operating within subjectivity: 
The dialectical composition of such concepts as “the future”, “plasticity”, and “temporality” 
forms the anticipatory structure operating within subjectivity itself as Hegel conceived it.  To 
distinguish this structure from the future as it is ordinarily understood, we will name this 
structure “to see (what is) coming (le voir venir)”, obeying Hegel’s injunction to philosophize 
in one’s own idiom.  “Voir venir” in French means to wait, while is prudent, observing how 
events are developing.  But it also suggests that other people’s intentions and plans must be 
probed and guessed at.  It is an expression that can thus refer at one and the same time to the 
state of “being sure of what is coming” and of “not knowing what is coming”. It is on this 
account that the “voir venir”, “to see (what is) coming”, can represent that interplay within 
Hegelian philosophy, of teleological necessity and surprise.40  
Further, Malabou explicates the importance of a systematic exposition both for speculative 
philosophy and for thinking the future: 
Being schematises itself, and the unification of the concept with empirical existence cannot be 
explained by anything external to the System.  The scarcity of references to the concept of 
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plasticity is thus evidence of its distinct mode of presence, which is that of the originary 
synthesis, maintained only in the interval between presence and absence.  It is for this reason, 
because plasticity works on and within the body of the systematic exposition without ever 
extending above it or overdetermining it, that it is revealed as the concept capable of accounting 
for the incarnation, or the incorporation of spirit.41  
Malabou’s notion of the mode of presence of plasticity as an originary synthesis without 
extending above or overdetermining it suggests how we might conceive of an epigenetic dialectical 
naturalism in its originary synthesis of necessity/contingency without a teleological overdetermination, 
as long as we are careful to think of plasticity as a strategic term and not another ‘first principle’.  
Hegel according to Malabou, works in two times at once: a Greek time represented by Aristotle’s 
conception, and a modern one represented by Kant.  In a later chapter, Malabou contests the 
interpretation and the implications of the dialectic seen as an independent ‘automatism’. She analyses 
the operation of the plastic movement in Hegel’s thought in the Philosophy of Spirit.  It is beyond the 
scope of this project to present Malabou’s reading of Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit in detail.  However, 
Derrida remarks about the impact of the book, in his eloquent and substantial preface, ‘A Time for 
Farewells’: 
A whole horizon, our own landscape seems here to have changed, our philosophical territory, 
the European scene, and much more than the French.  . . . there were few who did not situate 
their thought in the shadow of Hegel and in the legacy left by Kojeve’s and Koyre’s meditations.  
And not only in the more or less academic discipline of philosophy (Lévinas, Sartre, Merleau-
Ponty, but also Breton, Bataille, Klossowski, Lacan, and so many others) and not only in that 
generation: Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard all shared at least with a few others, a sort of 
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active and organised allergy toward the Hegelian dialectic.  They all shared this trait, of 
situating themselves philosophically, and they did this explicitly, from this rejection.42  
However, Derrida in his preface questions the ability of plasticity thought in dialectical terms 
within the immanent monism of a new materialism to explode form, without a residue or return of 
theodicy within the resources of form: 
If God is dead, is it an accident?  Is he dead by accident? Such an accident, would he have seen 
it, and seen it come—or not?  Would or could he have seen it come in this sense (foresight) or 
in this other sense (unexpectedness of the plasticity inherent to the expression “to see (what is) 
coming”? If this accident becomes essential, the expression “to see (what is) coming” would 
have been the future anterior of some sort of providence or of theodicy . . . no more explosive 
surprise, no more letting come, farewell to the future! For the future to have a future, and 
because God himself remains still to come, should not his death, if it has ever taken place, be 
purely accidental?43 
For the future to have a future, we must abandon any seeing, any essentialising sublation, that 
closes off the absolute surprise of the event.  Much of Malabou’s later work may be seen as a response 
to this question of whether plasticity can truly explode form. 
Let us return to the nature of the Hegelian Absolute, given its social and political import, as 
argued by Rose. How do Bookchin and Malabou treat this question?  Again, I do not think Bookchin 
resolves what appears to be an ambiguity and perhaps an ambivalence between the Kantian 
understanding and Hegel’s speculative approach.  He wants to divest his dialectical naturalism of 
‘theological trappings’ and the need for a ‘ghostly’ Spirit or Geist.  At the same time, he wants to 
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mobilise the speculative moment of the dialectic in order to surmount ‘reductionist’ science.  Bookchin 
does not attempt, in my mind, a thorough reading of the Hegelian Absolute. 
Malabou does offer such a reading in her The Future of Hegel.  Her reading of the Hegelian 
system is structured around questions of temporality that can provide a future for Hegel’s thought.  We 
have already noted the way in which she contests Heidegger’s claim that the Hegelian Absolute is a 
‘farewell to time on the road to eternity’.  She also quotes Bernard Bourgeois, who asserts: 
 
In substance, Hegel is saying: “History, in principle, is over”.  Of course things will continue to 
happen, but they will not relate the universal meaning of human life: in this area, nothing new 
or fundamentally important will be said.44 
 
For Malabou, the moment of Absolute Knowledge, does not mark the end of meaningful new 
appearances, but announces a new temporality born from the synthesis of Greek and Christian times, a 
time characterised by telos and the preserving role of habit is brought together with a temporality of 
sequential exposure to accidents, and comprehended by philosophical reflection. 
Unlike with art and religion, in philosophy, ‘form determines itself to content’, in a manner that 
Malabou identifies as a ‘new era of plasticity’.  She follows the process leading to the moment of 
absolute knowledge through a reading of the three syllogisms that Hegel presents in his exposition of 
the absolute Idea in the Science of Logic.   
In its process of individuation, thought determines and embodies itself, just as in life, just as 
with an embryonic [epigenetic] development, in its exposure and ‘projection’ into contingency and 
alterity.  Hegelian ‘spirit’ does not mean a ghostly or ethereal substance, but rather the gathering 
together of logical abstraction with its logical necessity, and natural contingency—categories and 
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sensuous forms.  Spirit takes on different positions in relation to what we can think of as the epigenetic 
growth of rationality and of natural life. 
The first syllogism of Logic-Nature-Spirit corresponds to the education of spirit in the passage 
of the idealities of abstract thought to the externality and contingency of life.  For the speculative to be 
effective, it must be incorporated into a sensuous existence.  The second syllogism of Nature-Spirit-
Logic correlates with the moment in which philosophical reflection negates the determinacy of its 
initial positions and moves toward a relatively free and universal position, subjectivity emerges as the 
capacity to think for oneself.  However, thought remains over against its world, confronting the object 
it is supposed to figure, as in a Greek statue, or represent, as in religious allegory.  The third syllogism 
provides spirit with its ‘own proper and determinate being’:   
The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely 
universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into spirit and nature, making the 
former its presupposition, as process of the Idea’s subjective activity, and the latter its universal 
extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea.45 
 
Philosophical reflection at this stage renounces rigidity and ‘freely opens itself to nature and to 
natural existence’.  This stage conceived historically would be that of dialectically overcoming the 
rigidity of the Kantian understanding, as a stark opposition between subject and object.  Malabou 
emphasises that the dialectical process of ‘simplification’, or suppression-preservation, is also one 
ultimately of abrogation or releasing of the self, the I=I of mastery.  As with her reading of an 
epigenesis of reason in Before Tomorrow, a multiple and mobile perspective emerges, one that effects 
the capacity for a reciprocal mirroring.  There is no prior or ‘underground’ genetic foundation.  The 
system itself becomes the subject.  Hegel introduces the dialectical moment of negativity and becoming 
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into both the Aristotelian prime mover, and the Christian conception of God or ultimate being.  
Dialectical simplification releases potential energy, as being continues to form itself systematically. 
This becoming does not end with a fixed universal absolute. The aufhebung of the Hegelian 
dialectic is itself susceptible to transformation, according to Malabou.  It ‘evolves as a term’, meaning 
the circularity of the dialectical process does not result in a vicious circle of a ‘bad infinity’ or an 
arbitrary stoppage.  As with natural evolution, epigenetic rationality continues to grow.  Contingency 
and necessity support one another, as Malabou writes: ‘It would be futile to want to determine some 
ontological priority of essence over accident, or accident over essence, for their co-implication is 
primary’.46 This dynamic universality allows a philosophy of the singular event to emerge in Hegel. 
Malabou describes the liberation of energy and the dynamic of mobile perspectives as a space not of 
confrontation but of difference: 
 
According to Hegel, there is an energy produced when the determinatenesses—the forms of 
what occurs—come into being, and that energy has always remained imprisoned.  In the chapter 
on Absolute Knowledge’ he shows that the moments shown are not to be conceived as static but 
rather as ‘pure motions’, which ‘impel themselves forward’.  . . . the teleological structure ends 
by reversing its course, in that the forms already actualised discharge their potential energy and 
consequently liberate future possibilities of actualisation.  Distributed in this way, the 
individuals are ready to engage again, in new constructions, new readings, new thoughts.47 
Malabou’s reading of Hegel is an intellectual tour de force that opens a space for contingency 
and alterity, as well as for the unforeseen event.  The plasticity that structures and explodes the 
moments of Hegel’s system reveals a dialectical unfolding that is decidedly not a return of the same.  
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Freeing theory from the rigidity of the Kantian understanding has important implications for issues of 
universality and ethics, in terms of an ethical approach that is more Hegelian than the universal 
categorical imperatives of Kant, issues I explore in the next chapter. 
 
A Social Ecology Response 
How does this plastic reading of the dialectic relate to social ecology’s effort to ‘ecologise’ the 
dialectic?  One of Bookchin’s presuppositions is the alternative pathway to Kantianism opened up by 
Hegel’s richly dialectical approach.  Bookchin ecologises the Hegelian dialectic by emphasising that 
humanity is constituted by the capacities developed in the process of natural evolution to create a 
‘second nature’ or a uniquely human culture with a wide variety of human communities, technics, 
richly symbolic languages, and carefully managed sources of nutriment.  This ecologised dialectic 
overcomes both dualism in all its forms, and a monism that would collapse first nature into second 
nature or second nature into first.  Both dualisms and monisms accept domination: Marxism and 
liberalism envision the project of domination of nature by humanity, while proponents of ‘natural law’ 
and a ‘misanthropic’ biocentrism attempt to invert this relation of domination.  Dialectical naturalism 
envisions the possibility of the creation of a ‘third nature’ wherein humanity would live in harmony 
with itself and the natural world. 
Bookchin considers what we are obliged to modify in the dialectical philosophy of Aristotle and 
Kant to render it an ecological mode of thought.  He affirms first that an ecological dialectic shares the 
movement of classical dialectical philosophy from an undifferentiated abstract towards a highly 
differentiated concrete.  Dialectic ‘picks up the thread’ of classical eduction and goes beyond it, 
moving from that which is implicit in bare potentiality to its realisation in a fully articulated actuality.  
Bookchin quotes G.R.G. Mure formulations of Aristotle’s thought: 




A conception of substance or the real, as the goal toward which develops a potential being that, 
save as ultimately realized is neither real nor intelligible, dominates the whole course of 
Aristotle’s speculation. . . . Follow him as he applies it in every sphere which he investigates; 
watch it grow from this initial abstract formula into a concrete universe of thought; and you 
may hope to grasp the essential meaning of his philosophy.48 
 
Bookchin comments that Hegel’s elaboration of this Aristotelian movement is more subjectivised and 
informed, although ‘at times cluttered by the mountain of problematics that had been added to Western 
philosophy since Aristotle’s time’.49 
Bookchin observes that Aristotle and Hegel did not of course work with an evolutionary theory 
of nature but saw the natural world more as a scala naturae, a ladder of Being, rather than as a 
continuum.  Influenced by the Platonic tradition more than is generally apparent or acknowledged, 
according to Bookchin, Hegel’s dialectic moves within a realm of ideas rather than within the 
existential details of nature.  The Hegelian dialectic further emphasises concepts over history, however 
historical it invariably remains.  The overarching teleology of Aristotle and Hegel tends as well to 
subordinate the ‘contingency, spontaneity, and creativity that mark natural phenomena’.   
Bookchin notes that English translations of Hegel often erroneously render real and actual as 
synonyms, leading to the notorious inference that for Hegel, everything that is real in the sense of 
‘given’ is actual in the sense of manifesting an actualisation of its potential.  Bookchin insists on using 
the term ‘real’ in the sense of the ‘brute fact’ of the given existential ‘is’ of common sense, and 
‘actuality’ in its more accurately Hegelian sense of the ‘almost momentary culmination of maturity, so 
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that the objectivity of the potential, which is crucial for an objective ethics, is subordinated to its 
actualization’. 
Bookchin emphasises that an ecological dialectic is not mere change but also development, not 
mere motion but also derivation, not mere process, but also mediation; and is cumulative not merely 
continuous.  An ecological dialectic is in-formed by an immanent self-directiveness and an entelechial 
eduction of the potential into the actual, revealing ‘a remarkable notion of causality’.  Bookchin warns 
against the reduction of ecological philosophy into ‘a mere husk that our current flock of “eco”-faddists 
can reduce to “kinetics”, “dynamics”, “fluctuations”, and “feedback loops”—the same mechanistic 
verbiage with which systems theory dresses itself up as a developmental philosophy’.  He quotes a 
passage from Hegel to underscore that dialectics is not mere change. 
 
That which is implicit comes into existence, it certainly passes into change, yet it remains one 
and the same . . .  The plant, for example, does not lose itself in mere indefinite change.  From 
the germ much is produced when at first nothing was to be seen; but the whole of what is 
brought forth, if not developed, is yet hidden and ideally contained within itself.  The principle 
of projection into existence is that the germ cannot remain merely implicit, but is impelled 
toward development, since it presents the contradiction of being only implicitly and yet not 
desiring to be so.50 
 
Scientific reductionism is useful in explaining life as a physico-chemical phenomenon; it is ‘no 
substitute for the multitude of forms, relationships, processes, and environments that the organic creates 
for itself as it metabolically sustains its own “selfhood” in distinction from other “selves”.  Systems 
theory enters into reductionism by dissolving the evolving subjective element when life-forms begin to 
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exercise choice as they move beyond self-maintenance to the striving activity that ultimately yields 
mind, will, and the potentiality for freedom.  In systems theory, the subjective dimensions of biological 
phenomena are dissolved into mathematical symbols that permit evolutionary interaction and 
subjective development to be taken over by the ‘system’, just as the individual, the family, and the 
community are destructured into the ‘system’ embodied by the corporation and the state. 
To eliminate or obscure the logic of development is to misunderstand the nature of the dialectic 
as well as the dialectic of nature; the dialectic explicates a rationally developmental phenomenon, just 
as systems theory explicates the workings of a fluctuating and cyclical system. Conventional forms of 
logic and pragmatic experience are generally more appropriate for most engineering problems.  The 
validity of dialectical reasoning is verified by attention to developmental rather than to relatively static 
or even fluctuating factors.  It distorts the meaning of dialectic to speak of it as a method.    
Bookchin emphasises that dialectical speculation is projective, though he does not display the 
concern of Derridean deconstruction with the absolutely un-anticipatable horizon of the “event”: 
 
Dialectical speculation, despite Hegel’s own view of the retrospective function of philosophy, is 
projective in a sharply critical sense (quite unlike “futurology”, which dissolves the future by 
making it a mere extrapolation of the present).  In its restless critique of reality, we can call 
dialectic a “negative philosophy”—in contrast, I should add, to Adorno’s nihilism or “negative 
dialectics”.  By the same token, speculation is creative in that it ceaselessly contrasts the free, 
rational, and moral actuality of “what-could-be”, which inheres in nature’s thrust toward self-
reflexivity, with the existential reality of “what-is”.  Speculation can ask “why” (not only “how”) 
the real has become the irrational—indeed, the inhuman and anti-ecological—precisely because 
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dialectic alone is capable of grounding an ecological ethics in the potential, that is, in its 
objective possibilities for the realization of reason and truth.51 
 
Social-Political Dimensions of the Dialectic 
In terms of its social, ethical, and political dimensions, Bookchin’s dialectic begins with the 
profound negative moment of opposition to social hierarchy as such, as well as to opportunistic and 
meliorative efforts that fail to challenge the reproduction of a capitalist order that perpetuates diverse 
forms of domination and oppression in its various and interconnected and dispersed forms, whether 
characterised as neo-liberal, ‘disaster’, ‘casino’, or ‘mobster’ capitalism, all of which point to 
increasing metastases of a social and political malignancy.  Dialectic is linked with this essential 
negative moment, and the possibility of a way of philosophical, ethical, and political thought that 
describes growth—the growth of the sense of real, concretely articulated alternatives and agential 
capacities capable of moving beyond ‘growth’ in the sense of the ‘grow or die’ dynamic of capitalism. 
Malabou in her treatment of the historical and political dimensions of the dialectic in What 
Should We Do with Our Brain? foreshadows her treatment of the epigenetic model of rationality in 
Before Tomorrow. As we have seen, she analyses Foucault’s writings on the Kantian Transcendental in 
the latter work in terms of a certain irreducible element he ultimately admits, even as he breaks the 
continuity between formal and historical structures by distinguishing the ‘formal a priori’ and the 
‘historical a priori’  She sees this irreducible element as supported by not only professed neo-Kantian 
but also by most Continental philosophers for ‘the residual existence of meaning as that which does not 
allow itself to be assimilated to any empirical determination’.   Paradoxically, she observes, this 
residual element creates an increased rigidity and even a certain version of preformation to the 
Transcendental as a preformed instance that does not differentiate, something that implies a stasis to its 
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temporal mobility and to its growth, its economy of transformability.   Overcoming this residual 
element of a rigid rather than an epigenetic notion of meaning and rationality furthers an epigenetic 
model of rationality offers theoretical resources to social ecology as an account of transformation—
transformation that can take dialectical forms.  Such dialectical transformation must then be linked 
explicitly and politically to the creation of the ‘real, concretely articulated alternatives and agential 
capacities’ referred to previously.  Next, I return to the issue of addressing a problematic of conceiving 
the dialectic within contemporary thought. 
 
 
Restaging the dialectic 
In his study of the modern dialectic Andrew J. Douglas offers another perspective from which to 
view John Clark’s critique of the dialectic in Bookchin.52 Clark is correct to insist on the increased 
complexity of a dialectical treatment of necessity and contingency, identity and alterity as it encounters 
the symbolic realm of the social and political.  He is also correct to point out the limitations of a 
dialectic based on the idea of a simple unfolding of what is already there.  However, two ideas—his 
dismissal of Bookchin’s naturalism and his contention that Bookchin’s obsession with a world he tries 
to will into existence led him to regard present reality with contempt—are more problematic, to say the 
least.  Bookchin does not dismiss the present of the natural world, however conceived.  Instead, he 
seeks to illuminate the fecundity and richness of the natural world, and mobilise reflection on natural 
evolution towards a future in which humanity would be able to foster it with increasingly knowledge 
and appreciation, to the extent that social hierarchy and oppression and the ‘grow or die’ logic of 
capitalism would be sufficiently overcome to accomplish such a stewardship consistently and 
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effectively. He begins indeed with a profound negation of current social and political reality; but so, 
arguably, does all dialectic that seeks to change the world and not merely describe it.   
It is unfair to accuse Bookchin of not addressing the complexity of forces involved in a social 
dialectic, or to say that his approach is excessively voluntaristic.  His nuanced historical analysis of 
capitalism as only one of several possible forms of social and political organization from the fifteenth 
to the eighteenth century is important in challenging the naturalisation or telos of capitalism—even in 
Marxist thought—in terms of the myth of its historical inevitability.  
In many ways, Bookchin gestures towards a comprehensive dialectic rather than demonstrating 
one in terms of a single system.  As previously acknowledged, speculative absolute knowing can never 
be a possession, a doctrine, or—as deconstruction has shown—a pre-script-ion.  Speculative knowing 
must wait on experience; it calls for a phenomenology.  Because of this previously acknowledged 
complexity of a dialectic that spans nature, society, history and politics, there cannot be one all-
encompassing successor to the Hegelian or Marxist dialectic.  There can, however, be a reclaiming of 
the critical and ‘rhetorical’ possibilities of multiple forms and instances of dialectical thinking. 
Douglas characterises the many ambiguities and challenges facing a revitalisation of a radical 
and critical dialectic in the current intellectual context. In reviewing the foundation of the modern 
dialectic in Hegel and Marx, he uses the terminology of the classic drama to identify the way in which 
the ‘comic’ dimension of dialectic, including its staging of a process of reconciliation and rational and 
practical triumph, is less resonant for an age permeated by various forms of scepticism—much of it 
aimed philosophically at the limitations of the dialectic.  He argues that the tragic dimensions of 
dialectic are thrown into bold relief, however, when we focus on individual struggles for autonomy.  He 
foregrounds again the Hegelian development and transformation of the Kantian critical project, a focus 
crucial for Bookchin’s thought as well. 
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For Hegel, just as much as for Kant and Foucault, autonomy requires the courage to think for 
ourselves. According to Hegel, ‘Scepticism is the actual experience of what freedom of thought is”.  
This does not mean a mere ‘shilly-shallying about this or that presumed truth, followed by a return to 
that truth again, after the doubt has been appropriately dispelled’.  Rather, it involves the embrace of 
the existentially disturbing fact that our ‘understanding’ (Verstand), which holds fixed determinations, 
is constantly challenged by our ‘reason’ (Vernunft), which ‘is negative and dialectical’.  In a constantly 
changing world, with the clash of contrary ethical and political determinations, any autonomous and 
sustainably reasonable determination requires a struggle, and ultimately a synthesis with that which lies 
outside of a particular or immediate determination of the understanding.  The struggle towards 
autonomous thinking and being requires a becoming that ‘spoils its own limited satisfaction’, in which 
‘thought troubles thoughtlessness, and its own unrest disturbs its inertia’.  For Hegel, this puts us not on 
the path of doubt, but on the ‘way of despair [Verzweiflung]’.52 
For Hegel, dialectic includes more than the process of negation as seen from the perspective of 
the understanding.  In its broader sense, it also incorporates the speculative, positive form of reason, or 
‘concrete comprehension’.   However, the long and complex history of both pro- and anti-Hegelianism 
has tended to highlight the ‘comic’ dimension of the dialectic, its speculative accomplishment.  As 
Douglas notes, quoting Katrin Pahl, ‘most readers prefer a happy ending to the path of despair’.  But 
the risk here is that ‘they lose the sense of despair by integrating it quickly into an economy of sacrifice 
or into the machinery of teleology’.53 For Douglas, this suggests a move to the way the modern 
dialectic brings its tragic dimensions into focus by emphasising lived experience—it is more difficult 
for those who actually struggle to win autonomy to take the serenity of observational distance and 
“laugh it off”.   
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In this respect, I suggest that an important consideration in terms of the ethical project of social 
ecology is an appreciation of ethics not only as a statement of determined positions, as for example, 
principles of compensation, usufruct, the “irreducible minimum”, and so forth—but how these emerge 
in the process of a dialectic of lived experience.  This could be seen as a move from a more Kantian 
deontological ethics (ironically, given Bookchin’s dismissive comments on Kant), to a more 
authentically Hegelian ethical sensibility.  The close articulation of ethics and politics in social ecology 
evokes a public realm in which objectivity comes to the fore, as previously noted in relation to Hannah 
Arendt’s thought.  Yet it is vital that this objectivity also include the subjective structures and 
dimensions of experience so richly explored in Hegel’s phenomenology and ethics. 
A key part of Douglas’ efforts to restage the dialectic is his insightful discussion of the 
challenge to the dialectical project presented by ‘the other great theorist of the tragic in Nineteenth 
Century Germany’, Nietzsche, as well as his ‘poststructuralist progeny’.  Douglas does not merely 
present another episode of a now-dated polemic between Continental philosophy and allegedly more 
straightforward political approaches.  Rather, he welcomes and skilfully responds to the challenges 
represented by Nietzsche’s thought. 
Nietzsche responded to the tragic defeat of various historical manifestations of ‘ontotheology’, 
whether in its more traditional theological form of the term originated by Kant, or in its Heideggerian 
form as the critique of the metaphysics of presence, as an occasion to question the very notion of 
rational self-mastery—the pursuit of rational truth as an instrument of divine, natural, or human 
purpose.  For Nietzsche, the world just is a place of uncontrollable chaos, better understood as a 
morally unaccountable game than a site capable of being gathered together into a rationally coherent 
system—a  world marked by precarious relationships of power and powerlessness, domination and 
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submission.  The sheer abundance of life exceeds rational determination, and such an effort in its 
ascetic discipline is not only destined to tragic failure, but is normatively misguided, in the sense that it 
denies the creative energies of life, creative energies that, especially for Nietzsche, manifest through 
artistic expression. 
Nietzsche’s thought may demonstrate a loosely dialectical movement that critics like Walter 
Kaufmann view as a more radical dialectic of worldly becoming that goes beyond a ‘mere’ dialectic of 
reason.  Indeed, the dialectic of reason is more precisely Nietzsche’s target.  He presents two concerns 
about dialectical reason: its logic of contradiction and its speculative conclusions. 
Regarding the first challenge, Nietzche claims ‘there are no opposites, except in the customary 
exaggeration of metaphysical interpretation’.  Dialectical contradiction is one more attempt to colonise 
the vitality of life and reduce its worldly complexity to a manageable coherence.  For example, binary 
oppositions such as that of gender cannot account for other gendered possibilities—an issue 
deconstruction has constructively explored, from Derrida, to Judith Butler, to Malabou.  We must avoid 
fitting new realities into old schemes.  Douglas there welcomes this critique of the logic of 
contradiction.  He quotes Diana Coole, who writes, ‘it is Nietzsche who sets becoming free from the 
synthetic march of the dialectic’.  He also quotes Foucault, who rejects the ‘sterilizing constraints of 
the dialectic’.  However, Douglas suggests that this critique tends to shift the focus away from the 
political.  He quotes Coole further, ‘although this shift is not devoid of political implications, it does 
generally move the explicit focus of critique from one of changing the real to a question of 
philosophy’s own standing’.  The implication is that we need to challenge the too interventionist 
relationship between theory and practice; take a step back and make room for a more immediate 
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embrace of the world and of difference.  Douglas reflects on this tendency and this implication as 
follows: 
But the problem here is that, in pursuing such an objective, in shifting the focus toward a kind 
of ontological project, we threaten to let in through the back door a more affirmative political 
posture, something not unlike what Nietzsche, in his very least critical moment, refers to as 
amor fati, a kind of self-satisfactory embrace of the world just as it is.54 
 
John Clark accuses Bookchin of failing to ‘tarry with the negative’ in his dialectic on the one 
hand, and on the other, of being too negative toward the presently existing world.  Clark asserts that ‘In 
truth, existent reality has much more truth, more value, and more reality than does the imaginary truth 
he depicts as “true reality”’.  In this comment Clark exhibits the two concerns that Douglas articulates 
in relation to the critique of the dialectic, both a form of amor fati combined with an all-too-common 
distortion of the speculative dimensions of dialectical reason. 
Douglas explores the latter concern in terms of an analysis of Hegel’s famous (and notorious) 
claim that ‘What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational’.  Bookchin, to reiterate, repeatedly 
emphasised the speculative meaning of this statement in terms similar to those Douglas uses.  The 
import of the statement turns on the speculative identification of the rational and the real.  Douglas 
quotes Gillian Rose: ‘To read a proposition “speculatively” means that the identity which is affirmed 
between subject and predicate is seen equally to affirm a lack of identity between subject and predicate’.  
The identity is a different kind that ‘must be understood as a result to be achieved’.  Hegel is attempting 
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to capture a sense of the complex interplay between reason and extant reality, as a reality to be 
achieved that emerges as an important resource for social and political criticism.  Douglas adds, 
To put it in the terms that we have been developing, we can say that the limited and partial 
nature of the understanding must be exposed, brought to consciousness, subject to the negative 
energy of dialectical reason.  Marcuse captures the general point when he says that social 
critique in the dialectical critique in the dialectical tradition is ‘motivated by the conviction that 
the given facts that appear to common sense as the positive index of truth are in reality the 
negation of truth, so that truth can only be established by their destruction’.  . . . In the 
dialectical tradition, the rational is not simply an imagined ideal that we drum up out of thin air 
and impose onto reality, like some arbitrary version of what ought to be.  It is important to keep 
in mind that for Hegel, as for Marx, . . . ‘any attempt radically to separate a purely rational 
‘ought’ from an arational ‘is’ leaves an ‘ought’ which is contentless and an ‘is’ which is 
unintelligible.55 
In this regard, it is important to highlight Bookchin’s critique of careless ‘dialectic’ as a mere 
‘ballet of ideas’, as well as his efforts to recover a utopian tradition not as an imaginary or ‘messianic’ 
and unattainable ideal but a reference point for a concrete and incremental praxis. In critically assessing 
philosophy, history, and contemporary ideologies, and in developing his own critical and dialectical 
project towards enhanced dimensions of freedom, Bookchin does what Marx and Kropotkin did before 
him, what many thinkers have done who engage with fundamentally changing the world for the better.  
Bookchin believes we can learn from history, overcome the trauma of the ‘dialectics of disaster’ of the 
mid-twentieth century, and articulate and implement to the greatest extent possible given current 
conditions, a revolutionary project for our time, on the basis of an ecological and an ethical imperative.  
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He learns from Marx and from the classical Anarchists, as well as from certain aspects of radical 
feminist and ecological thought, and he critiques them all. 
John Clark argues that Marx exhibits a genuine form of radical dialectic ‘when, applying the 
doctrine of internal relations, he shows that interrelated phenomena, far from having some Bookchinite 
identity in themselves, are dialectically “identical”, generating one another and indeed having no 
identity apart from one another’.  Bookchin does not see the dialectical phenomena as maintaining a 
fixed self-identity, but neither does he see them lost in a process of ‘mere change’.  Regardless of the 
doctrine of ‘internal relations’, the limits and trajectory of such a Marxist dialectic are defined by the 
initial categories, which do not completely lose their identity, however much their meaning may be 
transformed; otherwise, efforts such as Kojin Karatani’s rethinking of Capital-Nation-State categories 
designed to privilege modes of exchange over modes of production would remain incoherent.  
Bookchin’s critique of Marx and Marxian categories is thus an important one. 
In its political dimension, then, the dialectic is founded on a negation of the ‘is’ of current social 
conditions of reality, toward an ethical ‘ought’ of some kind.  In addition, for this ethics to be other than 
one that merely sustains an accommodation to the status quo, it must be directly linked to a political 
project for fundamental social transformation. Marx’s profound negation of the exploitative social 
relations of capitalism implies an ethics, but an ethics obscured by the attempt to ground the 
revolutionary project of Marxism in a scientific formulation in relation to economics, class struggle, 
and history, one that opposed the utopian socialism and anarchism of the succeeding century.   
Though Bookchin certainly does not reject science, and sought scientific support for his theses 
regarding nature, he critiques the way in which the European Enlightenment divested the objective 
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cosmos of ethical meaning, a meaning he attempts to restore.  But he grounded the social ecology 
project more on a Hegelian dialectic of self-grounding rationality than on a historical materialist 
dialectic conceived in empirical terms, despite the ambivalence I have alleged.  The dialectic of 
freedom and domination in the social arena represents an arena the Enlightenment left open for an 
order that has meaning and a change that has purpose.  He writes of the Marxist revolutionary project: 
Far more significant than Marx’s belief that he had rooted socialism in science is the fact that he 
had rooted the “destiny” of society in science.  Henceforth, “men” were to be seen (to use 
Marx’s own words in the “Preface” to Capital) as the “personification of economic categories, 
the bearer of particular class interest”, not as individuals possessed of volition and ethical 
purpose.  They were turned into the objects of social law, a law as divested of moral meaning as 
Laplace’s cosmic law.  Science had not merely become a means for describing society but had 
become its fate.56  
 
Summary and conclusion 
In this chapter I seek to identify challenges to the dialectic as a mode of contemporary thought, 
especially tendencies to read the dialectic as essentialist, teleological, identitarian, and necessitarian. I 
argued that Malabou’s work offers a thinking of the plasticity of dialectical transformation, one that 
articulates with emerging understandings of epigenetics, that comports well with the social ecology 
project of a scientific realism. Her arguments offer potential theoretical sophistication to the social 
ecology project of a dialectical naturalism, and even encourage an openness to their own 
transformation that is important in the political project of social ecology, one that, unlike in much of 
Continental philosophy, remains primary and explicit.  I have also responded to the objections of one of 
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Bookchin’s most persistent critics, John Clark, and endorsed Andrew J. Douglas’s call for more 
multiple and ‘tragic’ stagings of the dialectic.   
My concern is not to deconstruct social ecology, but to move towards a theoretical form of 
social ecology more responsive to the current historical/cultural/intellectual moment, a form in which 
social ecology can assume a deserved and important part of the conversation, not a discarded ‘shape’ of 
an earlier era.  A dialectic conceived along the lines of an epigenesis and an epigenetic model of 
rationality can be assimilated to a dialectical naturalism in a plastic reading.  Organisms in nature 
develop according to their own purposefulness or directness in their environmental context.  Epigenetic 
mechanisms modify gene expression in a kind of anticipation of contingent environmental stressors, 
based on experience.  The morphology or form of an organism as a momentary organisation can be 
called plastic in Malabou’s sense.   This involves not only the creation and reception of form, but also 
the capacity to annihilate form, and resist deformation, in a dialectic of self-maintenance and self-
transformation.  A plastic reading of the Hegelian dialectic understands the process as cumulative, 
accounting for natural growth, or the growth of personal and collective agency.  The process of 
simplification makes the singularities of these cumulative changes available to the organism, as the 
dialectic of self-maintenance/self-transformation develops as a difference-within-continuity. This 
dialectical growth does not proceed seamlessly according to a teleological necessity towards a fixed 
(pre)destination, but across multiple gaps, fissures, and disjunctions that themselves make use of the 
resources of form.  These disjunctions themselves reveal a contingency that allies with ecological 
diversity and thus with the potentiality of freedom as non- (genetic) determinancy and a diversity of 
natural forms that opens new evolutionary pathways. 
However, to think the Hegelian dialectic and especially to think the social import of the 
Hegelian absolute means not only to recover the project of an adequate rationality, epigenetic or 
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otherwise, but also to acknowledge the actuality of social relations and the ethical community.  At the 
core of Hegel’s philosophy is the account of self-consciousness as a collective achievement, achieved 
in a dialogue of mutual recognition.  When confronted by other self-consciousness, one’s experience is 
that of a decentred centre.  Social existence is seen phenomenologically as a process of mutual 
confirmations occurring through shared commitments.  Hegel’s philosophy requires both a logic, which 
Malabou explores, and a phenomenology, because actuality cannot be identified reflectively in its 
immediacy, a tendency of thought Hegel refers to as characteristic of abstract consciousness.  Actuality 
must wait on experience.  More specifically in material terms, absolute ethical life cannot be realised in 
a system of bourgeous property relations sanctioned by universal laws that assume inequality, an 
argument Hegel begins making in his early essays on natural law.57  
Malabou’s work offers vital resources for reauthorizing a speculative approach to nature, and 
for re-articulating the primacy of consciousness over language.   Her work offers as well the possibility 
of reconstituting sophisticated notions of subjectivity that may be ‘decentred’ from the standpoint of a 
discourse complicit with white, male European hegemony, but that yet have historical agency towards a 
shared narrative of liberation. In addition, her work offers the possibility of generating a systematically 
reconstructive project of reclaiming a future, one that makes a significant move beyond what Frederick 
Jameson refers to as ‘the prison house of language’, as well as the ‘political unconscious’41 repressed 
by the trauma of the failed revolutions of the twentieth century and the disillusion of the New Left and 
indeed the Left in general in both Europe and the United States. In the following chapter, I provide a 
social and ethical translation of the Hegelian dialectic for our moment, in conversation with Bookchin, 
as a complex movement from the particularity of struggles against domination, to more collective 
embodiments.  
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Chapter 7: From the Particular to the General 
Where then have we arrived thus far in our inquiry into the philosophy of social ecology? We 
have seen how Bookchin confronts some of the major ethical dilemmas facing naturalism: he 
strenuously denies that social hierarchy and domination could be ‘naturalized’ by reading them into 
nature.  This issue certainly underlies many of the concerns of social constructionists. He opposes 
sociobiology for its attempt to explain human behaviour through genes, however more sophisticated 
were these attempts than earlier theories of social Darwinism.  Bookchin’s attitude towards science is 
complex. On the one hand, schooled by Hegel’s critique of the fixed and one-sided positions of the 
Kantian understanding, he wants to avoid the ‘reductionism’ of science, and he seeks to free the 
revolutionary project from notions of a scientific materialism that would prescribe fixed, evolutionary 
stages of class conflict.  As we have seen, these tensions have played out in what Stephen Vogel terms, 
‘the problem of nature’ in Marxist critical theory, which ranges from Lukács’s attempt at a more 
Hegelian reading of the Marxist project, to a subtle romanticism towards nature of Adorno and 
Marcuse in their rejection of technological rationality, to Vogel’s own social constructionist formulation 
of an ‘ethics of the built world’.   
On the other hand, Bookchin seeks to avoid a semi-mystical rejection of science toward a more 
romanticised view of nature, acutely conscious of the way in which deep ecology philosophy and 
sensibility could degenerate into fascist ideology, as in the ‘blood and soil’ movements in Germany that 
formed the milieu in which Heidegger develops his ‘other thought’.  Rejecting what he views as the 
‘epistemological turn’ of Kantian philosophy, he fails to reconcile fully his attempt to restore the 
emancipatory potential of science with the project of a dialectical naturalism, a project that would 
provide a grounding in nature for moving from the ‘is’ of scientific factual consensus to the ‘ought’ of 
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ethical judgement, to drawing from this ecological ethics to provide the basis for a new politics of 
direct democracy. 
Malabou’s epigenetic reading of the Kantian transcendental offers, I have argued, a way to think 
about the ‘chance alliance of nature and freedom’ that extends past anti-reductionism to an appreciation 
of the making of meaning at the surface ‘contact point’ of mind and world, rather than at an 
‘underground’ authoritative code associated with the genetic.  Her reading aligns with emerging 
scientific understandings of the importance of epigenetics in natural evolution. The ‘epigenetic model 
of rationality’ that Malabou puts forward could inform and transform a philosophy of nature in which 
meaning is neither imposed on nor read directly from nature, but interpreted like reading a musical 
score.  Such an epigenetic model entails a rethinking of necessity and contingency, compatible with 
aspects of nature identified by Bookchin such as unity in diversity, but not with a ‘hard’ version of his 
directionality thesis that would imply a necessitarian telos in nature.   
Malabou’s epigenetic model further suggests a ‘non-identitarian’ dialectic, one she previously 
explores using different terminology within a different problematic, in her ‘plastic’ reading of Hegel.  
As delineated in the previous chapter, such a reading of dialectic resolves some stubborn ambiguities in 
Bookchin’s presentation of the dialectic, and is compatible with a more diverse, multiple, and ‘tragic’ 
staging of the dialectic, as argued by Andrew J. Douglas. 
We thus arrive at what Malabou refers to as a plastic rather than a deconstructive reading of 
Bookchin’s philosophy of social ecology, in which core concepts are expanded and transformed to 
encourage a relaunching of the social ecology project in the current philosophical milieu of a new 
materialism, and the historical moment of an emerging municipalist politics in Rojava as well as in a 
more nascent form in other parts of the world. 
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A plastic reading of Bookchin’s social ecology would expose the tensions in its core concepts 
and render them more sophisticated and more fluid, opening them to transformative encounters with 
other thought both within and outside of the Western tradition.  I see tensions at various levels of social 
ecology theory between Bookchin’s appeal to the objectivity of concepts drawn from the sciences of 
ecology and biology and his attempt to ecologise the Hegelian dialectical unfolding of concepts.  We 
can broadly characterize these as conflicts or tensions between what may be termed a more Kantian 
Marxist position and a more speculative Hegelian approach to both the philosophy of nature, as well as 
to his social and ethical philosophy.  In our reading of Bookchin via Malabou, we can further see these 
as a desire for the relative stability of an objective, necessary, and universal foundation for ethics, in its 
encounter with a need to re-cognise issues of contingency and diversity. 
As stated previously, I cannot accept the teleological and even authoritarian implications of the 
‘hard’ version of Bookchin’s directionality thesis. This version of directionality would lean too far 
towards a necessitarian view of evolution, one that obscures the way in which contingency and 
necessity support each other throughout many levels of evolving life-forms and their ecological 
contexts.  However, aspects of nature identified by Bookchin remain that are distinct from teleological 
notions of humanity as the spiritual destiny of nature, and distinct as well from a scientific scepticism 
that would inform a consideration of humanity as ‘merely’ a contingent development of evolution.  
Contingency and non-teleological necessity in the form of increasing self-organisation and self-
directedness are both part of natural evolution as understood by social ecology, though Malabou’s work 
on both Kant and Hegel offers as we have seen, sophisticated resources for articulating an 
understanding of the relation of necessity and contingency.    
I therefore argue in support of two elements of the ecological ethics of social ecology.  First, I 
argue for the objectivity and ethical import of potentiality; second, I support the assertion that nature is 
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fundamentally non-hierarchical, more mutualistic than competitive, and exhibits processes of self-
organisation, differentiation and development with important implications for ethics and politics. 
However, orienting a revolutionary project based on universal and objective natural features raises 
important concerns regarding questions of ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism regarding the formulation 
of a ‘universal’ ethics. 
This chapter forms a dialectical movement from the ‘universal’ to the particular and then to the 
general.  I argue that social ecologists would do well to advance a more Hegelian ethics based on a 
phenomenology of lived experience, rather than on ethical formulations based on a problematic and 
relatively static notions of the ‘universal’. Challenges to the universalistic claims of the Western 
tradition in relation to racism and colonialism illuminate the (social and community situated) 
implications of absolute knowing.  I view these as opening the Western tradition in general and social 
ecology in particular to other thoughts. 
This opening suggests a way of thinking about how social ecology might be transformed in its 
encounters with thoughts and practises from outside the Western tradition.  In this regard, I look at the 
way in which Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller assess the plasticity of law and its vulnerability to anti-
colonial efforts, in relation to Malabou’s thought.  Further, I look at how a synthesis of social ecology 
and new materialist approaches may serve these efforts.   
I then extend these insights and approaches to the question of how they can be articulated in 
terms of a model of will, desire, and agency that responds to the concerns raised by David Sherman in 
his remarks about the loss of a sense of political agency reflected in recent Continental philosophy.  
Leaving deconstruction, I turn to how this encounter with other thought can be seen in the philosophic 
encounter of Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon.  I then suggest that Linda Martín Alcoff’s insights on 
the future of whiteness and Jane Anna Gordon and Lewis R. Gordon’s notion of the creolization of 
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theory offers useful and important ways to think about how subjectivities and agencies are transformed 
in collective democratic struggles.  The insights suggested by these approaches are highly relevant to 
social ecology as a counter-tradition within the West, because it engages with theories and practises 
from the Global South.  Finally, I use examples to apply these considerations to the social ecology 
project of encouraging a general interest that is the social and ethical context for a politics of direct 
democracy.  
 
From a Universal to a Hegelian ethics 
Social ecology argues for an ethics based on an ecological and evolutionary development of 
capacities and meanings of freedom, and towards this goal, a politics that would be based not simply on 
need but on desire—a further elaboration of a desirable politics.17 However, in terms of concrete efforts 
to articulate an ethics that would inform such a politics, social ecologists, understandably in the 
interests of recovering a ‘general interest’ of the public realm, at times have appeared to move too 
quickly to an ethical universalism, ignoring the particularity of struggles against domination and 
oppression.  In this regard, social ecologists should heed Hegel’s critique of Kantian ethics. Hegel 
emphasizes that reason does not exist independently of naturally existing, self-conscious agents.  
The reason that is autonomous must always be the reason of a naturally existing, embodied 
agent; otherwise the self-determination of reason would have no significance for the ethical nature of a 
person.  Embodied indigenous traditions speak of ‘thinking with the heart’.1 Indeed, a ‘body’ of 
research has emerged that speaks of the ‘heart brain’2 and the ‘belly brain’3.  Within neuroscience 
research, growing evidence supports the importance of affective neural pathways for the development 
of intelligence and rationality.4 In fairness to Bookchin, one can find many passages in which he 
challenges the Cartesian notion of a disembodied subjectivity that has characterised a great deal of 
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Western notions of rationality.  The conditioning of rationality by affectivity already points to a bridge 
from the is to the ought, to the extent that we cannot speak of affective human life apart from a 
consideration of values.  This affective life has an evolutionary past that needs to be thought in terms of 
embodied experience. 
 Moral and ethical worth enter into the world of experience, and experience must be the soil and 
seed of ethics, rather than an alien matter upon which it is imposed.  Ethical value cannot be an 
independently defined categorical value that can be conferred upon the world of experience; rather, it a 
value opened up by the fact of experience.  In addition, an ethics must find ultimate political expression 
within an ethical community.  This ethical community is the antithesis of the psychopathology of a 
corporate capitalist disembodied logic that would reduce all value to that of profit. 
 
Ethics in an Anthropological Register 
Bookchin looks not only to nature but also to anthropological research on indigenous societies 
to guide the development of a social ecology ethics.  In The Ecology of Freedom he cites then-
contemporary ethnographic research, in particular that of Dorothy Lee, as evidence of the potential for 
humanity to form a non-hierarchical society based on mutuality, reciprocity, and compensatory 
structures that go beyond principles of justice based on legalistic notions of equality.5 These ‘organic 
societies’ demonstrate the capacity for a sharing of material goods through principles of usufruct and 
the irreducible minimum.  Such societies demonstrate an ethos of complementarity rather than 
competition.  Bookchin sees these principles as constituting an actualisation of human potentials, and 
he proceeds to investigate historically how such principles are obscured or violated in the Western 
tradition by the subsequent elaboration of systems of domination and oppression that lead to an 
‘epistemology of rule’, in dialectical interaction with ‘legacies of freedom’.  He acknowledges that 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   241 
 
 
there is much to admire in various ‘alternative lines of development’ of indigenous societies; but he is 
careful to avoid the tendency to romanticise such societies, a tendency he views as endemic to certain 
deep ecologists and ‘eco-faddists’ of his day.  
A social-ecological ethics would thus draw from each of the traditions of normative ethics: from 
virtue ethics for its Aristotelian/Hegelian recognition of the importance of the traditions of bildung and 
paideia as training for public life within a politically educated community; from deontological ethics 
for its focus on the universal and ‘general interest’, beyond an individualist moralism distorted by 
notions of ‘purity’; and from ego-altruist consequentialist approaches in their appreciation for the role 
of ethical examples in inspiring social and political movements.  This ethics exceeds any attempt to 
isolate it in a separate philosophical realm by its linking of an ontology of nature, social hierarchy and 
domination, and a radical democratic politics.  Drawing from the anarchist tradition the notion of a 
prefigurative politics, social ecology actualises ethics-politics beyond its binary opposition in 
contemporary thought. 
Though partly inspired by anthropological research, Bookchin’s social ecology argues against a 
primitivism associated with some deep ecology writers who would oppose modernity in an anti-
technological attempt to ‘return to the Paleolithic’.  Bookchin reads social history as a subversion 
of the balances in natural evolution, through the institutionalisation of systems of social hierarchy 
and domination.  Nevertheless, aspects of the emergence of modern urban life are seen as 
actualising the potential for the development of a universal humanitas that can overcome the 
parochialism of kinship ties and the fear of the other in traditional societies.  
Bookchin presents a detailed historical analysis of the dialectic of domination and emerging 
degrees of freedom.  Examples include the resistance to the emerging nation-state in various leagues of 
city-states, which formed a historical alternative to the supposed telos of capitalism and the state, and 
the example of anarcho-syndicalist Catalonia, Spain in the years of the Spanish revolution. The latter 
example provides at least some evidence to refute the arguments that radically democratic forms of 
social organisation in political and social life can be dismissed as simply ‘impractical’. 
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Bookchin calls for a (relatively) stable ethics informing a recovery of the public and political 
realm, along the lines of a radical democracy that would provide counter-institutions capable of 
effectively opposing the embeddedness, perpetuation, and exacerbation of hierarchy and domination 
within capitalism and the state.  The social and political forms of the latter can be seen as profoundly 
anti-natural in their destruction of the spontaneous and open-ended development of human beings.  
Crucial for understanding and responding to current ecological crises is the historical development of 
gerontocracies, patriarchies, warrior societies, and class societies, resulting in the project of dominating 
nature—though, in fact, nature cannot be dominated, as we continue to discover.   
According to Bookchin, the emergence of hierarchy and class society in settled agricultural 
societies cannot be explained simply through a technological determinism based on the availability of 
means to create and store agricultural surplus.  He makes a philosophical, historical, and 
anthropological argument that hierarchical tendencies must have already begun to emerge in earlier 
societies, in order to give shape to the development of class society.  Andy Price explores—and 
generally defends—Bookchin’s arguments in this regard, as does subsequent research confirming his 
speculative extrapolation from the relatively few anthropological studies available at the time he was 
writing.6 These sources provide support for the core social ecology insight that the attempt to dominate 
nature stems from the domination of human by human. 
Though Bookchin premises key ethical arguments on an idea of organic society drawn from the 
study of indigenous communities, relatively little in social ecology writings has focused on particular 
struggles against racism and colonialism, in comparison to the substantial contributions that social 
ecologists have made to inequality and gender oppression in the form of its contributions to social 
anarchism and ecofeminism.7 In the remainder of this chapter I raise questions of racism, colonialism, 
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and gender theory in the light of Malabou’s work and in light of the work of Linda Martín Alcoff and 
Jane Anna Gordon. 
 
The Question of Telos 
To examine these issues further, I would like to construct an imagined conversation between 
Malabou and Bookchin on the relation between society and nature.  I begin with the question of telos in 
nature and in society.  In ‘Whither Materialism? Althusser/Darwin’, Malabou asserts that ‘plasticity 
situates itself effectively at the heart of the theory of evolution’.8 Darwinian natural selection articulates 
identity and difference in a particular way: Identity derives from the reproduction of selected 
individuals which are thus able to inscribe themselves into the stability of an identifiable type.  
Difference arises from variability, an ‘empty point’ from which forms emerge.  Natural selection is 
ateleological, an automaticity without intention, a ‘blind movement’ that is ‘a promise of forms never 
chosen in advance, of differences to come’.9  
A natural balance emerges based on a plastic condition between the fluidity of structures on the 
one hand, and the selection of viable, durable forms likely to constitute a legacy or lineage on the other.  
The best is the fittest, but this aptitude is unpredictable; there is no ‘better’ in itself.  Malabou is careful 
to refute the confusion of Darwinism and Malthusianism, explicitly guarded against by Darwin in The 
Origin of Species.  Darwin most certainly did not think of natural selection as a simple quantitative 
dynamic governed by the ratio of the number of individuals in a population and the availability of 
resources. 
In nature, according to Malabou’s reading of natural selection, an automatic and blind 
equilibrium exists between identity and difference.  In the human social order, identity predominates 
over difference, and the balance is interrupted.  ‘The idea of choice’, she writes, ‘is again entirely 
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absent from natural selection’.  This is a questionable assertion, given the increasing evidence for the 
ways in which organisms create their ecological niches, by means of what Bookchin refers to as a kind 
of rudimentary choice.  For that matter, does not humanity with its desire, will, and augmented 
capacities for choice, evolve from selection processes in nature?    
Malabou, however, is primarily concerned with assessing the relevance of a new materialism to 
Althusser’s claim of ‘an almost completely unknown materialist tradition in the history of 
philosophy, . . . a materialism of the encounter, and therefore of the aleatory and of contingency’. This 
materialism would be a ‘wholly different mode of thought’ than materialisms in the rationalist tradition, 
including that of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, which are materialisms of necessity and teleology, or, as 
Althusser puts it, ‘a transformed, disguised form of idealism’.10 
Malabou’s new materialism names a non-transcendental status of form in general, without any 
outside of the process of formation.  This immanent dynamic of form is not governed by an internal 
tension towards a telos, one that orients and determines every self-development.  Such a materialism 
does not presuppose any telos, reason, cause or any ‘anteriority of meaning’. The structure does not 
precede its elements, which are then simply reproduced in order to reproduce the structure.  Forms are 
encounters that have taken form or ‘taken hold’ in order to last and become necessary--where 
contingency is not a modality of necessity; but rather, as discussed in a previous chapter, necessity is 
thought as the becoming-necessary of the encounter of contingencies.  As with Althusser’s ‘materialism 
of the encounter’ this materialism does not start from necessity, order, causality, and meaning, but 
without predeterminations, from a ‘point zero’. 
As Malabou discusses, Althusser critiques the way in which Marx abandons an analysis of the 
capitalist mode of development as an aleatory encounter between the dispossessed proletariat and the 
‘owners of money’. This encounter aggregates different elements, becoming gradually necessary, for an 
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essentialist(ic)and necessitarian conception of the mode of production within the logic of the 
reproduction of the proletariat on an extended scale, produced by ‘big industry’. 
Malabou briefly discusses the ways in which social ‘selection’ maintains a predominance of 
identity over difference, in the service of the dominant ideology.  Aptitude is never selected for political 
struggle but always instead for respecting and maintaining order.  She asks, ‘How can we ensure, 
within the realm of community and culture, the equilibrium between variation and selection, the future 
of difference, the promise of unexpected forms?’  I can endorse the argument that leads to these 
questions, though not the ethical or unethical implications of Althusser’s anti-essentialist critique of 
Marxism, wherein he cites a canon of exemplars that includes Machiavelli.  There are more than 
enough Machiavellian aspects to politics as currently practised. 
 
Bookchin’s Response: The Social Ecology View of Natural Selection 
In adapting Hegel to a naturalistic dialectic rather than to a dialectic governed by Geist, 
Bookchin argues for an understanding of natural evolution as non-teleological in any dualistic, vitalist, 
or ‘spiritualised’ sense.  He articulates a basis for social ecology in a nature understood philosophically 
along the lines of Aristotle’s dynamic substance, as well as an ecologised dialectic in which negativity 
is the moment in which one form gives way to another in an immanent process of growth or decay.  He 
opposes any need for a spiritualisation of nature from outside, whether in the form of a deity or an 
animating principle such as ‘Bergsonian vitalism’.   
However, the increasing complexity of natural forms and ecocommunities that he observes led 
Bookchin to seek alternative perspectives on the process of natural evolution from the scientists of his 
day.  As we have seen, he cited scientific support for a view of evolution that emphasized the role of 
cooperation as well as competition, in order to argue strenuously against the mutation of social 
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Darwinism into elements of a sociobiology that would naturalise the dynamic of social relations under 
capitalism.  Further, he articulates the thesis of a participatory evolution emphasising the contextual 
reality of the ecology of species development.  Participatory evolution highlights the role of species as 
they evolve in actively creating and shaping the environments in which they live, rather than merely 
adapting to a process of natural selection seen as a kind of perfectly balanced mechanism that could be 
claimed to underwrite deconstruction’s ethical concerns for maintaining difference.  Social ecologists 
argue in support of humanity’s potential role in creatively overcoming social hierarchy and ecological 
devastation as conscious ethical and political agents arising from natural evolution—however aleatory 
these evolutionary processes may be.  Nevertheless, for social ecologists to be successful towards these 
goals, I argue that they must not themselves fall prey to ideological closure based on teleological 
notions smuggled in as a ‘tendency’ in natural evolution that provides an objective, authoritative, and 
potentially authoritarian ‘excess of identity’. 
 
New Materialism, Law, Sovereignty, and Recognition 
In this section I explore further the issues raised by Malabou in her reflections on Darwin and 
Althusser, foregrounding questions of identity and difference as they relate to the legal issues of 
sovereignty and recognition many indigenous communities confront. I will first expand the discussion 
of Malabou’s work through a discussion of her argument in What Should We Do With Our Brain?  Next, 
I bring in some of her work and responses to it that appear in the collection Plastic Materialities. Both 
of these discuss possibilities for a radical politics in relation to nature and natural processes.  Finally, I 
return to the question of will and choice, the elements elided in Malabou’s discussion of Althusser, in 
terms of developing a model of human agency, with the capacity to recover a future not only for Hegel 
but for humanity as well as for virtually all complex life on this planet.   
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To be fair, Malabou does not deny the emergence of transformed understandings of evolution 
since Darwin and their political implications; indeed, she discusses these in her thoughts elsewhere on 
epigenetics, on the way in which gene expression depends on epigenetic factors that play a major role 
in brain development and in the fashioning of individual identities.   Neuronal structures are plastic—
genetically programmed to develop and operate without a program, plan, determinism, or 
preschematisation.  The brain makes itself, the brain is a history.  In What Should We Do With Our 
Brain, Malabou writes, 
 
“Humans make their own history, but they do not know that they make it”, says Marx, intending 
thereby to awaken a consciousness of historicity.  In a certain way, such words apply precisely 
to our context and object: “Humans make their own brain, but they do not know that they make 
it.”11 
 
As discussed previously, plasticity, conceived in a certain ideology of neuroscience—as the 
‘flexibility’ and suppleness of neuronal structures—appears to naturalise and justify the political and 
social organisation of neoliberal capitalism, in the form of part-time jobs, temporary contracts, flexible 
production, the demand for absolute mobility and adaptability. However, flexibility only names one of 
the registers of plasticity as thought by Malabou, the capacity to receive form.  Flexibility as celebrated 
in this ideology lacks the resource of giving form, of the power to invent and create, as well as the 
power to erase and explode forms. 
Malabou enunciates a kind of slogan: ‘no deconstruction without materialism, but no Marxism 
without deconstruction’.12 She also states that ‘it is vital to pluralise Marxism’.13 We can further 
pluralise the proper name for revolutionary thought in this case to bring Bookchin into the conversation.  
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Bookchin wants to base his revolutionary project on an Enlightenment concept of the unitary and 
universal human subject, which numerous thinkers have worked to deconstruct as almost inevitably 
white, male, and of European descent. It is not a matter of simply making social ecology concepts more 
flexible and open, or even ‘multicultural’, though I will argue later that some concepts may become 
‘creolized’ in the broader process of working within social movements.  Rather, it is a matter of 
problematising the universal human subject in relation to a host of questions, including those of ethics, 
law, and sovereignty.   
 
Law, Sovereignty, and Recognition in Neo-Colonial Contexts 
How does an ethics of spontaneity and compensation evolve within the law-based system of 
direct democracy that social ecology envisions?  As stated in my introduction, and examined more 
closely in chapter 3, deconstruction offers social ecologists theoretical resources in terms of exploring 
concepts about ethics and law, and biological definitions of humanity.  In their article, ‘Law, 
Sovereignty, and Recognition’, Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller explore the 
deconstruction of some of these concepts of ethics and law through focusing on issues of recognition—
both philosophical (specifically Hegelian) and legal—in colonial encounters.14  
According to Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller, settler colonialism can be seen as an ongoing 
structure of replacement to secure land, a process that often makes use of legal, cultural, and political 
forms of conservation and conscription of the role of indigenous peoples, rather than outright 
genocide—at least in the form of mass murder—or forced relocation.  The strategy of conscription 
plays upon the gap between the primitive and the modern, with primitivism operating as what Levi-
Strauss terms a floating signifier, which organises and mobilises language, social relations, and culture.  
Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller draw on Malabou’s attempt to deconstruct sovereignty by highlighting 
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the gap between the symbolic and the biological as a floating signifier.  They summarise the way in 
which Malabou elsewhere argues for a place of plastic transformation within the biological itself, rather 
than the biological assumed to be merely an ally of sovereign power in previous deconstructive 
attempts by Foucault, Derrida, and Agamben. 
Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller assess the plasticity of colonial law in terms of its vulnerability to 
anticolonial efforts.  Colonial law once sustained the division between savage and civilised, and now 
codifies multicultural social relations that reduce indigenous peoples to one equivalent identity among 
many.  Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller analyze the basis on which the Supreme Court of Canada in 2002 
denied treaty rights for harvesting logs to the Mi’kmaq of the eastern Canadian coast because 
commercial logging is not an activity that has ‘logically evolved’ from a ‘traditional activity’.   In this 
way, the subject of aboriginal rights becomes frozen temporally in a time prior to European settlement, 
since the essence of those rights is defined in relation to the moment that colonial sovereignty was 
asserted in order to preserve private property relations.  The nature of recognition in the settler colonial 
context of Canada creates contradictions and disjunctures as First Nation’s self-determination is 
ignored in favour of criteria based on Crown definitions of the community’s culture prior to contact 
with Europeans. 
Next, Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller move to a broader consideration of the limits as well as the 
inescapability of the framework of recognition. As the authors note, it was Frantz Fanon in Black 
Skin/White Masks17 who presents the most vivid and acute account of nonrecognition in the colonial 
context, shaped by a discourse of primitivism and biologically grounded racism.  Fanon finds 
recognition to be impossible in the colonial context: mutual recognition would require a shattering of 
psychic, economic, and metaphysical worlds.  Fanon’s critique of the impossibilities of recognition 
remains important; Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller look to a rethinking of the body and of temporality in 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   250 
 
 
Malabou’s new materialism as a way out of the contradictions, disjunctures, and immobilising effects 
of sovereign ‘recognition’.  As we have seen, Malabou uncovers the plasticity of temporality in Hegel’s 
dialectical logic as a structure of anticipation—the subject is able to temporalise itself.  This plasticity 
of temporality suggests a way of understanding how subjects confined by sovereign orders can think, 
act, and live according to temporalities that exceed and contradict these confines.  This is relevant to 
legal struggles wherein indigenous people are denied access to certain lands and activities on the basis 
of definitions of cultural practises as these practises existed prior to the colonial assertion of 
sovereignty, a kind of prehistory from which courts define the ahistorical essence of aboriginal cultural 
difference. 
In the colonial context, the bodies of settlers and the indigenous are bound in complex ways.   
Though they acknowledge the limitations of such generalisations, Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller note 
that many indigenous peoples maintain philosophies of the body that are not limited to the human form, 
and that value the recognition gained among many life forms.  In addition, indigenous peoples often 
understand the body as a collective being in contrast to the individuality assumed in Western culture 
and legal systems.  Thus,  Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller extend their assessment of Malabou’s work in 
relation to colonial biopolitics to indigenous conceptions of life.  They argue that indigenous ontologies 
of a vibrant matter, which have much deeper roots than contemporary new materialism, suggest a 
parallel approach to a rethinking of the symbolic within the Western realm of the biological.  
Indigenous ontologies of the often-metamorphic interrelationships of humans with animal, plants, and 
landforms thereby offer a traditional location of forms of resistance to colonial biopower for native 
peoples dispossessed of their land and cultural traditions.19 
Deconstruction thus occurs as anything but a static and uniform process; we have examined 
several layers of deconstructive practise, each with its own tendencies and areas of concern.  Bhandar 
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and Goldberg-Hiller suggest that Malabou’s thought can be useful for thinking beyond the temporal 
and other forms of immobility created and enforced by colonial or neo-colonial law, but that ultimately 
we must extend intellectual and critical recognition to indigenous ontologies in order to effect vibrant 
pathways of resistance against colonial biopower.   How is this relevant to our inquiry into social 
ecology? 
Social ecologists might initially resist such thinking along colonial boundaries.  Again, 
Bookchin disdains the presumed relativism of any form of deconstruction. A social ecology reply to our 
discussion above might be that only a revolutionary approach could overturn the property relations that 
remain at the root of colonial conflicts, and only such an approach can honour not only the diagnosis 
but also the remedies that Fanon (and many others) call for.  In the case of Fanon, these remedies 
certainly include the seizure of state power, the constituting of a new government, and the complete 
control of the economy by the people.  However, these remedies also involve overcoming the 
‘zombification’ of a static notion of traditional indigenous cultures, in which they are seen as petrified 
objects in a museum.  If there is to be a revival of indigenous and national cultures, it must be in a 
revolution through which they are recognized as living.  We must radically transform ourselves at all 
levels.20 
Further, a revolutionary project such as that of social ecology that eschews coercion and the 
‘seizure of power’ in favour of consolidating a prefigurative horizontal positive power from below, has 
all the more need to encounter diverse thought within the process of that consolidation.  Peter Skafish 
expresses this well when he writes, “Subjects,” “histories,” and “truths” not belonging to the West can 
be listened to and understood only if the concepts (of the subject, of history, and of truth) used to 
interpret them are enough at the borders of metaphysics to cross them and thereby become estranged by 
the other”.21 Approaching and transforming the borders of the Western metaphysical tradition has been 
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the project of deconstruction. Bookchin approaches a border of this tradition in his concern to shed the 
‘theological trappings’ of Hegelianism.  I have asserted that the failure to explore critical issues of race 
and colonial relations theoretically remains a lacuna in social ecology thought.  I argue that social 
ecology needs to confront the limitations of Hegelianism precisely at the meeting point of an other who 
escapes the Hegelian master-slave dialectic of recognition, because historically, this other has not been 
seen as fully human.  New theoretical resources are needed; similar to Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller in 
their article just examined, I believe that Malabou offers an important resource for opening the 
boundaries and borders of Western thought to their plastic transformation.  Further, (and also similarly 
to Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller), I believe that effective resistance to ongoing colonial and neo-
colonial contexts requires ‘re-cognizing’ intellectually, critically, legally, and politically non-Western 
sources as well, including indigenous ontologies.   As I discuss next, however, this recognition 
certainly does not involve an atemporal hypostatisation of cultural forms, as often occurs in 
essentializing ‘multi-cultural’ framings of encounters between those who identify as “white” or 
European and members of the Global South.    
 
Individual and Collective Agency Towards a Desirable Politics 
Social ecologists argue for the potentiality of humanity to overcome hierarchy as such in all its 
manifestations, in systems of domination and oppression, and in the project of dominating nature for 
the benefit of those who profit most from class and other forms of domination.  Essential to this 
redefinition of the revolutionary project is the recovery of agency as expressed within an effective 
social form, an actualised or politically educated and animated community in which individuality 
would develop in its roundedness and fullness based on non-hierarchical relationships within a vibrant 
and healthy community.  This would not be the community of passive conformity and overt or subtle 
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identitarian coercion that concerns Derrida but one capable of establishing a public space of political 
involvement that nourishes an objectivity rooted in diversity.  Such a community would provide the 
social context for overcoming any tendency towards individualistic voluntarism.   
A rethinking of will and choice, as proposed by John H. Smith, would help show how such an 
agency might develop.22 Smith claims that Derrida ignored the issue of will in Hegel, even as he 
deconstructed spirit in Hegel in Glas and Heidegger in Of Spirit.  Smith wants to continue a 
deconstructive reading of will however, to the extent of maintaining the tension of opposites such as 
subjectivity and objectivity in political thought, rather than unifying them in a sublated and determinate 
‘higher concept’.  This deconstructive reading of will suggests a way that social selection might retain 
the ‘empty’ or non-predetermined point within society with which Malabou addresses, while 
acknowledging the social ecology emphasis on the way in which societies—including non-human 
societies to varying degrees—are constructed on the basis of will, desire, and choice by the process of 
evolution itself. 
Will of course is closely related to desire.  I suggest that John D. Smith’s efforts to reclaim will 
in a deconstructed subject, cited above, can be synthesised with social ecologist Chaia Heller’s 
exploration of a dialectic of desire.  This synthesis may point the way to how individual desire can 
transform to social desire—a ‘socio-erotic’—toward a politics of desire and a desirable politics.23 
Heller’s ‘five fingers of desire’ begin with the relatively unmediated and visceral level of sensual desire, 
predicated on a deeply relational social context from infancy.  This desire is contingent upon social, 
cultural, and political practises and contexts, that shape the ways in which food, music, dance, or 
sexuality are expressed and shared.  The dialectic of desire arrives through relationality to an 
associative desire, the desire to know another.   
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The dialectic is cumulative but non-linear: sensual desire may derive from associative desire, or 
associative desire can be educed from sensual desire; both convey the idea of ‘feeling’ a ‘connection’. 
Association, especially as ‘free association’, is an important theme in anarchist and anarchist-
influenced elaborations of the revolutionary project, from Peter Kropotkin to Murray Bookchin.  
Associative desire moves individuals to develop structures such as rotating leadership and collective 
ownership, which maintain healthy relationality in cooperative, non-hierarchical ways.   
However, to actualise its liberatory potential fully, associative desire must activate 
differentiative desire, the desire to differentiate oneself in the context of a social group, moving from 
self-knowledge to making sense of the world through artistic or intellectual creative expression.  
Differentiative desire represents the development of identity and the expression of one’s uniqueness.  
Heller seeks to place this desire within a context of mutual recognition, rather than in the 
individualistic differentiation within liberal capitalism. Non-differentiated desire characterises 
expressions of self-hood that ‘surrender’ the self to authoritarian rule.   
Heller identifies developmental desire as the desire of the self to become unified within the 
diversity of its own differentiation, to discover an overriding logic that can endow our lives with 
meaning and wholeness, necessary for a maturation of the self.  Development rounds out the idea of 
differentiation, adding to it the unity and coherence necessary for self-development.  Heller and other 
social ecologists apply this understanding not only to individuals but to societies, which implies 
reconstructing new models of national and international ‘development’ beyond mere growth, an 
endless expansion that threatens both social and natural communities world-wide.   
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Exploring the fate of developmental desire within the context of social hierarchy leads to 
oppositional desire, opposition to all individuals, institutions, and ideologies that obstruct the full 
development of all forms of social desire.  Effective opposition cannot come from critique and theory 
alone, but has encompassed many forms of resistance throughout history, and calls for new forms of 
both social and political contestation.   
I suggest that the dialectic of desire presented by Heller can be ontologically grounded in 
Malabou’s idea of feminine essence as metabolic exchange or ‘passing’, beyond essentialism or anti-
essentialism.24 At the same time, Bookchin’s philosophy of nature, inspired in part by the philosophical 
focus on metabolism in nature by Hans Jonas, suggests an evolutionary context for this metabolic 
concept. 
Heller’s idealistic and utopian presentation of a dialectic of desire can be tempered by John D. 
Smith’s emphasis on maintaining the tension of opposites, resulting in a more ‘tragic’ staging of the 
dialectic within the lived experience of communities struggling to overcome specific forms of 
oppression.  This could occur as a deliberate intentionality that would inform a process that Heller 
suggests, one she calls illustrative opposition. This process might then help to actualise actions and 
movements toward the fulfilment of a revolutionary project defined as a confederal linking of self-
governing municipalities based on principles of non-hierarchy and direct democracy.  In addition, the 
process illuminates the way in which an ecological dialectic might proceed from the individual to its 
collective manifestation in the social and political sphere. 
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Illustrative opposition as elaborated by Heller unfolds in three moments.  The first moment is a 
critical moment in which a group looks at the historical development of an issue, and evaluates what 
worked and what did not.  The second is a reconstructive moment wherein the group begins to draw 
out the wider reconstructive potential and attempts to engender wider dimensions of justice around 
the issue.  The third moment is the illustrative moment, in which ways to articulate and demonstrate 
the insights gained through previous moments are created collaboratively; these forms of 
demonstration and illustration could include a combination of pamphlets, teach-ins, public discussion 
groups, performances, and various forms of direct action that engage media, including alternative and 
social media, all designed to be visibly socio-erotic and inspire others to direct action.  In addition, the 
first two moments of illustrative opposition could focus specifically on the ways in which socio-erotic 
desire is thwarted, distorted, or coopted in communities suffering from particular or intersectional 
forms of oppression, and then communicated creatively in the third moment.  This reflective process 
might be especially important in bridge building between activists who identify as white, European, or 
European-American, and activists from the Global South. 
The Creolization of Theory and Practise 
What does it mean for the social ecology aim of a revolutionary project for our time to navigate 
such new concepts and norms between universality and particularity?  How does such a project 
dialectically maintain and transform its structure?  In ‘opening to the other’ for purposes of theoretical 
sophistication and bridge building for movement activism, I am not suggesting a weakening of the 
coherence of its conceptual structure, or a wholesale adoption of new concepts. I am suggesting that a 
plastic reading of these concepts inspired by Malabou renders them more open to transformation. 
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Further, though, as an ongoing encounter, interaction, and conversation at the levels of both theory and 
practice, I suggest that the result of such encounters can be understood in a manner close to what Lewis 
R. Gordon and Jane Anna Gordon refer to as creolization.   
In discussing this process, Lewis R. Gordon makes use of Paget Henry’s concept of a 
‘potentiated double consciousness’.  This concept emerges from the way in which W.E.B. DuBois 
addressed the so-called Black problem—the question itself is in error, because Black people are not the 
problem.  Black people’s seeing themselves as the problem evokes a double consciousness of 
themselves through the eyes of those who despise them.  Once this problem is identified, it leads to a 
new critical perspective that Paget Henry calls “potentiated double consciousness”.  Gordon writes, 
 
Potentiated double consciousness addresses the false universal claims of hegemonic societies 
and their dominating groups.  Their particularity is hidden in the guise of their avowed 
universality.  Seeing possibilities beyond such claims relativizes their terms through reaching 
beyond them . . . This fusion is a creolization at the level of knowledge that acknowledges the 
underlying reality of culture and practiced values.25  
Jane Anna Gordon developed the concept of the creolization of political theory to grasp the 
distinctly African New World of the Caribbean.26 This concept offers especially useful resources for 
thinking through what can and should constitute alternative forms of intellectual legitimacy and 
scholarly progress in transdisciplinary pursuits. The concept does so by revisiting Thomas Kuhn’s 
suggestion in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that cause and effect are often mistaken when 
determining which scholarly projects merit the designation as ‘science’.  Suggesting that 
transdisciplinary scholarship fundamentally rejects most of the conditions that constitute normal 
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scientific communities, Gordon turns to the ways in which creole languages have revealed the 
insufficiency of prior academic linguistic models by demonstrating that the multilinguistic, multiracial, 
and multinational region out of which they came was prototypical rather than exceptional.  
As with the languages themselves, the concept of creolization, when used by creative writers 
and social theorists alike, offers a more rigorous descriptive account of the outcomes of the larger 
transnational and transoceanic processes that ushered in European modernity. In ways that offer a guide 
to disciplines beyond the model of identitarian, sovereign territories, they drew on varieties of scholarly 
resources to understand how people without prior shared histories did not exist in impermeable bubbles 
but were remade in relation to one another.  This approach challenges the notion of a single genitive 
origin (as with Derrida’s study of Rousseau in Grammatology).  Finally, this theoretical approach asks 
whether the prefix ‘trans-’, shared in terms like transnationalism, transdisciplinarity, or transsexuality, 
should encourage us to consider whether the aim of calls for transdisciplinarity are for ‘trans’ to be a 
temporary designation and episodic challenge or a permanent orientation, as suggested by Malabou in 
her investigation of the ontological status of the feminine (cited previously). The discourses of trans-
gender and trans-sexuality share in acknowledging the ‘remarkable salience of bodies that don’t seem 
properly to fit or express that which the trans- person feels him- or herself to be’.  These discourses are 
illuminating for questions of transdisciplinarity.  Transdisciplinarity, supported by Sandra Harding in 
her standpoint approach (discussed in chapter 4), is preferable to calls for interdisciplinarity, which 
tend to mimic the mode and politics of multiculturalism.  
Creolization means treating unavoidable epistemological limitations as sites of openness, 
restoring subjects as value giving and meaning making.   This requires thinking in multiple registers, 
and engaging in a plurality of intellectual heritages.   Creolization also rejects post-structural or other 
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narrowly academic suspicions of the inevitably totalising and repressive nature of any collective 
aspirations.  The approach recognises that there is no politics without the mobilisation of generalising 
identities, which may transform in the process, resulting in new identities that could not have been fully 
anticipated. 
Gordon notes that communities identified with conceptions of indigeneity have opposed those 
committed to conceptions of creolization, viewing the latter as celebrating a crude anti-essentialism.  
She acknowledges the moments in which creolization is avoided because it seems to amount to 
assimilation into a colonising culture.  But she argues that cultures that emerged out of colonisation and 
enslavement are already inescapably colonised.  Indigenous communities are often asked to exemplify 
an unadulterated and atemporal purity as a condition of recognition, respect, and access to material 
resources.  At the same time, the survival of indigenous communities in settler societies of the Atlantic 
and Pacific has required that they become among the most racially mixed of any living communities.  
In addition, Gordon notes that adopting and creatively altering colonial forms does not always signify 
compromise, as when Algerians animatedly speaking French to each other—a language they 
supposedly could not learn—became more threatening to the French government than the Négritude 
writings of Léopold Senghor and Aimé Césaire.27  
 
Throwing off the Current Form of ‘White’ Identity 
The above discussion of racism and colonialism only briefly touches on many areas that 
deserve further attention.  An additional area, and one in which social ecologists have made important 
contributions, is that of resurgent anti-semitism, including anti-semitism on the left.28 American 
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exceptionalism in terms of its racial lens has sometimes resulted in a focus on anti-black racism, 
contributing to a failure to appreciate the ways in which worsening anti-semitism or anti-Jewish racism 
is fuelled by the discourse of the European as well as American ‘ethno-state’, occurring through such 
figures as Richard Spencer, in sinister collaboration with the Russian ethno-nationalist Aleksandr 
Dugin.  These racist and nationalist identity-based ideologies, seemingly legitimised in the US in the 
age of Trump, suggest a need to interrogate with increased urgency the meaning of white identity. 
The Future of Whiteness29 by Linda Martín Alcoff is such an attempt by one of America’s most 
respected philosophers and scholars of race. In the present intellectual climate, and certainly in the 
context of an inquiry into a social ecology any attempt to explore such an issue as whiteness must 
contend initially with the need to argue for the meaning of identity and race as constructs and 
categories.  Social ecologists and those sympathetic to their project have pioneered and continue to 
develop scientific research showing that race is not a meaningful biological or physiological category.  
This is where the social constructionism embodied within social ecology has come to the fore, 
constituting in effect a utopian horizon for the overcoming of racial domination and oppression. 
Nevertheless, Alcoff delineates the ways in which race retains its social and political relevance.  
She begins with observing that any realistic account of how social categories of identity operate must 
acknowledge that we cannot always choose when or how our identities are politically salient.  This has 
been recognised by and for those whose social identities have occasioned discrimination and violence, 
but it is also true for those whose identities are not social liabilities, such as White people. 
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Alcoff notes that political salience is dependent on social salience—otherwise, they cannot be 
mobilised for political ends.  She argues that social identity categories such as race and ethnicity retain 
their social salience because they are explanatory: 
1. Quoting Satya Mohanty,30 Alcoff suggests that social identity categories are “small theories” 
that help explain our reactions through narratives that link group historical memory and 
contemporary experience.  We can expose these theories to empirical tests, such as the question, 
“does whiteness explain cross-class allegiances among white people, or divert from better 
explanations”? Reformulating identity concepts in this theoretical and empirical way can help 
to resist biological notions of race that racists use to explain economic success, while retaining 
the historical and social notions of race that play a role in the persistence of multiple forms of 
oppression. 
2. Identity categories are also material practises.  Culturally specific meaning-systems play the 
determining role in conferring status differences on perceptible differences, as we navigate our 
material social worlds.  This is not to say that the meanings and correlate statuses of identities 
are entirely determined by their materiality, but simply to warn against the idea that identities 
are mere illusions. Attempting to ignore entirely the distinctiveness of bodily types and 
appearances by promoting ‘colourblindness’, for example, is unrealistic.  Our identities are 
important features of who we are, but they are not all of who we are.  Alcoff quotes Pat Parker’s 
well-known poem, ‘For the White Person Who Wants to Know How To Be My Friend’: ‘The 
first thing you do is forget that I’m black. Second, you must never forget that I’m black’.31 
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3. Identity categories are a feature of collective or group subjectivity.  Patterns of perceptual 
attunement are connected to associations with various groups.  Our sensitivity to perceived 
slights, for example, varies with group identity. Some whites see anti-white prejudice looming 
whenever histories of racism are discussed, displaying extreme ‘fragility’ or sensitivity to real 
or imagined slights. 
4. Identity categories are a necessary effect, at least in some cases, of historical experiences, 
despite individual complexities. History exerts a gravitational pull, as in the case of the history 
of the organisation of service work in the US along lines of racialised difference. 
Alcoff argues that the category of whiteness fulfills all of the above conditions, and thus cannot 
be dismissed as an ideological obfuscation.   She acknowledges the way in which the science debates 
have re-emerged more recently around activities such as writing histories of population groups, using  
‘junk’ or non-explanatory DNA to refashion a biological conception of race, and promoting race-
specific pharmacological commodities.  She notes the way in which young philosophers of science 
have debunked the complicated methodologies bolstering these claims. 
Alcoff quotes David Theo Goldberg,33 who insists that denying that the category of race is a 
social construct is analogous to denying climate change. However denying the reality of race because it 
has a social and historical rather than a biological genealogy is also foolish, according to Goldberg.  
Alcoff endorses the general approach of recent critical race theory.  She finds particularly compelling 
Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s concept of ‘racial formation’.34 Their theory foregrounds the 
dynamic and flexible, socially embedded character of racial identities in terms of a bottom-up/top-
down dialectic in which social movements of resistance play a substantial role.  This approach shares 
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some affinities with creolization theory, in which identities are transformed in creative and 
unpredictable ways in democratic struggles. 
Contemporary white anxiety, Alcoff argues, manifests in a quest for a resolution to its troubled 
form of double consciousness, a quest that has mostly taken a strongly regressive form, especially in 
the US as whites face demographic challenges to their majority status within the electorate.  White 
double consciousness, however, is not simply a form of linguistic misdirection orchestrated by elites, 
however—it reflects an organic aspect of our current social ontology, in which popular narratives in 
many arenas of social life, including our educational system and our popular entertainment have 
exposed whites to the horrific history of white vanguardism and a historically grounded sense of shame.  
In assessing the possibilities of a more progressive form of resolution to white anxiety, Alcoff urges 
moving beyond the framing of antiracist work in terms of a merely negative agenda.  Whites have a 
motivation to face the full-on truth of history, to avoid being duped by white nationalist narratives by 
displacing these with narratives that bring the actual histories into clearer focus.  These narratives 
would include the history of white resistance to white racist regimes, and they would explain current 
cultural contestations in ways that vanguardist narratives cannot, and suggest new ways to make 
alliance and coalition.   
In the process, whites may come to understand that social progress by any measure cannot be 
advanced or achieved by white people alone—including social ecology reconstructive aims.  Whites 
have a motivation to live in communities in which they can hold their heads up high.  Social ecologists 
have emphasised that ethical motivations generally outweigh economic self-interest in historical 
struggles for liberation, though this is not to downplay the impact of the manufactured economic 
insecurities that continue to be exploited by elite forces to divide those struggles.  These claims can be 
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radicalised by social ecology in fact, by pointing to the way in which institutions of face-to-face 
democracy can provide public arenas in which the divisions exacerbated by online echo-chambers can 
be overcome in common, shared projects.  The reaching toward universalising practises that are not the 
universal, as Lewis R. Gordon points out, can be allied with the social ecology notion of the general 
interest, and given concrete institutional space for actualisation. 
The process of transformation needed, Alcoff suggests, can be seen in ‘conversion narratives’, 
as distinct from ‘white savior narratives’ all too commonly seen in dominant culture in the US.   She 
recounts the story of C.P. Ellis, who gave up his leadership role in the Ku Klux Klan in Alabama, 
became a lifelong friend of a black woman activist as they worked together on school desegregation 
policy, and eventually became a union shop steward in a majority African American union.  Alcoff 
sums up her study in this way: 
Whites who take up the challenge of ending the spread of white supremacist ideas and eroding 
the white material advantages still accruing, from slavery and colonialism are incorrectly 
understood to be “allies”.  They are activists in their own right coming into the movement in 
two ways: first, as “human beings too”, as [James] Baldwin’s colleague put it, and second, as 
white people who refuse to perpetuate the practice of white support of or apathy toward the 
oppression of nonwhite people.  The tragedy of the United States today, as well as other white-
dominated countries, is that poor people are engaged in daily battles, ideological and military, 
against poor people, at home and around the world.  The solution will not be found in a flaccid 
universal humanism, nor in a pursuit of white redemption, nor in a call to a race-transcendent 
vision of class struggle.  Rather, the solution will be found in facing the truths about who we are, 
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how we got here, and then developing an offensive strategy for achieving a future in which we 
can all find a place.35 
Creolizing General Interest 
In this thesis, I argue that one of the most crucial ways of achieving what Alcoff refers to as an 
‘offensive strategy’ means mobilising diverse efforts toward a collective project of radical democracy, a 
project social ecology identifies in terms of a dialectical development of a general interest.   Bookchin 
adapts the term from Rousseau’s general will.   Jane Anna Gordon writes of the creolization of this 
concept through her reading of Rousseau through Fanon in Creolizing Political Theory: Reading 
Rousseau Through Fanon.  I argue that this elaboration of the creolizing process allows us to see how 
social and political identities—including whiteness—can creatively transform in the process of a 
collective project of a radical democracy beyond the limitations of an ‘identity politics’ on the one hand, 
and a sophisticated variant of ‘colour blindness’ on the other. 
Bookchin interprets Rousseau in a historically nuanced way, noting his idealisation of what 
remained of the direct democracy of the Swiss cantonal community of his day, which was drifting 
increasingly toward oligarchy.  Bookchin observes that Rousseau sees the classic Athenian democracy 
as too individualistic, even as a faction-ridden mobocracy—a view influenced by Plato and others.  
Rousseau thus emphasizes the need for democracy to become not a political superstructure but a way 
of life.  His ‘general will’ is premised on the need for a collective substructure of sociality, 
responsibility, material competence, material independence, coherence, religious belief, and strong 
moral guidelines, strengthened by civic festivals and other traditions.   
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How can we envision and theorise the possibility of a general interest with those who have 
experienced a more problematic, conflict-ridden, and often traumatic ‘social heritage’?  How can such 
a concept as a general interest be even seriously entertained within an intellectual milieu that continues 
to be informed by the suspicions of ‘community’ and of juridical coercion evident in works such as 
Derrida’s ‘The Force of Law’?  How can a general will be understood and engaged in a way that 
references not only the development of the concept within the Western tradition, but also in reference to 
the complex forms of hybridity characteristic of a global and globalized North and a Global South? 
What happens in this context if we seek political legitimacy? What would it look like?  What would 
bring it into being? 
Again, the notion of ‘creolization’ as advanced by Jane Anna Gordon speaks to these questions.  
She notes that generations of modern and contemporary political theorists from Kant to Rawls and 
Habermas have asked these questions, but they do so within a terrain carved out by Rousseau.  She 
does not dismiss the concept of a general will out of a post-structuralist concern for maintaining 
discrete categories of difference, but endorses collective thought and action toward democratic aims. 
Gordon observes that authentic acts of the general will are acts of sovereignty, conventions of 
the body politic with each of its members backed by their collective public force.  The positions 
adopted by this body politic aim at a common good and general well being with which one cannot 
disagree without having been fundamentally misled.  The general will tends towards equality; it is 
contrasted with the sum of the private interests and preferences, which are not eliminated but framed as 
secondary.  The general will is the political achievement of a kind of freedom that requires a mutuality 
and reciprocality rooted in consent that is given and can be withdrawn. 
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What most defines political illegitimacy against which the general will is posited, is the ‘right’ 
of the strongest—in other words, that which equates sovereignty most commonly with force.  Gordon 
comments that the indictment of rule by threats or physical force extends to slavery and colonisation, in 
which social relationships require some to lose their liberty, rights, and duties, and thus their human 
dignity.  Against these relationships, Rousseau draws on the possibility of an accord above or beneath 
the warring particular interests, an accord forged by ‘the total alienation of each of us to the entire 
community’.  If everyone gives him or herself entirely, the condition placed on all is equal.  If all 
people give themselves to a unit of which they are a part, they give themselves to themselves and not to 
an individual person.  This unites people into a single body, and encourages them both as individuals 
and members of the body politic to come to each other’s aid.   
Gordon reiterates in her own way that the body politic created by the general will is not ‘natural’ 
and requires struggle, constant upkeep, and ongoing artistry.  She notes José Ortega y Gasset’s fear that 
modern man treated civilisation as if it grew up as spontaneously as a forest, and thus inhabited it as if 
primitive men in a state of nature, valorising the archaic and primitive. In her examination of Fanon’s 
‘national consciousness’ in relation to Algerian independence, Gordon comments that his formulation 
sustains the features that make the idea of the general will compelling while, 
if not transcending its limitations, productively reexamining them through a creolized lens. 
Both Rousseau and Fanon challenge the adequacy of mere proceduralism, the sense that to tally 
votes itself constitutes a democratic outcome, but in Fanon the general will is not discovered 
but authored with an emphasis on assuring that the highest of collective aspirations are 
thoroughly understood by everyone involved.   
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   268 
 
 
For Fanon, the general will is not a process of each citizen in isolation rekindling a pre-political 
unity, away from the influence of dogmatic and manipulative voices but instead emerges out of the 
deliberate seizing of power, the direct challenging of unfreedom.  Those who committed to this 
challenge incurred risks that meant there was no turning back.  Rousseau had identified how smaller, 
partial loyalties could develop that interfered with the formation of a truly general will.  For Fanon, 
these run along ethnic and religious lines and indicated political failure, a retreat into a crude and 
narrow nationalism.  This retreat is tantamount to abandoning the attempt to create genuinely 
postcolonial relations reliant on balancing out distributions of resources and political attention. 
Fanon seeks to make the polity of Algeria its own centre without collapsing into a conservative 
localism that would antagonise non-Algerian Africans or suggest that independence must come from 
the work of the hands of the formerly colonised alone.  In addition, there would need to be some kind 
of calculus of the restitution owed for deportation, massacres, forced labour, and slavery of the agents 
of capitalism used to amass and increase their wealth and power; the moral reparation of independence 
was not enough. After all, Europe is literally the creation of the Third World. To continue as if nothing 
were due, as if there was not an inversion of the relation of indebtedness of France to Algeria, would be 
to continue within an imperial hegemony that treats the legacies of colonialism borne out in such 
material discrepancies as a lamentable inevitability, the compulsions of capitalist growth. 
However, anger and resentment alone cannot sustain the effort to reclaim one’s humanity and 
agency.  A constructive project of a positive hegemony needs to be created, one based on a dialectic 
between the shared and the different in which the formulation of difference would make the shared 
more rigorous, without undermining its grounds.  Shared well-being for both Rousseau and Fanon 
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requires economic conditions not so radically unequal that political arguments must rationalise such 
differences as natural and necessary. 
Creolization theory, again, is not a project to be aimed at but rather a recognition of the 
potential for the ways in which identities and material and cultural practises can be creatively 
transformed in ways that cannot be foreseen.  The space for such complex processes is left open 
through letting go of commitments to theoretical closure that would impede it and obscure its 
recognition.  Even the reification of cultural difference in terms of ‘tolerant dialogue’ within the 
approach of comparative political theory may mislead, for it may be that it is at the edges of cultures 
that more subterranean forms of political identification emerge, those that are universalising rather than 
universal, but that more effectively approximate universal aims.   
Implications for the Theoretical Side of Praxis 
What I have argued for in previous chapters is a transformation of core social ecology concepts 
into concepts more adequate to the suspicion toward naturalist philosophy in contemporary thought, 
given the widespread dissemination of social constructivist insights and approaches.  In this chapter I  
argue that the transformation of those concepts suggested by an encounter with the materialist 
deconstructive ontological investigations of Malabou also opens them to the resources offered by anti-
racist and decolonising perspectives. Such resources are crucial to forging the broad, multi-ethnic, 
trans-class, majoritarian movements for fundamental social and political transformation that are 
essential to the challenge of confronting the ecological and ethical imperatives of our time.  Extended 
theoretically by two important resources, namely, the work of Linda Martín Alcoff, Jane Anna Gordon, 
and Lewis R. Gordon, this coming together of anti-racist and decolonising approaches within the 
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(transformed) explicitly anti-capitalist revolutionary and radical democratic project of social ecology 
could actualise an ethics-become-politics as the prefigurative ethical content inculcated within the 
particularity of movement struggles.  This agential generation of content would inform the counter-
institutional libertarian municipalist structures of public assemblies and other radical democratic forms 
envisioned by social ecology.  An understanding of the creolizing dynamics and the suspension of 
commitments that would block or interfere with the creative aspects of this process could help as well, 
as suggested through Jane Anna Gordon’s reading of Rousseau through Fanon.   
The crucial points for me are these:  
1. Libertarian municipalism or confederal democracy is not a methodology of simply establishing 
community assemblies and other forms.  True to its Hegelian roots in social ecology philosophy, 
it is a way of thinking and reflecting on experience that actualizes the move from an 
individualist moralism to a vibrant social ethics.  Movement building is essential to this 
actualization.   
2. the social ecology project is not or can no longer be, the project of establishing a hegemony on 
the left, but rather, with joining in creative and unforeseen, creolizing ways with other projects 
that share fundamental commitments, as in the case with Ocalan and Rojava, and potentially 
with an increasing number of other efforts developing within their own ethos and according to 
their own trajectory in many parts of the world.  This is the only way in which I can imagine the 
gathering of counter-hegemonic forces sufficient to overcome what can fruitfully be named 
both capitalism and the Western metaphysical tradition, but with the priority on the former 
name. 
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In my view, this does not mean uncritically stitching together an eclectic mix of theory and 
practice, nor endorsing a movement culture of mediating away differences.  It is precisely where 
differences emerge, that the critical and reflective process, including self-critical scrutiny, can lead 
beyond dogmatic sectarianism to creative growth; however, this must include a willingness to engage 
within some degree of commitment to the possibility of a shared and general narrative of liberation, 
within an intersubjectively shared and agreed upon institutional framework that recognises and 
promotes the value of every voice.  This can be named democracy, in its radical and direct forms.  Next, 
I sketch out how a creolizing perspective and a transformed white identity can contribute to the 
realisation of such a radical democracy, a radical democracy that—extended by the social ecology 
project of a confederal democracy—has the potential to become a revolutionary democracy. 
Creolization in Community Development Praxis 
I briefly describe here aspects of creolization in two instances related to activist efforts inspired 
by social ecology.  I hope these stories will help clarify a social ecology approach to community 
development, one that supplements the radicalising role that social ecologists have played in 
participating in various social and political movements (see final chapter). The social ecology approach 
to community development refers not to economistic approaches that aim to absorb communities into 
the mainstream of dominant culture, but to the process of providing a material social basis for the 
reconstructive political project of social ecology. This holistic process attempts to reintegrate all aspects 
of a community’s life, including the social, economic, artistic, ethical, spiritual, and political 
dimensions seen in their interrelationships, and make them work together and reinforce each other.  The 
community development process informed by social ecology aims to reconstruct vibrant and diverse 
communities able to free themselves collectively from exploitation, domination, and manipulation.  
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Social ecology does not propose an abstract ideal society, but rather proposes an evolving process 
guided by a utopian vision as a reference point for day-to-day actions.  It is important to understand the 
way a utopian vision is understood in social ecology.  Dan Chodorkoff articulates it thus: 
The utopian element in the community development process should not be misconstrued.  
Social ecology understands the limitations of social ecology as a blueprint, the tendency to 
retreat from the problems of reality into the cloud cuckoo land of abstract design.  It also 
recognizes the power of utopia as inspiration and as a point of orientation in the day-to-day, 
incremental process of changing the world.  It is the utopian process—holistic, participatory and 
integrative—that must inform the practice of community development.59  
The concrete instance that Chodorkoff uses to illustrate the social ecology praxis of community 
development is one familiar to many social ecologists: the experience of the Puerto Rican community 
of New York City’s Lower East Side in the mid-1970s, a community that became known as Loisaida.  
In this community, over one hundred rubble and trash-strewn vacant lots were converted by local 
activists to ‘vest-pocket parks’ with benches and green spaces, or to playgrounds with equipment made 
of recycled material.  Other lots were turned into community gardens which grew fresh, healthy, 
organic produce, improving nutrition and lowering food costs for community gardeners.  The 
gardening groups drew on and renewed the cultural traditions of the Jibaro, or Puerto Rican peasantry.  
One large lot was transformed into an outdoor cultural centre, La Plaza Cultural, where local musicians, 
poets, and theatre groups performed, helping to celebrate Loisaida’s New York Puerto Rican culture.  
Several lots were adopted by local schools that used them as training centres where area youth received 
lessons in agriculture and ecology, reintroducing the natural world into this urban community.  Social 
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ecology staff and students worked with the community, helping (among other things) to introduce the 
first urban use of solar energy. 
Local activists and citizens of the open-space movement contested with the city for the material 
base of their community, the land.  In most cases, they gained either legal leases or outright title to the 
lots.  Several community land trusts were created to remove particular lots from the real estate market 
and to ensure their continued use as a community resource.  Several youth gangs were involved in the 
intergenerational open-space movement, transforming their previously stigmatized members into that 
of active, capable agents of constructive social action.  Some youth joined a cooperative formed to 
manufacture playground equipment from recycled items, creating jobs and incomes. 
The participants in the open-space movement joined with other community activists working on 
health care, education, housing, and job development to coordinate and integrate their actions.  
Together, they formed quarterly town meetings to chart the progress of their movement, and to develop 
a comprehensive plan for the future of the community.  An alternative grassroots planning group, the 
Joint Planning Council, emerged to challenge the official city plan for the Loisaida community.60 
I briefly recount next a less far-reaching instance of community organizing in which I was 
involved in during the 1990s, inspired by the social ecology approach.  In Los Angeles in 1993 after the 
riots accompanying the not-guilty verdict of police officers in the beating of Rodney King, some 
community activists working in South Los Angeles perceived an increased awareness among city 
officials and wealthy individuals in Santa Monica and other areas of the West Side of the anger and the 
plight of disenfranchised areas of the city.  Some of us felt this increased awareness and concern 
offered an opening for increased support for long-suffering and neglected efforts in areas such as South 
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Los Angeles.  We wrote a grant for a project entitled ‘Project Metamorphosis’ that created education in 
organic gardening and soil-building for youth in the community, education that would ultimately 
prepare them for employment with the city Department of Water and Power.  The soil-building garden 
project brought together traditional gardening practises with gardening approaches taught by a leading 
figure in the organic movement in the US.  This aspect of the project increased access to healthy 
nutrition and augmented the food independence of participants.  The project brought together youth 
who were or had been involved in Black, Latino, and Korean gangs, helping to overcome gang rivalries 
and violence, and also helping bring together in a shared project neighbourhoods where hostilities and 
suspicions had been exacerbated by divide and conquer strategies of the dominant culture’s 
‘community development’ approaches. 
The project included a mural project and the revitalisation of a community cultural centre 
featuring musical performances and poetry readings, bringing together many previously isolated 
segments of the community, as well as providing a meeting ground for community activists involved in 
education, health care, and other projects.  These social and cultural elements exceeded the scope of the 
original grant, thus emerging as branches on the trunk of the originary vision.  Activist organizations 
such as the Earth Island Institute contributed expertise and guidance.  The project aimed at promoting 
the social, cultural, and political empowerment of South Los Angeles.61 
My contention is that both these social ecology related instances reveal creolizing processes at 
their heart, evident as inclusive, democratising community development initiatives moved across 
boundaries of ethnicity and culture.  This appears in the way older cultural traditions from the Global 
South are transformed within new contexts, through their encounters with dominant culture, as well as 
in the practises of white or European activists.  The social identities of all participants—and 
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particularly of youth—are transformed, sometimes in relatively lasting ways.  In both instances, the 
unfolding and enfolding of various aspects of the project exceeded anything foreseen in the initial 
stages.  The meanings of elements of cultural tradition are re-evaluated, and these transformed 
traditions are embodied in new cultural forms: for example, as seen in the Nuyorican poetry movement 
associated with the Puerto Rican community of New York City’s Lower East Side, still active at the 
Nuyorican Poets Café.  Participants at every level gain a creolized understanding and appreciation of 
social ecology, one that suits the needs of their social, cultural, and political moment, even as that 
moment develops. 
Community development experience and cross-cultural movement building reinforce the insight 
that the social ecology vision of a libertarian municipalism as the basis for a confederal democracy 
cannot be implemented as a pre-defined methodology following a prescribed route toward gaining 
political control in communities and cities and then forming confederations.  Movement-building and 
community development activism both require attentiveness to the complex and creolizing interplay of 
potentialities whose development cannot be predicted in advance. Such activism requires the 
cultivation of a revolutionary intention somewhere between reliance on the spontaneity of the 
multitudes and the imposition of a doctrine—it requires a self-reflective, self-critical, and resilient 
intention that waits on experience.  The social ecology reconstructive ethical and political project will 
thus continue to actualise concretely in unpredictable ways, beyond the fixed form of a simple 
‘implementation’, but visible in the creative, unforeseen, and unforeseeable risk and adventure—yes—
of the traces of a democracy to come, but at the same time of a (radical, direct, and embodied) 
democracy coming to be.  Reconstructive community-development projects can educate participants to 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   276 
 
 
the democratic ethos and the lived ethics of a general interest, as they are extended to the political 
realm of the entire community or municipality. 
Summary 
Social ecology seeks to define a revolutionary project for our time, one that thus necessarily 
engages issues of how to bring concrete, often-fragmented, siloed struggles against particular forms of 
oppression, domination, and social hierarchy created and exacerbated by capitalism into a general and 
shared narrative of liberation.  Such a project aims at a fundamental macropolitics of transformation, 
one that seeks to redefine politics itself.  However, such a project must overcome the mutual suspicions, 
internalised oppression, tendencies towards an ethos of scarcity and competition, a prevailing 
scepticism of universalistic or even unifying claims, and a dispirited weariness of doctrinaire 
revolutionary ideology.  This elaboration of features of our ‘post-political’ moment need not be 
interpreted as entirely negative: the suspicion of dogmatic revolutionary claims has been part of a 
generally anti-authoritarian sensibility among many social movement activists. 
In any case, alliances must be formed and extended, and the aims of movements radicalised.  
Deconstruction, new materialism, dialectics of desire, and creolization theory all could contribute to 
this inevitably synthetic process.  Social ecologists should thoroughly appreciate the ways in which 
unrecognised and unacknowledged patterns of privilege and exclusion can limit the effectiveness of 
minimal program efforts. Increased openness to the dialogic process—when seen in its dynamic 
creolizing aspect rather than its reified identitarian aspect, as well as in the dialectical process—could 
enhance the prospects for forming alliances towards the broad movements that will remain vital for the 
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social ecology revolutionary project, even as fragile municipalist projects begin to emerge, as discussed 
in the next and concluding chapter. 
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Notes to Chapter 7 
1. Based on an April 2017 conversation with Paul Chiyokten Wagner, of the Wsaanich (Saanich) Tribe 
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2. See Dominique Surel, MD, ‘Thinking from the Heart – Heart Brain Science’,  7 January, 2015, 
accessed 7 November, 2019, www.noeticsi.com.  
 
3. See Adam Hadhazy, ‘Think Twice: How the Gut’s “Second Brain” Influences Mood and Well-Being’, 
12 February, 2010, accessed 7 November, 2019, www.scientificamerican.com.  
 
4. See Antonio Demasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Random 
House, 2010).  See also Marco Verweig, Timothy J. Senior, Juan F. Dominguez, and Robert 
Turner.,’Emotion, rationality, and decision-making: how to link affective and social neuroscience 
with social theory’, 22 September, 2015, accessed 8 November, 2019, www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov. 
 
5. See Murray Bookchin, The Ecology of Freedom: The Emergence and Dissolution of Hierarchy (Palo 
Alto, CA: Cheshire Books, 1982). 
 
6. Soon-to-be-published research and review of many other researches by David Graeber and David 
Wengrow challenges the notion of the emergence of social hierarchy and inequality with the so-
called agricultural revolution, and thus supports Bookchin’s contentions that social hierarchy 
developed prior to this ‘revolution’.  In an online article at www.eurozine.com, 2 March, 2018, 
entitled ‘How to change the course of human history’ the authors state:  ‘For centuries, we have been 
telling ourselves a simple story about the origins of social inequality.  For most of their history, 
humans lived in tiny egalitarian bands of hunter-gatherers.  Then came farming, which brought with 
it private property, and then the rise of cities which meant the emergence of civilisation properly 
speaking.  Civilisation meant many bad things (war, taxes, bureaucracy, patriarchy, slavery . . . ) but 
also made possible written literature, science, philosophy, and most other great human 
achievements. . . . Overwhelming evidence from archaeology, anthropology, and kindred disciplines 
is beginning to give us a fairly clear idea of what the last 40.000 years of human history really 
looked like, and in almost no way does it resemble the conventional narrative.  Our species did not, 
in fact, spend most of its history in tiny bands; agriculture did not mark an irreversible threshold in 
social evolution; the first cities were often robustly egalitarian’. One of the key implications of their 
research is the challenge to the conventional justification for the effects of systems of domination 
and oppression as the inevitable result of living in any large, complex, urban, technologically 
sophisticated society.  But as the authors note, ‘egalitarian cities, even regional confederacies, are 
historically quite commonplace’. This challenge echoes those of Bookchin with regard not only to 
dominant liberal and conservative ideologies, but also to conventional Marxist theories of the 
progress of capitalism as necessary for the historical consolidation of the proletariat and the 
proletarian revolution.   
 
7. For an account of the development of ecofeminism and social ecology contributions to this field, see 
Chaia Heller, Ecology of Everyday Life: Rethinking the Desire for Nature (Montreal: Black Rose 
Books, 1999), 39-68. 




8. Catherine Malabou, ’Whither Materialism? Althusser/Darwin’, in Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan 
Goldberg-Hiller, eds., Plastic Materialities: Politics, Legality, and Metamorphosis in the Work of 
Catherine Malabou (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2015), 47-60. 
 
9. Ibid., 51. 
 
10. Louis Althusser, ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’ (1982), quoted in 
Ibid., 47. 
 
11. Catherine Malabou, What Should We Do with Our Brain? trans. Sebastian Rand (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2008), 1. 
 
12. Malabou, Plastic Materialities, 289. 
 
13. Ibid., 291. 
14. Brenna Bhandar and Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, ‘Law, Sovereignty, and  Recognition’, in Plastic 
Materialities, 209-232. 
15. Jacques Derrida, ‘Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason 
Alone’, in Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo, eds., Religion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
16. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998). 
17. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (New York: Grove Press, 1967). 
18. Catherine Malabou and Judith Butler,’You Be My Body for Me: Body, Shape, and Plasticity in 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit’, in Stephen Houlgate, ed., A Companion to Hegel (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011). 
19. Bhandar and Goldberg-Hiller, Plastic Materialities, 226. 
20. See Drucilla Cornell, ‘Afterword’ to What Fanon Said, 146-147. 
21. Peter Skafish, trans. and ed.,  ‘Editor’s Preface’, in The Heidegger Change: On the Fantastic in 
Philosophy (New York: State University of New York Press, 2011), xx. 
22. John D. Smith, ‘Of Spirit(s) and Will(s)’, in Stuart Barnett, ed., Hegel After Derrida (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 64-90. 
23. See Ecology of Everyday Life: Rethinking the Desire for Nature, 46-52. 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   280 
 
 
24. See Catherine Malabou, Changing Difference: The Feminine and the Question of Philosophy 
(Malden, MA) Polity Press, 2011). 
25. Lewis R. Gordon, What Fanon Said, 21. 
 
26. Jane Anna Gordon, ‘Creolizing as the Transdisciplinary Alternative to Intellectual Legitimacy on 




28. See Blair Taylor, ‘Antisemitism and the US Left:  Examining an Invisible Racism’, accessed 
7November, 2019, www.academia.edu. 
 
29. Linda Martín Alcoff, The Future of Whiteness (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2015). 
 
30. Satya Mohanty, Literary Theory and the Claims of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1997), referenced in ibid., 46. 
 
31. Pat Parker, Movement in Black (Ann Arbor, MI: Firebrand Books, 1999),  quoted in The Future of 
Whiteness, 51. 
 
32. Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1992), referenced in ibid., 61. 
 
33. David Theo Goldberg, Sites of Race: Conversations with Susan Searls Giroux (Malden, MA: Polity, 
2014), referenced in ibid., 62-3. 
 
34. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formations in the United States: From the 1960s to the 
1980s, 2nd ed.  (New York: Routledge, 1994),  referenced in ibid., 63. 
35. The Future of Whiteness, 204. 
36. In the Spirit of Critique, 49-51. 
37. Ibid., 54. 
38. What Fanon Said. 
39. Ibid., 49. 
40. See Robert Bernasconi, ‘Hegel at the Court of the Ashanti’, in Stuart Barnett, ed. Hegel After 
Derrida (London: Routledge, 1998), 41-63. 
41. Fanon quoted in What Fanon Said, 56. 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   281 
 
 
42. What Fanon Said, 130. 
43. Jane Anna Gordon, Creolizing Political Theory: Reading Rousseau Through Fanon (New York: 
Fordham University Press), 2014. 
44. Jane Anna Gordon, ‘Creolizing as the Transdisciplinary Alternative to Intellectual Legitimacy on the 
Model of the “Normal Scientific Community”, Quaderna 3(2015) 3. 
45. Catherine Malabou. Changing Difference (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012). 
46. Creolizing Political Theory, 109. 
47. Bookchin, Politics of Cosmology, 715. 
48. Ibid., 715-716. 
49. Ibid., 717. 
50. Ibid., 714. 
51. Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority’”, in Drucilla Cornell, 
Michael Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson, eds., Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice 
(London: Routledge, 1992), 3-67.   
52. Creolizing Political Theory, 110-111. 
53. Ibid., 155. 
54. Ibid., 160-161.  
55. Sybille Fischer, quoted in ibid., 213. 
56. Susan Buck-Morss, quoted in ibid., 214. 
57. Creolizing Political Theory, 220. 
58. See ‘Social Ecology and Community Development’, in Dan Chodorkoff, The Anthropology of Utopia 
(Porsgrunn, Norway: New Compass Press, 2014), 17-34. 
59. Anthropology of Utopia, 26. 
60. For a concise history and account of the ongoing resistance of the Loisaida community to the 
destruction of garden spaces by development interests, especially during the tenure of New York 
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   282 
 
 
City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, see Sarah Shearman, ‘In New York City’s Lower East Side, gardening is 
an act of resistance’, 11 August, 2015, accessed 30 November 2019, www.theguardian.com. 
61. As with Loisada, many of the project elements in South Los Angeles did not endure, though many 
gardens have and new gardens have been created, thanks to the subsequent (though not directly 
related) efforts of Ron Finley.  See Britt Hyson, ‘Gangsta Gardener Ron Finley Changes Urban Food 
Culture’, 4 April, 2016, accessed 2 December, 2019, www.milleniamagazine.com.  These instances 
perhaps illustrate, among other things, the importance of transforming the political and economic 
municipal spheres more thoroughly by a conscious municipalist political project capable of 
preserving community development gains.  
            Recovering A Future: A Critical Inquiry into Social Ecology                                   283 
 
 
Chapter 8: Bringing Life to Contemporary Politics 
In this study, I have argued that Murray Bookchin’s social ecology offers a crucial fourth model 
for addressing the threat of climate catastrophe beyond a ‘shallow’ or technocratic environmentalism, 
deep ecology, and social constructionism.  As noted previously, Bookchin’s social ecology has enjoyed 
something of a renaissance of interest recently.  This renaissance can be associated initially with Andy 
Price’s recovery of Bookchin from some of the stereotypes disseminated by deep ecologists, as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  More recently, this interest has been stimulated more broadly by media reports 
on Rojava and the Kurdish freedom movement initiated by Abdullah Öcalan, who drew inspiration 
from Bookchin’s writings, as discussed in Chapter 2.1 I have undertaken this inquiry partly to suggest a 
way in which social ecology might be transformed by encounters with other thought without losing its 
coherence, so that social ecology might be more adequate for this new moment. 
As observed in my introduction, Bookchin’s previous influence reached a high point after the 
publication of Post-Scarcity Anarchism in 1971, at least in the US.  In the 1970s in the US, a 
reconstructive vision based on politically empowered, decentralised eco-communities utilising small-
scale organic food production and eco-technologies artfully adapted to local conditions held 
considerable appeal.  With the advent of Reaganomics and neo-liberalism beginning in the 1980s, such 
a vision began to lose a certain credibility and feasibility.   Social ecology’s support within anarchist 
communities waned, given the individualistic and eco-primitivist direction taken by many anarchists in 
subsequent decades.   
In this final chapter I examine Murray Bookchin’s critique of ‘lifestyle’ anarchism and his turn 
to communalism. I then outline the social ecology politics of libertarian municipalism from a practical 
or activist perspective, and sketch the current status of this political project as it begins to actualise.  
Finally, I assess the potential contributions of the social ecology response to the urgent danger of 
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climate catastrophe, the broad threat that framed the beginning of this study.  I conclude by 
summarising the broader contributions of a relaunched social ecology within the current historical 
moment. 
 
Bookchin’s turn to communalism 
Bookchin’s response to the direction taken by prevalent strains of anarchism in the US is first to 
identify his position as a social anarchism, and then to renounce anarchism altogether in favour of what 
he termed ‘communalism’.  He critiques the way in which the classical anarchism of Bakunin and 
Kropotkin, and the anarcho-syndicalism of Catalonia in the mid-1930s, are being divested of their 
social ideal with the ideological shift to the right, and redefined in terms of a ‘Stirnerite individualism, 
marked by an advocacy of lifestyle changes’, and an emphasis on personal autonomy, thereby eroding 
the ‘socialistic core of anarchist concepts of freedom’.  Autonomy ‘focuses on the individual as the 
formative component and locus of society’.3 
We might note that a suspicion of community pervades the writings not only of ‘lifestyle’ 
anarchists, but also the work of Derrida and Deleuze.  A politics sensitive to issues of alterity and 
heterogeneity may help guard against the persistence of dogma, doxa, and various forms of 
parochialism in communities, as well as dogma within social movements; for these reasons, I have 
attempted a conversation between a materialist deconstruction and social ecology.  Certainly, a broad 
diversity of forms of collective action are vital to any possible post-capitalist future.  A politically 
educated community, animated through knowledge of its particular history and future goals, can 
augment diversity and cultural differentiation in relation to a community hegemonically captive to the 
atemporal ‘default’ ideologies of corporate capitalism, such as competitive individualism and 
consumerism.    
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If networked confederally as in the revolutionary vision of classical anarchism, these 
communities could also overcome issues of what is termed in post-Marxist socialist writings the 
‘problem of localism’.  This is a sketch of what is termed the ‘reconstructive vision of social ecology’.  
The ethical content of such an alternative structure of social and political life has been explored by 
social ecologists through a conscious attempt to recover the utopian tradition as a ‘principle of social 
hope’.4 These include historical utopian writings such as those of Robert Owen, William Morris, and 
Charles Fourier, as well as literary explorations such as the writings of Ursula LeGuin.4  There has also 
been the emergence of a vibrant body of writings on feminist utopias.5 
Bookchin defines his distinction between autonomy and freedom while the meaning of these 
terms evolves historically, in relation to his more collectively oriented notion of freedom.  He argues 
that substantive freedom needs to be institutionalised along socialistic lines.   He notes that the term 
communalism, relatively unsullied by historical abuse, could represent what libertarian socialists were 
for, not merely what they were against.  Bookchin emphasises, in contrast even to Kropotkin, the 
importance of a law-based society, though these laws would not be imposed on a powerless ‘mass’ but 
determined through the participation of an activated citizenry in local assemblies confederated using 
principles such as mandated, recallable delegates, which would ensure political power remains at the 
base of the local assembly meeting in a face-to-face democracy.  In addition to rights, there are also 
duties.   
As part of his concept of rational institutional frameworks, Bookchin writes against the way in 
which the demand for consensus in democratic decision-making can represent the manipulation of a 
well-organised few who could thereby block decision making by a majority of a community.  Such a 
process also blocks the efforts of dissenters from the majority decision to advocate reasoned and 
potentially persuasive disagreements openly and persistently later.  He comments that such a demand 
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for consensus in a larger confederation could ‘mutate into a Rousseauean ‘general will’ with a 
nightmare world of intellectual and psychic conformity’.8 
Bookchin thus feels what I consider a justifiable ethical imperative to distinguish his position 
not only from that of deep ecology but also from certain strains of anarchism that he encounters.  In 
speaking of the ‘unbridgeable chasm’ between ‘lifestyle’ and ‘social’ anarchism, however, I believe 
Bookchin burns bridges unnecessarily.  Concerned with defining the distinctiveness of his position, his 
articulation of social ecology becomes increasingly isolated, failing to engage dialogically not only 
with activists and thinkers who might have been more receptive to social anarchism, but also with 
increasing concern with a ‘decolonizing’ praxis that began to emerge in the US in the 1980s.9 
 
From Theory to Activism 
My inquiry is aimed at an academic audience, one acquainted with Marxism and the 
revolutionary tradition, as well as those familiar with Continental philosophy, deconstruction, and the 
New Materialism.  However, it is not aimed solely at such a readership.  As a self-taught ‘organic’ 
philosopher and a life-long activist, Bookchin himself exemplifies the importance of theory for 
activists. The importance of philosophical discussion, dialogue, and debate well beyond the confines of 
academia is increasingly shared by many academics as well10.  
The relation between theory and practice is a complex issue, which I simply acknowledge here, 
without having the space to pursue it further, other than to cite Bookchin’s comment during one of his 
ISE classes years ago on the distinction among a militant, a radical, and a revolutionary: a militant will 
become intensely active for a few years, driven by the immediate urgency of an issue; a radical will 
continue for five or ten years on the basis of strategic analyses of longer term prospects; and a 
revolutionary will continue resiliently for life on the basis of a comprehensive philosophical, historical, 
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social, cultural, and political inquiry into the nature of the society that must be transformed.11 I now 
turn to an assessment of the current, past, and potential future role and impact of activists inspired by 
social ecology. 
 
A Personal Perspective 
Upon arriving at the Institute of Social Ecology (ISE) in 1988, I found much more diversity and 
openness in the ISE staff and generally in the community of students of social ecology than I might 
have anticipated, given the tenor of Bookchin’s more polemical writings.  Students of varying ages and 
ethnicities, mostly from the US but also from many parts of the world, attended such classes as 
bioregional agricultural, ecotechnology, community health, ecofeminism, and community development, 
all woven together by Murray Bookchin’s lectures on social ecology.  Students varied in their 
orientation to theory, but all shared a sense of excitement about the possibilities of ecological, social, 
and political reconstruction.  We would emerge from a lecture in which Bookchin lambasted New Age 
‘mysticism’ suffused with Buddhist and Taoist ‘homilies’, to a class taught by an avowed Buddhist.   
The ISE did impart a coherent understanding of social ecology, but not in a doctrinaire fashion.  
I recall a conversation with Bookchin and one other student in which Murray said something to the 
effect of, ‘I don’t care if you want to practice Buddhism, shamanism, or with a Wiccan coven; I just 
want to insist on the right of rational thought to critique any belief, and I want any such belief to 
encourage activism not quietism’.12 
I returned to the ISE in subsequent years, and from 1991 for over a decade, my wife, the noted 
eco-artist Beverly Naidus, and I co-taught a course there entitled ‘Activist Art in Community’.  In 2002 
Beverly co-taught the course with the well-known activist David Solnet.  A cohort of social ecology 
students left our course and other courses in the ISE Summer Program in the summer of 1999 and 
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traveled to Seattle in Washington State in the US, to engage in international networking with groups of 
farmers, labour groups, environmentalists, anarchists, and other radical activists in the lead-up to the 
meeting of the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference at the Washington State Convention 
and Trade Center on 30 November, 1999.  The ISE students participated in Spokescouncil meetings and 
formed the majority of the group that successfully pushed for the strategy of shutting the WTO meeting 
down entirely, thus setting the match to long-accumulating fuel that ignited what became known as the 
Alter-globalisation movement. 
 
Contributions of Social Ecologists to Movements 
Brian Tokar, current director of the ISE, has summarised Bookchin’s and his students’ 
contributions to social movements from the 1960s on: the efforts described in the previous chapter of 
ISE co-founder Dan Chodorkoff and other social ecologists, together with the largely Puerto Rican 
residents of the Lower East Side in New York City in the late 1970s, to pioneer the urban use of ‘green 
energy’ and animate and activate their community against the forces of displacement and gentrification.   
Chodorkoff has continued to write on the crucial importance of new, anti-capitalist and non-
economistic models of what constitutes “community development”, in contexts ranging from local to 
international. These contributions include the prominent role of social ecologists in the anti-nuclear 
movement of the late 1970s, especially the Clamshell Alliance in Vermont, which included an emphasis 
on bottom-up organising principles.14 Bookchin introduced the concept of ‘affinity groups’, borrowed 
from his close study of the ‘grupos de afinidad’ of Spanish anarcho-syndicalism in the 1930s.  Social 
ecologists played the major role in the formation of the Left Green Network and the Youth Greens as 
the Green Movement emerged in the US during the 1990s. These more radical tendencies, as well as 
the larger Green movement in the US, lost momentum and direction as Green moderates formed a 
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separate national organisation based exclusively on state-certified Green parties. In addition, I argue 
that a presidential campaign by Ralph Nader, a left ‘celebrity’ with no substantive connection to 
grassroots elements of the movement, further marginalised the US Greens.15 
Social ecologists Ynestra King16 and Chaia Heller17played a key role in moving the 
development and elaboration of ecofeminist ideas in a radical political direction rather than towards the 
predominantly cultural and spiritual forms in which ecofeminism evolved in the 1990s.  Peter 
Staudenmaier, a long-time social ecologist, has emerged as one of the most articulate and scholarly 
voices on social ecology in relation to fascist and neo-fascist ecology movements, environmental 
history, and persistent attempts to recycle or devise new permutations of biological arguments in 
relation to racial categories.18 Eric Toensmeier has become a widely acknowledged and respected 
practitioner and writer on permaculture and regenerative agriculture.19 Cindy Milstein has become a 
widely read and admired author on various aspects of contemporary anarchism.20 New Compass Press 
in Norway has published important writings on social ecology.21 Brian Tokar has written extensively on 
social ecology and climate justice.22 Thus I acknowledge some of those who have contributed to social 
ecology, but I must add an apology and disclaimer for those I have inevitably left out.  I have attempted 
to convey the range and flavour of ongoing social ecology writing and activism. 
After the WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, the ISE booklet ‘Bringing Democracy Home’ 
highlighted the writings of social ecologists on potential future directions of the movement.  In the 
present century, social ecologists have participated in almost every major social and political 
movement, from Occupy in the US, to the ZAD in France, to the emergence of a climate justice 
movement globally, to left libertarian elements of the Gilets Jaunes movement in France, and to the 
Extinction Rebellion. 
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Less prominent both in Bookchin’s writings and in those of his students, as well as in social 
ecology activism, has been a sustained engagement with anti-racist and anti-colonial struggles.  I argue 
that this lacuna is a serious one, especially given its potential importance within the context of a 
nascent politics  going under the general name of municipalism, which begins to emerge in pluralised 
cultural conditions, but not always with explicit acknowledgment or direct connection with Bookchin’s 
social ecology, in contrast to such acknowledgment in the case of Rojava.  This broader municipalist 
series of movements and formations continues to emerge rather fitfully on the margins, even in the face 
of the seeming exhaustion of neo-liberal globalisation and the turn to right-wing authoritarian 
governments in the US, UK, Europe, and Latin America.  
 
An Emerging ‘Municipalist’ Movement? 
In a recent and influential essay published in ROAR magazine, Yale University PhD student 
Alexander Kolokotronis explores the potential of municipalist politics as an ant-fascist strategy in the 
Trump era in the US.23 He notes that Trump’s program includes blocking federal funding to sanctuary 
cities, which serve as safe havens for undocumented immigrants through limiting the enforcement of 
anti-immigrant federal laws by non-cooperation, as well as through proactive policies such as 
municipal ID programs.  The mayors of Seattle, San Francisco, New York City, Los Angeles, and 
Philadelphia have pledged that their cities will remain sanctuaries, even as Trump denies federal 
funding.  Such cities will be forced to think creatively about how they can resist Trump’s policies 
individually and together as a confederation of municipalities.  Kolokotronis notes that city 
governments in San Francisco, New York City, Boston, and Chicago are funnelling resources into 
worker-cooperative development, as well as devolving fiscal capacity to the community through 
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participatory budgeting, which aids undocumented immigrants in the policy realm and in their day-to-
day economic well-being. 
These initiatives, however, could be pushed much further through anti-fascist coalitions.  The 
normalisation of the word ‘socialism’ through the Bernie Sanders campaign in the US could help 
promote a libertarian socialism that seeks to create post-state and post-capitalist institutions.  
Kolokotronis highlights and briefly summarizes Bookchin’s libertarian municipalism, as part of a 
broader anti-fascist strategy.24 
Kolokotronis is not arguing that a libertarian socialist revolution similar to what is taking place 
in Rojava is immanent.  However, he is arguing for the opportunity to create anti-fascist coalitions in 
collaboration with a number of groups and movements that are also looking to municipalities, 
movements that could stitch together policies and structures to enhance the conditions for the possible 
success of more maximal programs.  He cites the Movements for Black Lives platform, which calls for 
participatory budgeting at all levels as well as for a cooperative economy.  He further cites the 
victorious mayoral campaign of the late Chokwe Lumumba in Jackson, Mississippi, supported by the 
Malcolm X Grassroots Movement, a campaign explicitly based on Black self-determination and 
libertarian socialism.  The Jackson Plan promoted by the mayor includes assemblies ‘organised as 
expressions of participatory direct democracy’.25     
Kolokotronis observes the increasing number of developments organised around inter-
municipalism and transnational municipalism. These include the Right to the City Alliance (RTTC), 
which has created a progressive platform around such wide-ranging issues as the commons; economic, 
indigenous and environmental justice; police harassment; and migrant rights.  Other programs include 
Sister Cities International, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), the Creative Cities Network, 
International Cities of Refuge Network (ICORN), and other efforts.  Counter-power at the local level is 
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also being implemented in a number of cities world wide, including Porto Alegre in Brazil, Torres in 
Venezuela, Madrid, Barcelona, and a number of other cities in Spain.   
Eleanor Finley, a social ecologist who has focused on emerging municipalist developments, 
recently authored an article entitled ‘The New Municipal Movements’.26  She notes the general context 
of organising in the US in the time of Trump discussed by Kolokotronis:  under the banner of sanctuary 
cities, community-based organisations, faith groups, legal advocates, workers centres and engaged 
citizens have organised crisis networks on a neighbourhood-to-neighbourhood basis to support 
immigrant families living under the threat of deportation.  She notes that mayors and city officials have 
emerged as one of Trump’s most vocal opponents: In June, 2018 nearly three hundred mayors, 
including nine of the ten largest cities in America, recommitted to the Paris Climate Accord in defiance 
of his wishes.   
Beyond this, Finley writes that a ‘small constellation of civic platforms’ have emerged that seek 
to transform how municipalities are actually run, aiming to return decision-making power into the 
hands of citizens in a conscious trajectory towards social freedom and a counter-power of confederated 
councils at ever larger levels that might eventually challenge state power towards a stateless democracy.  
Reporting on meetings with participants in projects such as Cooperation Jackson, the Seattle 
Neighborhood Action Councils (NAC), the Portland Assembly, the Olympia Assembly, and Genese 
Grill’s District City Counselor campaign in Burlington, Finley comments, ‘what I found most striking 
was their ability to articulate utopian ideas with common-sense policies aimed at actually improving 
people’s lives.  Their political aspirations are serious and grounded in the belief that popular power 
really can offer superior solutions to difficult social issues’.  Finley notes, 
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The municipalist movement in the US today is like a seedling. It is small and delicate, fresh and 
brimming with potential. Although we often look for leftist leadership in big cities like New 
York City or Chicago, these new municipal leaders are rooted in relatively smaller cities 
including Jackson, Mississippi and Olympia, Washington. Perhaps this shouldn’t surprise us. As 
big cities are emptied of their original inhabitants and character, small and moderate-sized cities 
are offering relatively more opportunities for communal interaction and organization.25 The 
social ecology vision is that these seedlings will continue to grow and confederate until they are 
able collectively to constitute an effective dual power to the capitalism and the state.27  
 
Centring Racism, Colonialism, and Gender Oppression 
Among the serious social issues long endemic in the US but whose visibility has heightened in 
opposition to and out of the extreme emergency conditions created by the Trump presidency are racism 
and gender-based oppression.  One of my motivations for exploring Continental philosophy was the 
way in which Derrida and deconstruction have decentred the Western tradition and the Western subject 
in ways that many feminist and anti-racist theorists and activists have found useful.  In the current 
historical and political moment in the US, it is crucial for social and political movements that have 
developed among predominantly white activists—including social ecology—to push their internal and 
external education on anti-oppression a step further.  People of color activists, most often those who 
identify as female or as gender queer, have developed effective programs and approaches that help 
individuals and organisations confront sometimes-subtle forms of unrecognised racist and patriarchal 
patterns of behaviour.  
If Derrida’s deconstruction has carved gaps and traces in the Western tradition of thought, 
Malabou’s new materialism supplies a body or form and materiality to those traces.  I argue that such 
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efforts provide an intellectual milieu that has had and will continue to have indirect influence on 
movement activists as these are ‘translated’ into grassroots anti-racist and queer/feminist struggles, 
whether or not activists are reading Derrida and Malabou.  As concepts are questioned close to their 
limits, it becomes possible for these concepts to be transformed by encounters with other thought.  This 
does not mean that social ecology, a revolutionary counter-tradition to the conventional canon, need 
weaken its basic structure, as some social ecologists may fear, fostering a defensive posture. Rather, as 
Malabou insists ‘identity, in order to endure, ought paradoxically to alter itself or accidentalize itself’.28 
 Though the seedling is growing, many questions remain.  How can a libertarian municipalist 
movement adequately address transforming economic systems, beyond participatory budgeting?  This 
objective involves addressing the radical democratisation of corporate structures, as well as a 
developing a broader post-capitalist economics.  The work of Nathan Cedric Tankus, cited by 
Kolokotronis, in theorising a post-state monetary system consistent with confederalism, is worth a 
closer look.  How can municipalist efforts overcome the parochialism and other limitations of localism?  
Here websites devoted to linking diverse efforts may play a constructive role.  How can municipalist 
struggles avoid devolving into a mere counter-institutional methodology, ignoring the vital role of 
social movements in inculcating ethical sensibilities and solidarity across communities currently 
divided from each other?  How far do community development processes need to proceed before they 
implement the more electoral aspects of municipalism?  How essential are explicit movement links to 
municipalist projects?  How important in the process are political organisations dedicated to libertarian 
municipalism?  Here, there is hope in the non-hierarchical and generally non-dogmatic qualities of 
activists who have already learned from previous movement experience how to be effective.  How can 
libertarian municipalists work to meet people’s needs without succumbing to cooptation and reformism?  
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Here, social ecology with its vibrant core of inspired social and political reconstructive vision, can play 
an important role in maintaining a resilient and creative revolutionary intention. 
A major contribution in alignment with many of the themes discussed in this study is the recent 
book, Pan-African Social Ecology by lifelong revolutionary organiser Modibo Kadalie.29 Kadalie 
acknowledges a debt to Bookchin’s thesis that every ecological crisis is fundamentally a social crisis, 
and that current ecological threats expose the inadequacies of the nation state and hierarchically 
organised societies and their ‘antiquated’ politics: 
 
The problem of human survival in the face of rapid and catastrophic climate change is beyond 
the understanding of these antiquated politics, which cannot grasp the scope of this catastrophe 
that by its very nature demands a new politics beyond the realm of exploitative global capitalist 
enterprise, zealously protected by the armed forces of completing empires.  . . . Now in the 
twenty-first century, we can confidently say that hierarchically-organized societies cannot solve 
or even adequately address ecological crises.  In fact, such societies—with their nation-states, 
empires, and capitalist markets—have shown themselves to be the cause of widespread 
ecological destruction.30  
 
Kadalie expresses what we may call a creolized perspective on social ecology, through his 
organising efforts in Black communities in Detroit, Michigan, USA, and through the early influence of 
C. L. R. James.31 The Pan-African social ecology he calls for is also a creolized social ecology 
perspective in the larger sense of creolization theory.  This perspective is evident as he acknowledges 
Bookchin’s influence on his views, yet criticises Bookchin’s portrayal of the American Revolution as a 
social revolution similar to those that occurred in Haiti or France.32  




A Vital Material Contribution 
All of these elements will be crucial if we are to meet the ecological imperative we face.  The 
concept of an ecological imperative, especially with regard to the threat of climate catastrophe, must 
not be regarded as merely rhetorical.  Currently, even the 0.8 C rise in global temperature is causing 
widespread devastation in terms of drought, severe storms, wildfires, and flooding, leading to increased 
hunger, water shortages, conflict, and the destruction of habitats and many important ecological 
communities, such as coral reefs.  We cannot assume that even the projected 2o C rise given our best 
emission-reduction scenarios will achieve a liveable world for the majority of the world’s people.  The 
4-6 o C rise expected from business as usual policies would almost certainly mean an uninhabitable 
planet for complex organisms. 
Despite the undeniable urgency of the threats posed by the reality of androgenic rapid climate 
disruption, the rhetoric of ‘crisis’ and of ‘emergency’ (employed even by Extinction Rebellion) is not 
the optimal framing, I argue.  Derrida exposes the way in which the language of crisis suggests the 
need to shore up tradition; ‘emergency’ can too easily suggest or be exploited as the need for short-term 
measures aimed at perceived symptoms, such as shutting down borders.  Instead, the measured, 
science-based but broad reconstructive vision of social ecology towards fundamental transformation at 
every level of culture, society, technics, as well as a politics that intertwines the global within the local, 
have much to offer. 
During a recent social ecology intensive program of courses, I attended a series of presentations 
by long-time social ecologist, friend and colleague Grace Gershuny.  Grace is co-author of The Soul of 
Soil and the recent autobiographical Organic Revolutionary: A Memoir of the Movement for Real Food, 
Planetary Healing, and Human Liberation.33 She has written extensively on soil, compost, and food-
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system issues.  As a staff member of the US Department of Agriculture’s National Organic Program in 
the 1990s, she helped develop the organic regulations now in use in the US. 
At her presentations, Grace introduced us to the work of Walter Jehne.  Jehne is an 
internationally recognised climate scientist and soil microbiologist.  He was one of the early 
researchers on glomalin, mycorrhizal fungi, and root ecology.  He has focused in recent years on 
studying how we can reverse global warming by working with and restoring hydrology cycles and the 
‘soil carbon sponge’.34 
Jehne argues that access to adequate water and food in the coming years depends on 
understanding, respecting, and regenerating natural processes governing the bio-systems that in turn 
govern our climate, health, social equity, and stability.  A crucial natural process is that of pedogenesis: 
the microbial bio-conversion of plant exudates and detritus into stable soil carbon. 
The basic idea is that reducing emissions, the main target of environmental efforts including by 
the Extinction Rebellion, is not enough to avert climate catastrophe.  Neither would the combined 
effect of all projected efforts at carbon sequestration be adequate.  Carbon dioxide has a half-life of 
hundreds of thousands of years in the atmosphere.  Alternatively, what could be sufficient is restoring 
the earth’s hydrology cycle by rebuilding the soil carbon sponge, which provides more immediate 
cooling, and which is key to the long-term cooling of the earth’s climate.  Beyond simply the increase 
in CO2 emissions, the soil carbon sponge and hydrology cycle have been disrupted by the destruction 
of the balance of carbon oxidative processes vs. drawdown rates through industrial agriculture.  To 
restore these natural cooling processes, we urgently need to regenerate the planet’s soil-carbon sponge. 
One obvious area in which to regenerate the soil carbon sponge, with all its associated benefits 
including production of healthy food, is to increase the total areas under organic food cultivation.  This 
has been Grace Gershuny’s aim for many years, but now pursued with added urgency.  She writes, 
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There is huge potential to create a better society in the seeds sown by the “good food” 
movement, whether you resonate with Murray Bookchin’s vision of a free society or with the 
Shambala vision of enlightened society or some combination of the two.35 
 
Rebuilding the soil-carbon sponge will need to be supplemented by and coordinated with other 
reconstructive science-based approaches focused on biological systems designed to avert climate 
catastrophe, such as massive tree-planting and rainforest regeneration projects, combined with 
committed struggles to halt the deforestation that now exceeds current reforestation efforts.  Such 
struggles go far beyond the defensive organising strategies described by Braun and Wainwright in the 
introductory chapter. In addition, regenerating marine bio-systems offers numerous benefits beyond 
increasing carbon dioxide drawdown potential.36 
These approaches must be accompanied by ever more dedicated efforts to curb greenhouse gas 
emissions, especially carbon dioxide, and transition thoroughly away from a fossil-fuel economy to the 
use of renewables adapted to local scales and conditions.  The social ecology reconstructive vision does 
not require an anti-technological return to the Palaeolithic, as imagined by some anarcho-primitivists.  
Smaller scale renewable energy technologies would, of course, be more compatible with the social 
ecology reconstructive political vision of confederated municipal assemblies, a vision championed by 
social ecologists since the 1970s that is more relevant than ever.  
Unfortunately, many of these approaches retain a central emphasis on market approaches. 
Social ecologists have advanced principled and important critiques regarding relying on market-based 
solutions to ecological problems; these are especially relevant to the question of implementing the 
regeneration of the soil carbon sponge.  Brian Tokar has extensively critiqued the ‘transparently false’ 
and demonstrably failed approach of market-based trading of carbon dioxide emissions.  Further, Grace 
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Gershuny writes, ‘market incentives alone cannot bring about the revolutionary social, political, and 
economic changes needed to avert certain worldwide catastrophe.  As I tell my students, you can’t 
dismantle capitalism with a marketing plan’.37 
 
The Promise of a Renewed Social Ecology 
Today, renewed interest in Murray Bookchin’s social ecology is occurring in the context of 
climate change denial and the global rise of neo-fascist movements, fuelled by racism, xenophobia, 
homophobia, transphobia, and multiple forms of gender oppression.  Dispersed progressive and radical 
anti-authoritarian movements have emerged, but mainstream neoliberal parties are able to play these 
forces off against each other to secure their hegemony.  Mainstream media and discursive space, apart 
from social media and other personalized and privatized sites, remains truncated, especially on the left 
end of the political spectrum.  But in this context it is useful to recall Walter Benjamin’s comment that 
‘behind every fascism, there is a failed revolution’.38 
I believe there is a crucial need for a concrete, incremental, plausible and comprehensively 
articulated alternative to capitalism, one that responds to the urgent ethical and ecological imperatives 
we face. Indeed, various forms either directly inspired by or analogous to Bookchin’s political project 
of a libertarian municipalism are already under way in various locales across the planet.  Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right argues that revolution must accord with the habituated cultural patterns of a people.  
The local aspect of the social ecology vision allows for this, while also providing a means of moving 
past the limitations of micropolitics and the issues of localism through confederation, a political form 
that can perhaps be augmented in our day by the skilful employment of virtual communication 
capacities. 
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Given the current historical and political moment, it may seem hopeless and utopian in the 
negative sense to imagine such revolutionary transformation.  The municipalist revolution will not 
happen in the crucial next ten years. Nevertheless, it is not impossible to conceive of an increasing 
dissemination in creative and effective ways (including socially engaged art practises) of the 
scientifically informed directions towards which we need to move. 
The threats we face could be overwhelming.  These threats include climate catastrophe and the 
attendant threats of species and habitat destruction, hunger, climate refugee crises, resource wars, the 
now-vivid threats of global viral pandemics, and fascist attempts to exercise authoritarian control over 
societies as they attempt to respond to the proliferating crises.  Certainly, because of negative 
synergistic effects, climate change is happening a lot faster than earlier predicted. However, I believe it 
is still possible to recover a liveable future for humanity and for other life. 
Arguing for a minimal human engagement in the natural world, and for a deeply sceptical 
attitude towards human agency, as many deep ecologists do, will not help us get there.  Further, neither 
will a ‘post-empirical’ constructionist scepticism regarding knowledge about nature apart from the 
humanly built world, nor a Messianic waiting for the event of the future beyond any anticipation, 
accomplish this vital objective.   
A majoritarian movement or confluence of movements toward fundamental social and political 
transformation could get us there, guided by the best scientific research, including more ‘science from 
below’ from groups who have contributed the least to climate change, but are already suffering the 
most.  Such a movement of movements can mobilise the collective agency and inculcate the values 
needed for such a fundamental transformation.  The libertarian municipalist revolution is not a 
methodology that can be applied in a volunteerist manner, but a fundamental philosophical, cultural, 
social, and political becoming.  Murray Bookchin always understood this. 
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The approach recommended by Tokar, Kadalie, Gershuny, and others differs from a ‘techno-fix’ 
that would likely increase the need for centralised and authoritarian control.  It reinforces instead the 
grassroots activism and network building that could lead to a radical living democracy, an anti- and 
ultimately post-capitalist political form that alone could create a truly ecological society. This social 
ecology approach recognises the linkage between global threats such as viral pandemics, and the 
corporate capitalist forces that destroy the carbon-storing capacities of rainforest and other essential 
habitats for biodiversity, increasingly forcing wildlife to invade human habitats, thus increasing the 
incidence of zoonotic diseases such as COVID-19.39 The link between this viral pandemic and the need 
for anti-capitalist alternative is emerging.40 In addition, critiques are being made of the capitalist growth 
society (in the context of COVID-19) that align with Bookchin’s social ecology in moving towards a 
more radically democratic and postcapitalist world.41 Some authors suggest as well that COVID-19 can 
be viewed as a ‘dress rehearsal’ for changes needed to successfully combat climate catastrophe.42  
The rapid and powerful emergence of a movement challenging longstanding institutionalized 
racism in the US is also mobilising many toward radical and visionary social and political change.43 In 
Seattle, Washington, USA, protestors have taken over a section of the Capitol Hill area, declaring an 
“autonomous zone”, holding direct-democratic public assemblies, and providing mutual aid to each 
other to support the movement.44  The question now, as with so many movement gains, is how to 
maintain and radicalise this autonomous zone.45 Some commentators are even seeing the possibility of 
moving what is known as the ‘Floyd Rebellion’ in the US toward revolutionary goals and strategies, 
along the lines of a confederal municipalism.46 
It is not impossible to imagine groups and movements such as social justice activists, Agro-
ecologists, (social-justice informed) permaculturalists, and food justice and other social justice activists 
coming together to realise important dimensions of a reconstructive vision, along with healthy food and 
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soil regeneration, nurturing the ‘seedlings’ of libertarian municipalism in the process.  I have argued in 
this study that a transformation of social ecology theory and practise is vital and important for 
optimising the conditions that would nurture this process among diverse communities.  Such a 
transformation of core concepts, in a direction inspired by the work of Malabou, would ventilate any 
closure that would impede or obscure what Jane Anna Gordon identifies as the creative creolizing 
aspect of this community and movement-building process.    
As people increasingly engage together post-pandemic in face-to-face democratic public arenas 
over substantive issues of a general interest, an interest defined by local effects of increasing climate 
disruption that affect everyone in a given place, it is not impossible to foresee a diminution in the 
polarisation exacerbated by Russian bots and the echo chamber of the blogosphere.  Perhaps a renewed 
form of public ethics and sense of ethical social and political agency will emerge as well, energised by 
collaborative struggles against police violence.  Perhaps we will see an increase in the capacity to move 
away from an atomised, helpless and dystopian social existence, towards a sense that maybe we can 
after all, recover a liveable future, in a material, biological and grounded sense.  
 
General Conclusion: Social Ecology in the Current Moment 
From the middle of the preceding century until his death in the early years of the current century, 
Murray Bookchin sought to bring ecology into revolutionary thought.  He saw the ‘grow or die’ 
imperative of capitalism as fundamentally incompatible with the resources of a finite earth, and with 
the well-being of human and non-human communities.  This ‘ecological imperative’ of limiting or 
overcoming capitalism conceived as an economic system was accompanied in his thought by the 
urgency of a long-enduring ethical imperative of opposing capitalism as a social system constructed on 
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and sustained by exploitation and expropriation, growing polarities of extreme wealth and poverty, 
racism and colonialism, and patriarchy. 
These imperatives have catalysed radical anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian movements over 
the past several decades, even as the political imaginary within mainstream political discourse remains 
severely constricted to a spectrum shifted significantly to the right.  Among the sources that crystallized 
anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian visions and movements going back to the 1970s in the US and 
certain left circles in Europe has been Bookchin’s social ecology.  In succeeding decades Bookchin and 
his writings became relatively obscure, but have reemerged as some of his core ideas have recently 
become integral to the program of the Rojava movement in parts of Turkey and Syria. 
Currently, renewed interest in social ecology is occurring in the context of the ‘nature sceptical’ 
perspectives of the social construction of nature.  Social constructionist perspectives take their bearing 
generally from Marxian or other socialist traditions, or from post-structuralist insights into the ‘situated’ 
nature of knowledge, sharpened by the way in which naturalising assumptions can perpetuate systems 
of domination and oppression.  Further, renewed interest in social ecology is occurring in the context of 
a so-called New Materialism, which calls for integrating some of the insights of post-structuralism with 
greater attention to a myriad of material dimensions.  This thesis is concerned with pointing the way to 
a social ecology more adequate in its philosophical formulations and in its activist focus within the 
demands of the current historical moment.   
What I have done most uniquely towards this goal is to bring together Bookchin’s thought with 
that of Catherine Malabou.  Malabou’s work offers theoretical resources to a social ecology reading of 
nature through her plastic reading of the Hegelian dialectic.  Her work on Kant and epigenesis offers 
resources for a thinking of nature and freedom that is broadly compatible with social ecology.  
Malabou’s study of neuroscience and its political implications presents a theoretical sophistication 
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concerning issues of the relation between a scientific and philosophical understanding of matter that 
goes beyond the ‘game of anti-reductionism’. Together with the recent scientific new paradigm 
research cited in chapter 4 of this thesis, Malabou’s arguments can be interpreted to support social 
ecology’s call for an ecological ethics that would inform a non-hierarchical radical democratic politics. 
Though Bookchin’s ‘directionality thesis’ cannot be supported in the sense that he proposes, that 
‘nature itself writes natural philosophy and ethics’, Malabou’s work shows that this assessment need 
not lead to ethical relativism that would fail to challenge the ongoing devastation of human and natural 
communities. Rather than a genetic and authoritative code self-evidently written, a metaphor drawn 
from  Malabou’s Before Tomorrow is more apt to describe the relation between nature and ethics, that 
of an interpretation of a written score of music, an ethical interpretation informed both by reflection on 
nature and by lived experience. Malabou’s metaphor is more compatible with an epigenetic rather than 
a genetic understanding of natural evolution.  Even recent scientific evidence alone is not sufficient to 
establish a self-evident overarching tendency or directionality within natural evolution, beyond the 
complex interplay of specific contingent evolutionary factors.  Demonstrating responsibility to both the 
ecological and ethical imperatives can be facilitated by a symbiotic relation to a deconstructive 
materialism that avoids the sclerosis of dogmatism and the illusion of total theoretical closure, 
remaining open to the capacity for a vital growth and transformation adequate to its aims.  
Bookchin’s social ecology calls for an ecologised dialectic, one compatible with increasing 
focus on the importance of epigenetics in evolution, as well as with Malabou’s articulation of an 
epigenetic model of rationality in Before Tomorrow.  Her reading of the Hegelian dialectic in The 
Future of Hegel offers theoretical resources for staging dialectics in a non-necessitarian and non-
identitarian form.  Malabou shows that Absolute Knowledge in Hegel’s system is not the final end 
point of a “bad infinity”, but rather is the stage at which the rigidity of determinate forms is recognised 
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and overcome, and the potential energy of previous actualisations are liberated—allowing for new 
thoughts and new constructions. 
However, the development of an ecological ethics based on a dialectical naturalism that is able 
to inform a new politics of direct democracy in social ecology has significant lacunae that become 
visible in a consideration of the particularity of struggles against patriarchy, racism, and colonialism.  
Such an ethics can be formulated in general, more Kantian universal and categorical principles such as 
non-hierarchy, compensatory social relations that move beyond legalistic notions of justice, the 
irreducible minimum, and usufruct.  Nevertheless, grounding and fully articulating a social ecology 
system of ecological ethics in a more dialectical and Hegelian approach, requires the consideration of 
perspectives generated by the lived experience of those engaging in such struggles. In this light, the 
need for close engagement with the particularities of struggles against racism and the criminal justice 
system in the US becomes increasingly obvious as new movements form around these long-standing 
travesties. 
The reconstructive vision of social ecology is furthered by a utopian principle of social hope, 
one that emphasises the importance of shared narratives of freedom toward a political general interest.  
In this context, the objectivity of an ethics can be maximised by a diversity of perspectives, a diversity 
that underlies an agonistic conception of directly democratic structures.  This diversity can be 
encouraged towards a multiple, dialogic capacity to open to the encounter and the emergent, beyond 
the preconceived program or dogmatic assertion.  The result, I argue, is best thought of in terms 
developed by Jana Anna Gordon and Lewis R. Gordon, as a creaolized social ecology, one in which 
identities and practises are transformed in unpredictable ways in the context of struggles towards a 
radical democracy. 
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In summary, social ecology articulates a comprehensive and compelling reconstructive vision, 
one that affirms our capacity to learn from history and define a revolutionary project for our time.  This 
revolutionary effort is guided by an ethics that attempts to provide a needed objective basis for an 
ethics sufficiently stable to guide a principled politics.  However, objectivity itself is increased by a 
diversity of perspectives, especially from those who have experienced forms of oppression.  A 
reflective dialectical ‘spirit of critique’ as illuminated by Andrew J. Douglas, attuned to the grounding 
of discourse and deconstruction theory in realist discourse and a new materialist orientation has the 
potential to bring Bookchin’s insights and emancipatory ethical vision to an enhanced level of 
sophistication and contemporary relevance.  A ‘Pan-African social ecology’ as put forward by Modibo 
Kadalie, has the potential to sharpen the critical focus of social ecology, and thereby to revitalise its 
activism to encompass more directly and effectively anti-racist and decolonising efforts, thus 
expanding its global impact.  The need to overcome divisions between revolutionaries and more 
reform-minded activists in the currently emergent movements against police violence highlights the 
need for a confluence of social ecology and what Bookchin termed ‘social anarchism’ with the 
liberation struggles of communities of color, as argued at numerous points in this thesis. This need 
suggests the further importance of the classical model of ‘minimal, middle, and long-term programs’, 
rearticulated for our time.  Revolutionaries seeking to animate a ‘socio-erotic’ politics of desire need to 
integrate efforts to meet the short-term needs of people, within a revolutionary project some have 
defined as ‘reform that doesn’t stop’. 
However, even if the social ecology vision is already sufficiently formed conceptually and 
practically to offer the framework for a much needed viable alternative to capitalist social domination 
and biodevastation, it must also maintain a deconstructive openness, possessing a multiple vision 
beyond even dual power capable of being transformed by other perspectives, other traditions of thought, 
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in order to expand both the depth and the breadth of this shared vision.  Ethically this is so for its own 
sake (a principle endorsed by both Kant and Hegel), and for the sake of effectively building the 
majoritarian movements for social change needed to accomplish this vision.  Murray Bookchin’s social 
ecology, now extended by Abdullah Öcalan, Modibo Kadalie, and many others among the more radical 
and revolutionary activists in the movements emerging from the police killing of George Floyd, argues 
eloquently that a non-hierarchical organisation of society and a politics of direct democracy is not only 
the age-old form taken by people in reaction to systems of domination and oppression and the 
emergence of capitalism and the state.  This non-hierarchical organisation toward a revitalisation of 
radical democracy, I argue, is also the only politics able to deal adequately with both accelerating 
ecological and the ethical imperatives of overcoming racism, colonialism, and all forms of domination 
and oppression.47 Rather than some far-out fringe sectarian radicalism, this is truly the politics of how 
we in the broadest possible sense—including many non-human species—may recover a future. 
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Notes to Chapter 8 
 
1. For Rojava support, especially in light of the ongoing Turkish invasion, see 
www.rojavasupportnetwork.org.  Debbie Bookchin, Murray’s daughter, has recently been touring the 
US giving talks on Rojava and the connection between Öcalan and Bookchin. 
 





4. See the three volume work by Ernst Bloch, trans. Neville Plaice, Stephen Plaice, and Paul Knight, 
The Principle of Hope.  Written 1938-47, published 1995 as paperback (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press). 
 
5. See Frances Bartkowski, Feminist Utopias (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1989). 
 






9. This decolonising activism built on earlier anticolonial or postcolonial writing.  Anticolonial writing 
and discourse is, of course, a subject of immense scholarship and critical-analytic study and debate, 
including the work of such influential theoreticians as Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, Homi K. Bhabha, R. Siva Kurkuma, Dipesh Chakrabarty, Derek Gregory, and 
Amar Acheralou.   Postcolonial studies have grown to encompass diverse subject areas such as 
politics, economics, culture, feminism, theology, and subjective experience.  In Post-Colonial 
Drama: Theory, Practice, and Politics (New York: Routledge, 1996), Helen Gilbert and Joanne 
Tompkins engage post-colonialism as not merely a chronological structure of post-independence, 
but as a contestation of colonial discourses, power structures, and social hierarchies.  It is this 
intersection and encounter not merely of discourse and power but also of material struggles of 
emerging social movements and non-hierarchical knowledge from below that most interests me in 
this study. 
 
10. The Jamaican-Jewish writer, activist, and scholar Lewis R. Gordon told the story at a conference of 
being invited to give a talk during another conference organised by a young institute in South 
Africa out to make a name for itself.  He was told apologetically when he arrived that the 
conference would have to be cancelled because there were insufficient attendees. He asked, ‘Can I 
have a few days?’  He went into the townships and returned with about 300 people, some with 
broken teeth, but all wanting to talk about the fundamental questions of life. ‘We should not 
marketise thought, but rather, thought must critique the market’, Gordon commented at another 
point.  Lewis R. Gordon, remarks at ‘Anomalies, Aberrations, and Open Futures: Practicing 
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Intellectual Resistance’, conference held in Maribor, Slovenia, 1-2 July, 2017, also attended by this 
author. 
 
11. Murray Bookchin, from transcribed notes of lecture on the theory of social ecology given at the 
Institute for Social Ecology, Plainfield, VT, July 1988. 
 
12. Personal conversation with Murray Bookchin at the Institute for Social Ecology, July, 1988. 
 
13. Brian Tokar, ‘On Bookchin’s Social Ecology and its Contributions To Social Movements’, 
Capitalism, Nature, Socialism (March 2008). 
 
14. The Clamshell Alliance, which continues anti-nuclear work to this day, was founded in 1976 to 
organise direct action against the construction of the Seabrook, New Hampshire nuclear reactors.  
See www.clamshellalliance.net.  
 
15. These comments are based on my perspective and my experience with local chapters of the US 
Greens in Long Beach and Los Angeles, CA from 1989 -1995. 
 
16. See Ynestra King and Gwyn Kirk, What is Ecofeminism? (Yellow Springs, OH: Ecofeminist 
Resources, Antioch College, 1999). 
 
17. See Chaia Heller, The Ecology of Everyday Life (previously cited), and Food, Farms, and 
Solidarity: French Farmers Challenge Industrial Agriculture and Genetically Modified Crops 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013). 
 
18. Staudenmaier is Associate Professor of History at Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI. 
 
19. See Eric Toensmeier, The Carbon Farming Solution: A Global Toolkit of Perennial Crops and 
Regenerative Agriculture Practices for Climate Change Mitigation, and Food Security (White 
River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2016). 
 
20. See Cindy Milstein, Anarchism and its Aspirations (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2010; Cindy Milstein 
and Eric Ruin Paths Toward Utopia: Graphic Explorations of Everyday Anarchism (Oakland, CA: 
PM Press, 2012); and Cindy Milstein, ed., Rebellious Mourning: The Collective Work of Grief 
(Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2017). 
 
21. In addition to publishing Andy Price’s Recovering Bookchin (cited numerous times in this study), 
New Compass Press published Brian Tokar, Toward Climate Justice: Perspectives on the Climate 
Crisis and Social Change (Porrsgrunn, Norway: New Compass Press, 2014).  New Compass 
recently published Adam Krause, The Revolution Will be Hilarious & Other Essays (Porrsgrunn, 
Norway: New Compass Press, 2018). 
 
22. See Brian Tokar and Tamra Gilbertson, Climate Justice and Community Renewal (New York: 
Routledge, 2019).   
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28. What Should We Do with Our Brain? 71. 
 
29. Modibo Kadalie, ed. Andrew Zonneveld, Pan-African Social Ecology: Speeches, Conversations, & 
Essays (Atlanta, GA: On Our Own Authority Publishing, 2019).   
 
30. Ibid., 116. We would hope to see in the future perhaps also a Pan-Asian Social Ecology, a Pan 
Latin-American Social Ecology, and more work on social ecology and Indigenous thought. 
 
31. Especially ‘Every Cook Can Govern’,  from C. L. R. James Correspondence 2, No. 12, (June 1956), 
transcribed by David Harvie, (2003), accessed 10 December, 2020, www.marxists.org.  
 
32. Pan-African Social Ecology, 127.  In his four-volume study completed near the end of his life 
entitled The Third Revolution, Bookchin identified an initial revolt that moves in increasingly 
radical directions, which is retrospectively identified as the first revolution.  In time, however, 
conflicts among revolutionaries are resolved by a military regime, which is supplanted in turn by a 
restoration of the old regime.  This restoration however is not wholly successful, because the social 
gains of the revolution cannot be removed, and become institutionalised in a kind of historical 
advance.  This is the ‘two stages’ theory of revolution subscribed to by Marx and later, by the 
Chicago School of urban sociology. But Bookchin added a third stage, highlighting the insurgent 
revolutionaries who sought to reclaim and expand highly democratic institutions that had been 
established during earlier phases of the revolutionary cycle, and whose power had been usurped by 
the parties and factions that professed to speak in their name.  Exemplified by the French sans-
culottes and the Russian workers and sailors who wanted to reinvigorate the ‘soviets’ or grassroots 
councils, these insurgent revolutionaries articulated a popular desire for a radical democracy.  
However, Bookchin deliberately excluded revolutionary movements in Africa or Latin America in 
favour of the ‘classical’ revolutions in America, France, and Russia.  Kabile significantly expands 
our historical vision of both contemporary and past revolutionary movements by discussing such 
movements as the movement of indigenous residents—especially women—of Cherán in the 
Mexican state of Michoacán for direct democracy and to preserve their collectively owned lands 
from illegal logging.  See Pan-African Social Ecology, 128-129. 
 
33. Grace Gershuny, Organic Revolutionary: A Memoir of the Movement for Real Food, Planetary 
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